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ABSTRACT 
 
Mark David Witte: Essays on the Relationship between Exchange Rates and Prices 
(Under the direction of Stanley W. Black) 
 
 
The border effect is created when violations of the law of one price are greater 
between cities in different countries than cities in the same country. In Chapter 1, I introduce 
a method that leads to more accurate estimates of the proportion of the border effect 
attributable to 'sticky' prices and a more volatile exchange rate.  Employing this method on 
price index data, I find that this proportion varies depending on the good; from 8% to 91% 
and averaging 53%.  For non-indexed annual commodity prices, the proportion is estimated 
as 11% to 58% depending on the good and averaging 36%. These results are predicated on 
first stage estimates that are statistically questionable. 
Exchange rate pass-through is defined as the percentage change in the relative prices 
between different countries for a given change in the exchange rate. In Chapter 2, I test 
different possible determinants for the pass-through rate including, uniquely, the exporting 
country's macroeconomic information using a new dataset of U.S. imports of 96,739 unit 
value observations from 57 countries of 253 goods. There is a significant, positive 
relationship between the country specific pass-through rate and the exporter's long term 
monetary volatility or the exporter's long term average inflation.  Short term price volatility 
in the exporting country significantly decreases the pass-through rate.  This is empirical 
evidence for the theoretically predicted effects of short term and long term inflation 
introduced by Taylor (2000).  
 iv 
Firms engaging in international trade must choose what currency in which to 
denominate their price and how often to change their price. In Chapter 3, I model the optimal 
currency of denomination for traded goods in the presence of an endogenous frequency of 
price adjustment: enabling a more detailed analysis than in previous theoretical studies 
regarding "herding" and exchange rate volatility. By "herding" a firm chooses a currency of 
denomination in order to maintain a stable unit of account with its competitors.  The dynamic 
model suggests that exporting firms will "herd" with the local currency, producer's currency 
or a vehicle currency.  Greater exchange rate volatility amplifies the representative firm's 
desire to "herd" relative to all other considerations.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
STICKY PRICES, A VOLATILE EXCHANGE RATE AND THE BORDER 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The border effect on relative prices is caused by greater Law of One Price (LOOP) 
failure across countries relative to LOOP failure within countries.  In this paper, I introduce a 
method that leads to more accurate estimates of the proportion of the border effect 
attributable to incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate.  Using monthly price index data 
from Engel and Rogers (1996), I estimate that the proportion of the border effect due to 
incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate varies depending on the good; from 8% to 91% 
and averaging 53% for all goods.  I also analyze non-indexed, annual commodity price data 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  In this dataset the proportion of the border effect 
attributable to incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate is estimated between 11% and 
58% depending on the good and averaging 36% for all goods.  This portion of the border 
effect is not necessarily suboptimal; it is the result of firms acting optimally by not changing 
their price and paying menu costs simply to reflect volatile exchange rate movements.  These 
results are predicated on first stage estimates that are statistically questionable. 
Engel and Rogers (2001) highlight four reasons for the failure of the Law of One 
Price. 
1. There are formal and informal barriers to trade such as tariffs, quotas, language 
barriers etc... 
2. The presence of a non-traded component makes up some proportion of the final 
price of any traded good. 
3. Consumers in different places may have different preferences. 
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4. Nominal prices tend to be sticky while the nominal exchange rate is more volatile. 
 
The fourth reason for LOOP failure is the focus of this paper.  As stated in “How 
Wide is the Border?” by Engel and Rogers (1996, 1114) this fourth reason is as follows: 
“…the price of a consumer good might be sticky in terms of the currency of the 
country in which the good is sold.  Goods sold in the United States might have sticky prices 
in U.S. dollar terms, and goods sold in Canada might have sticky prices in Canadian dollar 
terms.  The nominal exchange rate is, in fact, highly variable.  In this case, the cross border 
prices would fluctuate along with the exchange rate, but the within-country prices would be 
fairly stable.” 
 
Firms may choose to keep their prices ‘sticky’ to minimize menu costs or for strategic 
considerations.  As exchange rates are more volatile, it may not be in the best interests for 
firms to change their prices simply to reflect movements in the exchange rate.  Thus, the 
portion of the border effect due to ‘sticky’ prices does not imply suboptimal international 
integration; it is the result of firms acting optimally. 
This paper has three aims. One, I show a methodology where the proportion of the 
border effect directly attributable to the fourth reason for LOOP failure (the nominal 
price/nominal exchange rate relationship) can be estimated.  Other attempts to estimate this 
proportion include Engel and Rogers (1996) as well as Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005)   
These authors change the standard LHS variable and compare the new results with those 
using the standard LHS variable.  This is discussed in section 1.3.2. Cheung and Lai (2006) 
overestimate the proportion of the border effect caused by the fourth reason for LOOP failure 
as shown in the Appendix.  Only by fully understanding exchange rate pass-through can the 
border effect be understood.  Exchange rate pass-through is defined as the percentage change 
in relative prices given a change in the exchange rate.  The Law of One Price requires that 
exchange rate pass-through be perfect (equal to 1); however, this is rarely the case.  As 
 3 
shown in section 1.3.1, some proportion of the failure in the LOOP is simply caused by 
imperfect exchange rate pass-through. 
Two, for each of the 14 goods in the monthly or bi-monthly price index dataset from 
Engel and Rogers (1996), I calculate the percentage of the border effect due to the nominal 
price/nominal exchange rate relationship. Depending on the good, 8% to 91% of the 
measured border effect on price volatility is due to incomplete pass-through of a volatile 
exchange rate; the average proportion for all goods is 53%.  And for at least one good, there 
is evidence that the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship is responsible for the 
entirety of the border effect. 
Three, using annual commodity prices from the Economist Intelligence Unit, I 
calculate a smaller percentage of the border effect due to the nominal price/nominal 
exchange rate relationship than in the price index data; averaging only 36% for all goods. 
The proportion of the border effect caused by incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate 
varies from 11% to 58% among the goods studied with reason to suspect that the nominal 
price/nominal exchange rate relationship is responsible for the entirety of the border effect 
for at least one good. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 1.2 contains a review of 
previous empirical work and highlights the multicollinearity troubles inherent to particular 
regression techniques.  Section 1.3 of this paper will illustrate a methodology in which the 
relationship of the nominal prices and nominal exchange rate can be explored.  Also in 
section 1.3, I examine other attempts to control for the fourth reason for LOOP failure.  
Section 1.4 reports the results and section 1.5 concludes.   
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1.2 Empirical Background 
In this section, I will discuss the main method of estimating the border effect on the 
Law of One Price.  In a dataset of only two countries, it is difficult to account for the effect of 
the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship because all cross-border observations 
necessarily contain both the border and a volatile exchange rate.  
When the relative Law of One Price is tested, a baseline regression formulation is as 
follows (used in Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (2001)): 
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tip ,  represents the price of a particular good in city i at time t. Similarly, tjp ,  is the 
price of the same good in city j at time t.  te represents the exchange rate between the two 
countries in which city i and city j are located.  ijbord ,Ι  represents a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 when there is a border between cities i and j.  ijdist  is the distance from city i to city 
j. qΙ  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if either q = i or q = j1. 
One extension to the RHS formulation given in Eq. 1.1 is the addition of exchange 
rate volatility. 
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1
 It should be noted that some papers exclude the constant term and include every city’s dummy variable 
instead. 
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The inclusion of the explanatory variable, )( teDevStd , represents one component of 
the LHS variable.  Thus, it is not surprising that the coefficient exβ  is often significant. 
)( teDevStd is only included in an observation if the two cities are using different currencies; 
these cross border city pairs will also have ijbord ,Ι = 1.  As a result, a certain level of 
multicollinearity is introduced.  For a two-country model, if )( teDevStd  is the same for all 
cross border city pairs then perfect multicollinearity is present in the estimating equation2. 
In section 1.3, I offer a more appropriate RHS formulation for estimating the 
proportion of the border effect that is attributable to the nominal price/nominal exchange rate 
relationship.  The LHS variable from Eq. 1.1 may explicitly or implicitly include the 
volatility in the exchange rate; thus, any coefficient on the volatility of the exchange rate will 
likely be significant.  Section 1.3 will also include an analysis of other attempts to estimate 
the effect of the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship.    
 
1.3 Empirical Methods 
 Section 1.3 is separated into two parts.  In section 1.3.1, I illustrate the impact of the 
exchange rate on the border effect and develop a three stage method designed to estimate that 
impact. In section 1.3.2, I examine previous methods used to estimate the impact of the 
nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship on the border effect.  
1.3.1 The role of the exchange rate  
In order to understand how the volatility of the exchange rate influences the border 
effect it is necessary to review previous work on the relationship of prices and the exchange 
rate: namely, the rate of exchange rate pass-through.  Recall, there may be a border effect 
                                                 
2
 One suggestion is to use an instrumental variable for the exchange rate to reduce this multicollinearity. 
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simply because sticky prices don’t necessarily reflect changes in exchange rates.  So long as 
exchange rate pass-through is incomplete, the fourth reason for LOOP failure remains: sticky 
cross-border prices do not fully reflect the continual changes in the exchange rate.  Thus, it is 
necessary to understand the pass-through rate within the context of the LOOP. 
The following regression equation used to estimate the pass-through rateγ , 
generalized in Goldberg and Knetter (1997), is as follows: 
ttijttjti uZepp +++= ,,, )ln()ln()ln( ψγδ       (1.3) 
Where tijZ ,  represents additional, non-collinear control variables with a variance of 
ZΩ . One form of Eq. 1.3, in first differencing is as follows: 
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Eq. 1.4, or some version thereof, was used recently in Frankel, Parsley and Wei 
(2004) and Pollard and Coughlin (2004). For Eq. 1.4, the relative LOOP holds so long as δ  
= 1 and γ  = 1.  And when there is a perfect fit of δ  = 1 and γ  = 1 the LHS variable 
described in Eq. 1.1 is zero and the relative LOOP holds.  However, all that is needed for 
complete exchange rate pass-through isγ  = 1.   
In order to test the relative LOOP, I will retain the condition that δ  = 1, just as the 
LHS variable in Eq. 1.1 demands, but I will allow for the pass-through rate,γ , to be 
estimated.  Eq. 1.4 then becomes the following regression equation. 
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So long as ψ andγ are estimated consistently the LHS variable in Eq. 1.1 can be 
decomposed as follows: 
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The deviation from the relative LOOP has been separated into an exchange rate 
component and a non-exchange rate component.  Specifically, any movements in the nominal 
relative price that are not described by movements in the exchange rate are captured 
in tijZ , and tµ 3.  As shown in Eq. 1.6, 
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3
 Because there many reasons why prices may move, µΩ  should not be considered mere white noise. This is in 
many ways synonymous with residuals from GDP growth regressions.  The residuals for GDP growth 
regressions, sometimes taken as technology changes, also contain much useful information. 
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Now, I use Eq. 1.5 and 
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4
 This is a potential 126 x 14 = 1764 pass-through estimates for the data in Engel and Rogers (1996) and 12,371 
pass-through estimates for the annual commodity price data. 
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The dummy variable for the border is replaced with 
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variable in a simple linear manner.  Thus, if bpβ  = 1 then the entirety of the border effect is 
due to the fourth reason for LOOP failure: incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate.  
However, if 1>bpβ  then the proportion of the border effect that is due to the nominal 
price/nominal exchange rate relationship is
bpβ1 .  In the Appendix, I derive the relationship 
between the LHS variable in Eq. 1.7 and 
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Vγ  to show how bpβ  is formed.  
Recall that Eq. 1.2 exhibits perfect multicollinearity when only two countries are considered.  
The estimation procedure described in this paper can be used regardless of how many 
countries are included.  
In section 1.3.2, I examine other empirical methods used to measure the proportion of 
the border effect generated by the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship.  Section 
1.4 will include a review of the methodology introduced here in Section 1.3.1 and apply that 
method to the price index data from Engel and Rogers (1996) and the annual commodity 
price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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1.3.2 Other Empirical Methods  
As stated in the introduction, even if the nominal exchange rate is removed from the 
LHS variable, the LHS variable may still inadvertently imply the nominal exchange rate.  
Exchange rates may not be affected by movements in the prices of goods, especially 
disaggregated goods.  However, it is very likely that movements in prices of goods are 
affected to some degree by the exchange rate; any measure of price must then contain some 
degree of information regarding the exchange rate.   
Engel and Rogers (1996) use a LHS variable, with no exchange rate included, in an 
attempt to estimate a border effect that is independent of the fourth reason for LOOP failure.  
The authors compare the nominal price/nominal exchange rate “independent” estimate with 
the baseline estimates to see how much the nominal price/nominal exchange rate 
“independent” border effect declines relative to the total border effect.  Unfortunately, the 
LHS variable designed by Engel and Rogers to exclude the nominal exchange rate implicitly 
may still reflect the nominal exchange rate.  Engel and Rogers use the standard deviation of 
the forecast error Ut as shown in the regression equation below: 
t
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 Where tjP ,  represents the overall price index for all goods in city j at time t.  Thus, 
Engel and Rogers use the following LHS variable as “independent” of the nominal exchange 
rate.   
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Suppose Eq. 1.5 is applied to Eq. 1.9.  Then the nominal price/nominal exchange rate 
“independent” LHS variable can be shown to implicitly include the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate.  
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  (1.10) 
As long as the pass-through rate for the overall price index, Oγ , does not equal the 
pass-through rate of the particular good in question,γ , the volatility of the exchange rate is 
part of the LHS variable.  Engel and Rogers use Eq. 1.9 to find the border effect assuming 
that they’ve completely controlled for the volatility of the exchange rate.  Yet as shown in 
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Eq. 1.10, the authors may not control for the variance of the nominal exchange rate as long 
as γγ ≠O .   
In Table 1.1, for all 126 cross border city pairs and for each of the 14 goods studied in 
“How Wide is the Border?”, the percentage of cross border city pairs for which γγ ≠O  at the 
90% confidence interval is shown.  For Goods 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 a large 
proportion of the cross border city pairs state that γγ ≠O  at the 90% confidence interval.  
For these goods the estimation procedure outlined in section 1.3 is a statistical improvement 
over the method used by Engel and Rogers.  For Goods 2, 4, 6, 10 and 14 the improvement 
made by the procedure in section 1.3 over Engel and Rogers's method is less statistically 
conclusive.    
Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) attempt to create a LHS variable that eliminates the 
volatility of the exchange rate. They use the volatility of forecast errors, tω , from the 
regression in Eq. 1.11 which is taken for each city pair and each good (3371 in total). 
For cross border city pairs: 
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For same country city pairs: 
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Thus, Gorodnichenko and Tesar’s LHS variable is as follows: 
[ ]tDevStd ω           (1.12) 
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Eq. 1.11 is in many ways an extension of Eq. 1.4.  Recall that in order for the LOOP 
to be true both δ  = 1 and γ  = 1.  For Eq. 1.11a, mψ  is directly related toδ while mϕ is 
directly related toγ .  Because both mϕ  and mψ  are estimated, Eq. 1.11a allows the LOOP to 
fail on multiple dimensions.  The LOOP demands that δ  = 1 and γ  = 1; however, onlyγ  
relates to the fourth reason for LOOP failure.  The series of mϕ  alone controls for the effect 
of the nominal exchange rate.  However, because Eq. 1.11 does not enforce ∑
=
6
1m
mψ =1, 
Gorodnichenko and Tesar’s method controls for more than just the fourth reason for LOOP 
failure.  Consequently, it is unlikely that Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) can control for 
only the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. 
In both Engel and Rogers (1996) and Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) the authors 
control for the exchange rate by changing the LHS variable being tested.  They then compare 
the results to the original LHS variable given in Eq. 1.1. In contrast, section 1.3.1 notes that 
the effect of the volatility of the exchange rate on the border can be estimated and the 
proportion of the border effect directly attributable to the exchange rate can be found and 
tested for significance without changing the LHS variable.  In section 1.4, this paper will 
apply the methodology of section 1.3.1 to find the proportion of the border effect that is 
attributable to the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship. 
 
1.4 Results 
In this section, I will use the three stage method, outlined in section 1.3, to find the 
proportion of the border effect attributable to incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate.  
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First, I will study the price index data in Engel and Rogers (1996) and then I will analyze the 
commodity price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  
The first stage to finding the proportion of the border effect attributable to the fourth 
reason for LOOP failure is to find the pass-through rate for each of the 126 cross border city 
pairs and for each of the 14 goods (126 x 14 = 1,764 regressions in Engel and Rogers (1996) 
dataset).  To estimate the pass-through rate I use the following regression equation: 
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tI  is a yearly dummy meant to capture any dynamic movements in any of the other 
three reasons for LOOP failure.  Because the city pair has a constant distance, distance is 
captured by α  (as is any static parameter for the good and city pair).  Any dynamic effect is 
controlled with the yearly dummies.  The 1,764 pass-through estimates are reported in Table 
1.25.  The pass-through estimates,γ , are retained so long as the estimate is non-negative.  If 
γ  is estimated to be less than zero thenγ  is set to zero.  
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calculated for each city pair.  Figure 1.1 plots 
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5
 Implicit in the formulation of Eq. 1.6 is the assumption that the exchange rate is uncorrelated with the error 
term when estimating the pass-through rate.  In order to assess this, I use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.  For Eq. 
1.13, 6.6% of the 1,764 estimates fail the DWH test at a 95% confidence interval.  This is sufficiently close to 
the 5% failure rate so as to not be of great concern. Results are given in Table A.4.  
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As shown in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 there are a large number of pass-through 
coefficients that are insignificant or negative.  Theoretically, all pass-through coefficients 
should range between 0 and 1.  In this paper, whenγ  is estimated to be below 0, the term 

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

−
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t
t
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e
eVI γ  instead setsγ  to 0 because the estimate is not theoretically 
feasible.  This necessarily will increase any estimate of bpβ  and decrease the resulting 
estimate of the proportion of the border effect due to nominal price/nominal exchange rate 
relationship.  As such these first stage estimates are statistically questionable. 
 Why is it that so many pass-through estimates are not significant or below 0?   
First, because the pass-through rates are using city-level data, and not regional or 
country-level data, we should not necessarily expect to see the prices in smaller geographical 
areas to be as susceptible to the influence of macroeconomic characteristics inherent in the 
exchange rate.   
Second, the LOOP statistic of the LHS variable of Eq. 1.14 demands immediate pass-
through of the monthly or bi-monthly exchange rate change to the prices in cities.  As shown 
in Campa and Goldberg (2002) as well as Coughlin and Pollard (2004), pass-through 
estimates tend to be larger for long-run (annual) changes in the exchange rate than for short-
run (quarterly) changes in the exchange rate.  For example, in the United States, Campa and 
Goldberg (2002) estimate a long-run pass-through rate of .41 and a short-run pass-through 
rate of .26.  It is likely then that immediate pass-through estimates are even lower or may 
tend to zero as city level price setters may not change prices on a monthly or bi-monthly 
basis to reflect the exchange rate change.   
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Third, there may be a non-linear relationship between the city-level prices and the 
change in the exchange rate.  In fact, when 
2
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squared exchange rate term is significant at the 95% confidence interval in over 8% of the 
1,764 cross border city pairs.  This is all the more remarkable when considering that only 
48% of the pass-through estimates in Eq. 1.13 are significant. 
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For the third stage I apply the regression stated in Eq. 1.7, which is reproduced below: 
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Again, the proportion of the border effect directly attributable to the fourth reason for 
LOOP failure, the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship, is equal to
bpβ1 .      
The results are given in Table 1.3.  The calculated proportion of the border effect 
attributable to the fourth reason for LOOP failure varies widely from good to good.  Three 
goods, Fuel and other Utilities (Good 5), Women’s and Girl’s Apparel (8) and Public 
Transportation (11), have a comparatively small proportion of their border effect that is 
accountable to the fourth reason for LOOP failure.  Thus, the proportion of the border effect 
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that is due to the first three reasons for LOOP failure (barriers to trade, the non-traded 
component in the final price and different preferences) is relatively large for these goods6.  
The average proportion (among the 14 goods) of the border effect attributable to the 
fourth reason for LOOP failure is approximately 53%.  While one good, Footwear (9), 
appears to have the entirety of its border effect motivated by the nominal price/nominal 
exchange rate relationship.  That is, for Good 9, bpβ  is not significantly different from 1.  
Thus, it appears that 
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Another way to understand the methodology in this paper is to subtract 





−1
ln
t
t
e
e
 from 
both side of Eq. 1.5.  This leaves us with the following equation. 
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Then by taking the variance of Eq. 1.5 and we get an equation that’s very similar to 
the regression equations in Eq. 1.7 and Eq. 1.14. 
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This necessarily means that the first stage regression exemplified by Eq. 1.5 is a 
regression on levels of LOOP failure while the final stage regression, exemplified by Eq. 1.7, 
                                                 
6
 In an alternative formulation, I add a lagged relative price variable to the RHS of Eq. 1.13 as a first stage 
regression.  The final results are very similar to the results in Table 1.3.  The estimated proportion of the border 
effect for goods 1-14 are, respectively, 64%, 66%, 51%, 73%, 21%, 77%, 31%, 11%, 85%, 46%, 8%, 50%, 
67% and 76%.  For this estimation procedure, the DWH test fails in 4.5% of estimates at the 95% confidence 
interval. Results for the DWH test are given in Table A.4. 
 
7
 Further estimation is contained in the appendix that controls for the country heterogeneity problem highlighted 
by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) and Cheung and Lai (2006). 
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is a regression on the volatility of LOOP failure.  Again, we see that the degree of LOOP 
failure caused by the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship is built into the final 
stage regression.  Because the two equations are so similar, we can use a strategy, employed 
by Cheung and Lai (2006), which directly calculates the portion of the border effect caused 
by the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship without regression analysis.  Instead 
of using Eq. 1.5 to find the pass-through rateγ  and placing the estimated pass-through rate 
into 
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eVγ  we will calculate the additional volatility of the nominal 
price/nominal exchange rate relationship as follows8.  
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 Then we can place VPEx into the following regression equation. 
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 The results for Eq. 1.18 are given in Table 1.4.  Note that the estimated proportion of 
the border effect is greater than that given by the results using Eq. 1.14.  This is because of 
the possibility that 
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 is less than zero.  For Eq. 1.14 all 
pass-through rates that are estimates to be below 0 are set to 0 because negative pass-through 
                                                 
8
 This relationship is derived in Appendix A. 
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estimates are considered theoretically impossible.  For Eq. 1.18, 
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of its value.  
Another alternative regression framework to that given in Eq. 1.14 is to place the 
coefficient measuring the volatility of the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship, 
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shown in the following regression equation. 
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Results from testing Eq. 1.19 are given in Table 1.5. Also in Table 1.5 are the 
regression results using the methodology of Engel and Rogers (1996) as shown in the 
equation below. 
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The proportion of the border effect due to incomplete pass-through is calculated in 
Table 1.5 as bordβ  of Eq. 1.19 divided by bordβ  of Eq. 1.20; the results are similar to the 
estimates in Eq. 1.14.  
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As shown in Eq. 1.16, ( )tijZV ,2ψ  is part of the variance of the LHS variable that is 
used to test for LOOP failure.  Table 1.6 has results for the following equation which 
includes ( )tijZV ,2ψ  as part of the LHS variable. 
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 Also in Table 1.6 are the results for the regression equation below where there is no 
control for the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship. 
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 (1.22) 
The proportion of the border effect due to incomplete pass-through is calculated in 
Table 1.6 as bordβ  of Eq. 1.21 divided by bordβ  of Eq. 1.22. 
One worry with data of this nature is the possibility of unreliable tests of significance 
due to heteroskedasticity.  The data used in Eq. 1.14, Eq. 1.18 and Eq. 1.19 can be 
heteroskedastic because of the multi-city nature of the observations and/or because the time 
series for some observations is either monthly or bi-monthly.  To combat this, I use 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors just as is done in Engel and Rogers (1996).    
 There are two ways to calculate 
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eVI γ .  The first method uses 
regression analysis via Eq. 1.5 while the second method simply uses VPEx.  Figure 1.2 plots 
the 1,764 potential pass-through estimates from Eq. 1.13 (126 cross border city pairs x 14 
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goods), separated into significant and insignificant coefficients.  Table 1.7 contains summary 
statistics for both significant and insignificant coefficients.   
 As shown in Figure 1.2 many of the estimated pass-through rates hover around 0 or 
are negative.  This result suggests that price setters in individual cities react slowly to any 
change in the exchange rate between countries or that they ignore the change in the exchange 
rate altogether.  Surmised from Taylor (2000), if the city-level price makers see changes in 
the exchange rate as temporary then there would be little reason to expect prices to change 
much.  If the Canadian/U.S. exchange rate is considered as fairly stable, with little 
persistence in movements, compared to other currency pairs then the resulting low city-level 
pass-through estimates are not necessarily surprising. 
 Of the regressions that create the pass-through rate, 83.4% have a homoskedastic, 
normal distribution at a 5% confidence interval.  Because this is well below the expected 
95% proportion the significance of the pass-through estimates is less reliable.  However, the 
significance of the pass-through estimates does not impact the method in which they 
contribute to Eq. 1.14 or Eq. 1.18.   
Now I will analyze the annual commodity prices as provided by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.  The goods are listed in Table 1.8.  The prices are collected annually from 
1990-2004 in 223 narrowly defined goods.  The data is collected in the following cities; 
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New 
York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington D.C., Calgary, Montreal, Toronto and 
Vancouver9.  Because the time series contains only 15 observations I group the individual 
commodities into 7 broader categories: Food, Alcohol, Household Supplies, Recreation, 
Personal Care, Tobacco and Clothing. 
                                                 
9
 Data from Honolulu is collected only from 1992-2004. 
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First, I calculate the pass-through rate according to the following regression equation 
undertaken once for each of the 223 goods and each of the 56 cross border city pairs (of the 
223 x 56 = 12,488 potential regressions only 12,371 of the instances have sufficient data)10. 
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The 12,371 estimated pass-through rates are placed into 
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If the estimated pass-through rate is negative thenγ  is set to zero.  For the second stage, I 
calculate 














−








−







−−− 11,
,
1,
, lnlnln
t
t
tj
tj
ti
ti
e
e
p
p
p
p
V  for each of the 33,751 observations (223 
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(1.24) 
Unlike Eq. 1.14, Eq. 1.24 includes both city dummy variables and good dummy 
variables.  Results from Eq. 1.24 are reported in Table 1.9.  The average proportion of the 
border effect attributable to incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate is 36%; while 
individual goods have estimates ranging from 11% to 58%.  However, Personal Care’s bpβ  is 
                                                 
10
 The program used to estimate the 12,371 pass-through rates is available at www.unc.edu/~witte. 
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not significantly different from 1; intimating the possibility that the entirety of Personal 
Care’s border effect is caused by incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate. 
On the whole, the proportion of the border effect attributable to incomplete pass-
through of the exchange rate is comparably smaller in the annual commodity priced dataset 
as opposed to the monthly, or bimonthly, price index data from Engel and Rogers (1996).  
This is not unexpected as the commodity price data is less processed than the comparable 
price index data.   
 
1.5 Conclusion 
The border effect on relative prices is caused by greater Law of One Price (LOOP) 
failure across countries relative to LOOP failure within countries.  A proportion of the border 
effect is caused by incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate.  I introduce a method 
that can lead to more accurate estimates of that proportion.  With price index data from Engel 
and Rogers (1996), I estimate that the proportion of the border effect due to incomplete pass-
through of the exchange rate varies from 8% to 91% depending on the good and averaging 
53% for all goods.  For non-indexed, annual commodity prices, the proportion is estimated as 
11% to 58% depending on the good and averaging 36% for all goods.  These results are 
predicated on first stage estimates that are statistically questionable. 
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Table 1.1 Inability of E&R (1996) to estimate the effect of the exchange rate  
  
    
Proportion of cross-border 
  
  
Good pass-through estimates for which   
  
    
0γγ ≠ at 90% confidence level 
  
  
Good 1 
  
  
  US: Food at Home 42.9%   
  Can: Food Purchased from stores     
  
Good 2 
    
  US: Food away from home 21.4%   
  Can: Food purchased-restaurants     
  
Good 3 
    
  US: Alcoholic Beverages 59.5%   
  Can: Alcoholic Beverages     
  
Good 4 
    
  US: Shelter 31.0%   
  Can: Shelter - .2135(Good 5)     
  
Good 5 
    
  US: Fuel and other utilities 70.6%   
  Can: Water, fuel and electricity     
  
Good 6 
    
  US: Household Furn. and Operations 20.6%   
  Can: Housing excluding Shelter     
  
Good 7 
    
  US: Men's and Boy's Apparel 79.4%   
  Can: .8058(Men's)+.1942(Boy's)     
  
Good 8 
    
  US: Women's and Girl's Apparel 77.8%   
  Can: .8355(Women's)+.1645(Girl's)     
  
Good 9 
    
  US: Footwear 77.0%   
  Can: Footwear     
  
Good 10 
    
  US: Private Transportation 20.6%   
  Can: Private Transportation     
  
Good 11 
    
  US: Public Transportation 57.9%   
  Can: Public Transportation     
  
Good 12 
    
  US: Medical Care 46.8%   
  Can: Medical Care     
  
Good 13 
    
  US: Personal Care 42.1%   
  Can: Personal Care     
  
Good 14 
    
  US: Entertainment 19.0%   
  Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(reading material) 
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Table 1.2a City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
US City Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. Balt. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .145 .181 .082 -.238 .015 .009 .000 -.098 .069 
std err .129 .138 .105 .109 .109 .113 .094 .099 .112 
Good 2 
         
Pass-through rate -.154 -.026 -.140 -.006 -.019 -.155 .021 -.233 -.083 
std err .113 .106 .092 .121 .104 .134 .118 .107 .108 
Good 3 
         
Pass-through rate .209 .097 -.168 -.149 -.224 -.112 -.149 -.158 -.120 
std err .163 .160 .143 .140 .151 .120 .135 .140 .152 
Good 4 
         
Pass-through rate .062 .022 .048 .084 -.013 .056 .124 .119 .051 
std err .135 .127 .126 .133 .127 .138 .142 .137 .132 
Good 5 
         
Pass-through rate .601 .451 .228 .207 .256 .247 .290 .129 .230 
std err .509 .481 .396 .399 .404 .399 .415 .435 .403 
Good 6 
         
Pass-through rate -.073 -.168 -.192 -.207 -.177 -.214 -.177 -.128 -.195 
std err .137 .137 .135 .135 .123 .144 .120 .137 .128 
Good 7 
         
Pass-through rate .103 .199 .262 .183 .185 .114 .167 .301 .139 
std err .365 .379 .377 .384 .386 .393 .391 .352 .387 
Good 8 
         
Pass-through rate -1.027 -.932 -.769 -.739 -1.048 -.894 -.706 -.791 -.985 
std err .892 .915 .879 .892 .872 .909 .897 .861 .899 
Good 9 
         
Pass-through rate -.086 -.025 .139 -.066 .129 -.003 -.148 -.162 -.086 
std err .464 .462 .467 .462 .458 .468 .433 .468 .454 
Good 10 
         
Pass-through rate .092 .086 -.098 .038 -.028 .170 .056 -.135 -.041 
std err .143 .140 .139 .165 .142 .184 .196 .137 .183 
Good 11 
         
Pass-through rate -.409 -.336 -.232 -.372 -.215 -.449 -.301 -.462 -.343 
std err .576 .538 .408 .442 .380 .562 .468 .559 .553 
Good 12 
         
Pass-through rate .020 -.048 -.119 -.018 -.088 -.084 -.091 -.086 -.024 
std err .148 .156 .129 .145 .119 .327 .136 .142 .123 
Good 13 
         
Pass-through rate -.007 .096 .000 .039 .079 -.036 .057 .076 .028 
std err .239 .224 .215 .219 .228 .219 .232 .207 .234 
Good 14 
         
Pass-through rate .145 .155 .219 .185 .226 .182 .238 .105 .128 
std err .134 .133 .146 .155 .155 .150 .146 .136 .141 
Good 0 (All goods) 
         
Pass-through rate .059 .057 -.017 -.042 -.022 .004 .028 -.028 -.005 
std err .074 .077 .076 .072 .073 .076 .072 .063 .072 
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Table 1.2b City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
 
US City Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. Bost. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .068 .103 .004 -.316 -.063 -.068 -.078 -.176 -.009 
std err .137 .141 .113 .113 .116 .120 .100 .110 .118 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate .055 .183 .069 .202 .190 .054 .230 -.024 .126 
std err .121 .122 .121 .128 .119 .144 .127 .117 .113 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .151 .040 -.225 -.206 -.281 -.169 -.206 -.215 -.177 
std err .177 .179 .173 .160 .172 .160 .157 .168 .179 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate .033 -.007 .019 .055 -.041 .027 .095 .090 .023 
std err .166 .164 .143 .156 .145 .162 .161 .175 .153 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .258 .107 -.116 -.136 -.087 -.096 -.053 -.214 -.113 
std err .364 .382 .341 .337 .358 .399 .334 .341 .352 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate .348 .253 .229 .214 .244 .207 .244 .293 .226 
std err .151 .135 .150 .141 .149 .143 .144 .158 .155 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .139 .236 .298 .220 .221 .150 .204 .338 .176 
std err .323 .315 .341 .322 .340 .337 .320 .306 .336 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate 1.189 1.284 1.447 1.477 1.168 1.321 1.510 1.425 1.230 
std err 1.017 1.040 1.026 1.020 1.021 1.047 1.032 .994 1.027 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate -.083 -.024 .201 -.060 .144 -.029 -.096 -.153 -.075 
std err .317 .307 .339 .295 .366 .333 .308 .304 .318 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate .044 .038 -.146 -.010 -.076 .122 .008 -.184 -.090 
std err .159 .156 .147 .168 .153 .186 .202 .152 .187 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate -.194 -.121 -.017 -.157 .000 -.234 -.086 -.247 -.128 
std err .554 .535 .383 .441 .383 .536 .454 .539 .529 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.102 -.170 -.241 -.141 -.211 -.207 -.214 -.209 -.146 
std err .164 .181 .148 .180 .135 .338 .164 .165 .140 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate .102 .208 .131 .161 .204 .100 .176 .198 .151 
std err .199 .186 .170 .185 .172 .191 .173 .174 .177 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .017 .027 .091 .057 .098 .054 .111 -.023 .001 
std err .126 .130 .155 .164 .158 .131 .154 .137 .130 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .113 .110 .036 .011 .031 .057 .081 .025 .048 
std err .091 .092 .082 .079 .082 .091 .081 .073 .082 
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Table 1.2c City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates   
US City Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. Chi. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .123 .158 .060 -.260 -.007 -.013 -.022 -.120 .047 
std err .131 .139 .110 .110 .108 .112 .094 .097 .112 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.056 -.042 -.037 .086 -.009 -.111 .024 -.079 -.047 
std err .076 .069 .071 .078 .073 .089 .072 .078 .075 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .136 .075 -.097 .026 -.149 -.073 .030 -.104 -.025 
std err .108 .110 .106 .108 .106 .101 .108 .101 .113 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate -.005 -.012 -.007 .020 -.030 .005 .026 .079 -.006 
std err .101 .104 .105 .100 .112 .101 .101 .106 .102 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate -.305 -.329 -.394 -.462 -.391 -.457 -.372 -.500 -.387 
std err .454 .437 .415 .415 .421 .438 .420 .415 .422 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate -.017 -.059 -.070 -.066 -.014 -.060 -.037 -.005 -.103 
std err .099 .097 .096 .096 .092 .098 .097 .095 .095 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .307 .359 .327 .334 .388 .292 .408 .541 .344 
std err .259 .255 .287 .257 .291 .265 .265 .259 .273 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate -.206 -.144 -.198 -.059 -.136 -.083 -.032 -.004 -.256 
std err .395 .401 .410 .399 .416 .403 .398 .390 .401 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate .127 .197 .208 .185 .289 .116 .205 .136 .154 
std err .297 .301 .283 .281 .294 .295 .283 .302 .280 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate -.079 -.009 -.170 -.022 -.048 .112 -.019 -.264 -.094 
std err .119 .124 .110 .119 .119 .139 .133 .126 .151 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate -.124 -.148 -.278 -.203 -.179 -.151 -.184 -.202 .049 
std err .380 .355 .288 .293 .262 .370 .314 .367 .368 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.122 -.051 -.137 -.051 -.070 -.129 -.120 .019 -.022 
std err .097 .108 .083 .097 .081 .219 .090 .094 .077 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate -.047 .014 -.006 .074 .038 -.044 .019 .051 .055 
std err .140 .111 .124 .124 .124 .134 .123 .119 .128 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .057 .080 .124 .146 .135 .074 .159 .050 .129 
std err .083 .084 .095 .097 .099 .090 .099 .085 .091 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate -.010 .005 -.054 -.041 -.045 -.017 -.006 -.067 -.017 
std err .052 .052 .057 .052 .058 .059 .052 .052 .054 
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Table 1.2d City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
  
US City Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. Dal. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .214 .249 .151 -.169 .084 .078 .069 -.029 .138 
std err .133 .143 .120 .122 .123 .116 .111 .105 .122 
Good 2 
         
Pass-through rate -.009 -.005 .001 .071 .046 -.105 .083 -.004 -.010 
std err .091 .098 .079 .101 .092 .111 .092 .105 .088 
Good 3 
         
Pass-through rate .163 .101 -.141 .138 -.154 -.123 .127 -.131 -.040 
std err .185 .178 .169 .177 .172 .156 .179 .176 .180 
Good 4 
         
Pass-through rate -.081 -.092 -.105 -.042 -.172 -.083 -.026 .043 -.078 
std err .107 .106 .116 .109 .116 .111 .112 .120 .110 
Good 5 
         
Pass-through rate .332 .263 .262 .182 .289 .128 .198 .251 .182 
std err .528 .521 .458 .461 .440 .472 .471 .474 .461 
Good 6 
         
Pass-through rate .106 .060 .025 .076 .055 .135 .112 .114 .011 
std err .158 .156 .156 .153 .159 .161 .150 .150 .156 
Good 7 
         
Pass-through rate .126 .195 .009 .097 .110 .052 .216 .255 .160 
std err .373 .378 .364 .361 .362 .379 .365 .362 .383 
Good 8 
         
Pass-through rate -.414 -.312 -.344 -.265 -.341 -.347 -.304 -.180 -.349 
std err .570 .577 .556 .562 .551 .555 .567 .549 .567 
Good 9 
         
Pass-through rate -.019 .081 -.111 .030 -.168 -.185 .087 .128 .024 
std err .264 .253 .295 .266 .286 .294 .277 .275 .267 
Good 10 
         
Pass-through rate -.073 .050 -.096 .012 .023 .003 -.039 -.217 .065 
std err .156 .160 .149 .146 .164 .176 .159 .150 .183 
Good 11 
         
Pass-through rate -.165 -.078 -.330 -.123 -.168 -.180 -.222 -.124 .029 
std err .603 .575 .479 .506 .466 .584 .518 .584 .581 
Good 12 
         
Pass-through rate -.263 -.159 -.281 -.164 -.172 -.199 -.201 -.031 -.135 
std err .136 .147 .107 .125 .105 .287 .116 .117 .102 
Good 13 
         
Pass-through rate -.273 -.190 -.330 -.204 -.193 -.359 -.303 -.229 -.263 
std err .182 .174 .171 .169 .153 .172 .166 .178 .165 
Good 14 
         
Pass-through rate -.032 .004 -.059 -.018 -.056 -.021 -.025 -.019 .019 
std err .098 .099 .096 .102 .104 .109 .102 .098 .109 
Good 0 (All goods) 
         
Pass-through rate .017 .029 -.005 -.007 .003 -.018 .037 -.026 .038 
std err .068 .065 .071 .066 .068 .074 .063 .063 .071 
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Table 1.2e City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
 
US City Det. Det. Det. Det. Det. Det. Det. Det. Det. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .172 .207 .109 -.211 .042 .036 .027 -.071 .096 
std err .127 .135 .103 .109 .105 .111 .094 .094 .109 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.072 -.006 -.020 .056 .025 -.116 .035 -.054 -.014 
std err .083 .074 .073 .082 .083 .095 .081 .085 .073 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .111 .045 -.100 .049 -.129 -.047 .061 -.114 -.025 
std err .109 .106 .111 .109 .110 .099 .107 .100 .120 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate -.003 .011 .011 .059 -.015 .018 .079 .146 .025 
std err .126 .126 .126 .123 .126 .128 .125 .133 .128 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .098 -.013 -.001 -.105 -.010 -.198 -.056 -.130 -.065 
std err .326 .309 .278 .275 .278 .316 .280 .290 .304 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate .016 -.036 -.027 .013 .009 .016 .050 .019 -.065 
std err .112 .101 .099 .113 .099 .100 .097 .106 .105 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .045 .103 .013 .051 .082 -.031 .153 .156 .090 
std err .262 .266 .259 .250 .264 .280 .255 .256 .270 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate .414 .482 .527 .600 .586 .492 .557 .614 .464 
std err .451 .462 .430 .439 .446 .454 .444 .440 .449 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate -.396 -.338 -.419 -.374 -.340 -.504 -.310 -.376 -.394 
std err .312 .311 .322 .299 .329 .321 .304 .317 .302 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate -.186 -.079 -.222 -.087 -.081 -.021 -.105 -.349 -.200 
std err .126 .128 .121 .137 .137 .150 .146 .130 .172 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate -.066 -.151 -.303 -.131 -.148 -.107 -.165 -.158 .025 
std err .404 .380 .297 .316 .271 .391 .336 .391 .386 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.184 -.128 -.203 -.140 -.153 -.097 -.172 -.065 -.100 
std err .107 .121 .096 .112 .095 .233 .102 .110 .089 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate -.128 -.105 -.159 -.103 -.013 -.186 -.154 -.137 -.030 
std err .142 .112 .122 .107 .107 .120 .113 .117 .114 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate -.189 -.161 -.166 -.143 -.146 -.172 -.118 -.186 -.110 
std err .098 .099 .096 .098 .102 .095 .100 .092 .101 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate -.012 .010 -.004 -.016 .013 -.021 .020 -.058 -.004 
std err .062 .062 .064 .059 .061 .068 .060 .058 .067 
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Table 1.2f City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates   
US City Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. Hous. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .217 .253 .154 -.166 .087 .082 .072 -.026 .141 
std err .142 .148 .125 .124 .127 .129 .110 .107 .134 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.019 -.015 -.009 .061 .036 -.115 .073 -.014 -.020 
std err .088 .096 .079 .095 .098 .110 .078 .108 .091 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate -.088 -.149 -.391 -.112 -.404 -.373 -.123 -.381 -.290 
std err .164 .161 .147 .161 .153 .144 .165 .147 .155 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate -.056 -.068 -.081 -.017 -.148 -.058 -.002 .068 -.054 
std err .112 .113 .118 .114 .117 .119 .117 .124 .119 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .219 .151 .149 .069 .177 .015 .086 .139 .070 
std err .498 .482 .388 .422 .382 .437 .433 .416 .411 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate -.005 -.050 -.086 -.035 -.055 .024 .001 .004 -.100 
std err .175 .163 .155 .177 .150 .163 .163 .156 .165 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .202 .271 .085 .173 .186 .128 .292 .330 .236 
std err .288 .291 .309 .291 .311 .312 .302 .279 .322 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate .530 .631 .600 .679 .602 .596 .640 .764 .594 
std err .611 .613 .579 .591 .585 .620 .598 .612 .608 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate .436 .519 .347 .476 .267 .265 .546 .550 .456 
std err .333 .328 .327 .327 .325 .362 .319 .349 .339 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate .028 .152 .005 .113 .124 .104 .062 -.116 .167 
std err .156 .161 .152 .149 .167 .186 .163 .150 .186 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate .165 .252 .000 .208 .162 .150 .109 .206 .359 
std err .460 .433 .325 .352 .305 .440 .369 .442 .438 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.050 .054 -.069 .049 .041 .013 .012 .182 .078 
std err .128 .144 .111 .127 .098 .278 .112 .122 .104 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate .185 .268 .128 .254 .265 .099 .155 .228 .194 
std err .205 .155 .165 .167 .152 .163 .163 .177 .170 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .103 .138 .075 .116 .079 .113 .110 .115 .153 
std err .148 .145 .149 .145 .151 .155 .148 .148 .161 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .041 .053 .020 .017 .028 .006 .061 -.002 .062 
std err .071 .068 .070 .064 .070 .074 .058 .061 .072 
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Table 1.2g City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates  
US City L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. L.A. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .159 .194 .096 -.224 .029 .023 .014 -.084 .083 
std err .133 .141 .115 .111 .115 .113 .105 .098 .116 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.028 -.015 -.010 .113 .018 -.084 .051 -.052 -.020 
std err .067 .063 .058 .070 .065 .079 .068 .073 .068 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .054 -.008 -.180 -.057 -.232 -.156 -.053 -.187 -.107 
std err .114 .113 .118 .117 .114 .112 .119 .116 .121 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate -.036 -.044 -.038 -.012 -.061 -.026 -.005 .048 -.038 
std err .074 .076 .078 .074 .081 .078 .078 .081 .076 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .216 .192 .127 .060 .130 .065 .149 .022 .134 
std err .307 .289 .240 .250 .240 .261 .254 .254 .263 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate .016 -.025 -.036 -.032 .020 -.026 -.004 .028 -.069 
std err .108 .101 .105 .108 .106 .107 .105 .106 .115 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .066 .117 .086 .093 .146 .051 .166 .299 .102 
std err .214 .211 .223 .210 .227 .219 .217 .203 .222 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate -.062 -.001 -.054 .084 .008 .061 .111 .140 -.112 
std err .291 .299 .303 .293 .326 .303 .292 .300 .292 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate .349 .419 .430 .407 .511 .338 .427 .358 .376 
std err .176 .174 .196 .178 .199 .197 .179 .192 .179 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate .023 .093 -.068 .080 .054 .213 .083 -.162 .007 
std err .120 .128 .113 .120 .120 .141 .134 .126 .155 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate .001 -.022 -.153 -.077 -.053 -.026 -.058 -.077 .174 
std err .402 .381 .308 .330 .292 .395 .346 .389 .392 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.134 -.063 -.149 -.063 -.082 -.141 -.132 .007 -.034 
std err .102 .113 .088 .103 .084 .225 .094 .098 .085 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate -.038 .023 .002 .083 .046 -.035 .028 .060 .064 
std err .137 .119 .128 .122 .123 .121 .125 .124 .130 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .002 .025 .069 .091 .080 .019 .104 -.006 .074 
std err .081 .082 .085 .091 .089 .087 .090 .082 .083 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .032 .047 -.012 .001 -.003 .025 .036 -.025 .025 
std err .043 .044 .047 .041 .046 .049 .042 .040 .047 
 
         
 
 
 32 
Table 1.2h City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates  
US City Miami Miami Miami Miami Miami Miami Miami Miami Miami 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .103 .138 .039 -.280 -.027 -.033 -.042 -.141 .026 
std err .143 .149 .127 .123 .131 .134 .119 .115 .130 
Good 2 
         
Pass-through rate -.002 .126 .012 .146 .134 -.003 .174 -.080 .070 
std err .175 .180 .171 .181 .168 .193 .174 .195 .174 
Good 3 
         
Pass-through rate .244 .133 -.132 -.114 -.188 -.077 -.113 -.122 -.084 
std err .204 .199 .192 .177 .181 .189 .177 .199 .207 
Good 4 
         
Pass-through rate .236 .195 .222 .258 .161 .230 .297 .292 .225 
std err .132 .131 .135 .134 .135 .140 .134 .144 .139 
Good 5 
         
Pass-through rate .318 .168 -.056 -.076 -.027 -.036 .007 -.154 -.053 
std err .341 .319 .256 .257 .269 .281 .271 .268 .242 
Good 6 
         
Pass-through rate .118 .024 -.001 -.016 .015 -.022 .015 .064 -.003 
std err .136 .156 .158 .143 .144 .141 .142 .142 .142 
Good 7 
         
Pass-through rate -.228 -.132 -.069 -.148 -.146 -.217 -.164 -.030 -.192 
std err .382 .374 .410 .387 .426 .384 .386 .365 .381 
Good 8 
         
Pass-through rate -1.169 -1.074 -.911 -.880 -1.190 -1.036 -.848 -.933 -1.127 
std err .600 .602 .603 .587 .646 .615 .586 .577 .596 
Good 9 
         
Pass-through rate -.191 -.117 .088 -.171 .070 -.127 -.216 -.226 -.162 
std err .405 .404 .435 .426 .463 .442 .440 .415 .426 
Good 10 
         
Pass-through rate .145 .140 -.045 .091 .026 .224 .109 -.082 .012 
std err .162 .152 .142 .170 .146 .192 .205 .145 .185 
Good 11 
         
Pass-through rate -.725 -.653 -.548 -.688 -.531 -.765 -.617 -.778 -.659 
std err .604 .569 .443 .472 .427 .586 .493 .581 .576 
Good 12 
         
Pass-through rate .086 .018 -.053 .048 -.023 -.018 -.025 -.020 .042 
std err .156 .162 .129 .149 .115 .309 .140 .133 .122 
Good 13 
         
Pass-through rate .108 .211 .115 .154 .194 .079 .172 .190 .142 
std err .191 .159 .169 .177 .162 .169 .179 .168 .184 
Good 14 
         
Pass-through rate .003 .013 .077 .043 .084 .040 .096 -.037 -.014 
std err .123 .130 .155 .155 .159 .137 .152 .127 .126 
Good 0 (All goods) 
         
Pass-through rate .102 .100 .026 .001 .020 .047 .070 .015 .038 
std err .080 .081 .075 .071 .075 .080 .073 .064 .075 
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Table 1.2i City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
 
US City N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. N.Y. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .141 .176 .077 -.242 .011 .005 -.004 -.103 .064 
std err .120 .131 .102 .105 .103 .105 .087 .091 .105 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.058 -.045 -.040 .083 -.012 -.114 .021 -.082 -.050 
std err .067 .063 .059 .073 .063 .080 .066 .072 .066 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .113 .052 -.120 .003 -.172 -.096 .007 -.127 -.048 
std err .097 .095 .096 .089 .091 .083 .089 .085 .100 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate -.053 -.061 -.055 -.029 -.078 -.043 -.022 .031 -.055 
std err .076 .076 .075 .075 .077 .076 .077 .082 .074 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .053 .029 -.036 -.104 -.033 -.099 -.014 -.141 -.029 
std err .226 .196 .145 .152 .158 .192 .156 .158 .161 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate -.008 -.049 -.061 -.056 -.005 -.051 -.028 .004 -.093 
std err .085 .080 .080 .084 .082 .085 .084 .085 .081 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate -.009 .043 .011 .018 .071 -.024 .091 .225 .028 
std err .198 .191 .208 .183 .207 .200 .205 .179 .206 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate -.224 -.162 -.216 -.078 -.154 -.101 -.051 -.022 -.274 
std err .399 .411 .394 .389 .399 .421 .391 .388 .403 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate .080 .151 .162 .138 .242 .070 .159 .090 .107 
std err .181 .176 .180 .169 .196 .187 .171 .180 .183 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate -.063 .006 -.155 -.007 -.032 .127 -.003 -.249 -.079 
std err .113 .119 .102 .112 .111 .128 .122 .116 .148 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate -.161 -.184 -.314 -.239 -.215 -.187 -.220 -.239 .013 
std err .356 .331 .235 .261 .209 .339 .283 .343 .340 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.125 -.054 -.140 -.054 -.074 -.133 -.124 .016 -.025 
std err .093 .099 .077 .089 .073 .221 .082 .087 .068 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate -.024 .037 .016 .097 .060 -.021 .042 .074 .078 
std err .135 .095 .109 .092 .106 .111 .102 .103 .105 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate -.040 -.017 .027 .049 .038 -.023 .062 -.047 .032 
std err .070 .071 .085 .088 .089 .071 .089 .072 .076 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .000 .016 -.043 -.031 -.035 -.006 .005 -.056 -.007 
std err .041 .042 .044 .040 .044 .048 .041 .037 .044 
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Table 1.2j City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates   
US City Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. Phil. 
  
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
  
Eq. 1.13 
                    
Good 1 
                    
Pass-through rate .238 .273 .174 -.145 .108 .102 .093 -.006 .161   
std err .130 .140 .107 .111 .106 .112 .098 .098 .112   
Good 2 
           
Pass-through rate .023 .037 .042 .165 .070 -.032 .103 -.001 .031   
std err .074 .070 .070 .076 .072 .090 .074 .081 .071   
Good 3 
           
Pass-through rate .180 .119 -.053 .069 -.105 -.029 .074 -.060 .019   
std err .098 .101 .104 .100 .104 .094 .099 .099 .111   
Good 4 
           
Pass-through rate -.060 -.068 -.062 -.036 -.085 -.050 -.029 .024 -.061   
std err .088 .088 .089 .086 .094 .090 .088 .089 .090   
Good 5 
           
Pass-through rate .017 -.006 -.072 -.139 -.069 -.134 -.050 -.177 -.065   
std err .263 .242 .207 .214 .215 .245 .219 .223 .224   
Good 6 
           
Pass-through rate -.048 -.089 -.100 -.096 -.044 -.091 -.068 -.036 -.133   
Std err .110 .111 .107 .101 .111 .106 .102 .104 .103   
Good 7 
           
Pass-through rate .305 .357 .326 .332 .386 .290 .406 .539 .342   
Std err .315 .315 .316 .312 .322 .315 .316 .312 .331   
Good 8 
           
Pass-through rate .114 .176 .122 .261 .184 .237 .288 .316 .064   
Std err .498 .502 .507 .498 .503 .510 .497 .491 .494   
Good 9 
           
Pass-through rate .080 .150 .161 .138 .242 .069 .158 .089 .107   
Std err .281 .288 .292 .281 .300 .288 .296 .292 .283   
Good 10 
           
Pass-through rate -.008 .061 -.100 .049 .023 .182 .052 -.194 -.024   
Std err .113 .117 .099 .111 .108 .123 .123 .115 .150   
Good 11 
           
Pass-through rate .123 .099 -.031 .044 .069 .096 .063 .045 .296   
Std err .376 .357 .292 .303 .264 .366 .318 .367 .363   
Good 12 
           
Pass-through rate -.072 -.001 -.087 -.001 -.020 -.079 -.071 .069 .028   
Std err .102 .119 .092 .105 .086 .221 .098 .103 .090   
Good 13 
           
Pass-through rate -.053 .008 -.012 .068 .032 -.050 .013 .045 .050   
Std err .177 .139 .143 .148 .148 .151 .149 .146 .146   
Good 14 
           
Pass-through rate -.041 -.019 .025 .047 .036 -.024 .060 -.049 .030   
Std err .117 .115 .117 .120 .119 .116 .122 .117 .116   
Good 0 (All goods) 
           
Pass-through rate .024 .040 -.020 -.007 -.011 .017 .028 -.033 .017   
Std err .043 .045 .045 .042 .045 .048 .040 .041 .045   
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Table 1.2k City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates  
US City Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. Pitt. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .007 .042 -.057 -.377 -.124 -.129 -.139 -.237 -.070 
Std err .140 .138 .117 .125 .119 .118 .109 .107 .124 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.062 -.058 -.052 .018 -.007 -.158 .030 -.057 -.063 
std err .084 .092 .083 .084 .092 .108 .082 .103 .088 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .076 .015 -.227 .051 -.241 -.210 .040 -.218 -.127 
std err .135 .129 .134 .138 .130 .119 .141 .104 .148 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate .049 .038 .025 .088 -.042 .047 .104 .173 .052 
std err .166 .167 .154 .162 .152 .163 .163 .179 .160 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .384 .316 .314 .234 .342 .180 .251 .304 .235 
std err .251 .232 .176 .189 .188 .227 .186 .173 .180 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate .002 -.044 -.079 -.028 -.049 .031 .008 .011 -.093 
std err .114 .108 .113 .100 .114 .127 .107 .106 .119 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate .298 .367 .181 .269 .282 .224 .388 .427 .332 
std err .313 .300 .316 .309 .305 .334 .334 .300 .337 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate .097 .198 .167 .246 .169 .163 .207 .331 .162 
std err .575 .578 .574 .574 .575 .574 .576 .560 .573 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate -.385 -.302 -.474 -.345 -.554 -.556 -.275 -.271 -.365 
std err .229 .231 .245 .228 .223 .250 .232 .252 .234 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate .003 .127 -.020 .088 .099 .080 .037 -.140 .142 
std err .152 .159 .154 .150 .170 .174 .151 .152 .195 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate .030 .117 -.136 .072 .027 .015 -.027 .071 .223 
std err .570 .543 .455 .469 .427 .555 .488 .559 .549 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate -.085 .019 -.103 .014 .006 -.022 -.023 .147 .043 
std err .124 .147 .102 .123 .102 .285 .111 .119 .103 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate .132 .215 .075 .201 .212 .046 .102 .175 .141 
std err .172 .158 .185 .176 .177 .181 .169 .174 .170 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .068 .103 .040 .082 .044 .079 .075 .080 .119 
std err .126 .122 .115 .114 .125 .123 .121 .126 .129 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .056 .069 .035 .033 .043 .021 .077 .014 .077 
std err .068 .066 .067 .065 .066 .068 .069 .065 .069 
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Table 1.2l City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates   
US City S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. S.F. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .225 .260 .161 -.158 .095 .089 .080 -.019 .148 
std err .135 .143 .117 .116 .119 .120 .107 .101 .116 
Good 2 
         
Pass-through rate -.046 -.095 -.069 .043 -.040 -.156 .020 -.081 -.098 
std err .076 .072 .066 .085 .078 .094 .077 .082 .072 
Good 3 
         
Pass-through rate .026 -.031 -.305 -.041 -.338 -.316 -.061 -.287 -.205 
std err .124 .121 .131 .132 .135 .118 .133 .118 .130 
Good 4 
         
Pass-through rate -.056 -.089 -.098 -.054 -.164 -.069 -.051 .007 -.082 
std err .118 .122 .123 .124 .131 .124 .124 .118 .125 
Good 5 
         
Pass-through rate .606 .621 .548 .504 .589 .543 .555 .568 .533 
std err .368 .358 .288 .297 .285 .303 .305 .300 .316 
Good 6 
         
Pass-through rate .060 .025 -.033 -.014 .016 .052 .014 .077 -.040 
std err .111 .110 .109 .117 .114 .112 .106 .104 .105 
Good 7 
         
Pass-through rate -.144 -.080 -.219 -.156 -.124 -.162 -.063 .098 -.119 
std err .260 .264 .273 .258 .268 .274 .264 .257 .282 
Good 8 
         
Pass-through rate -.236 -.138 -.266 -.126 -.265 -.129 -.100 .002 -.263 
std err .428 .434 .430 .432 .439 .444 .430 .421 .433 
Good 9 
         
Pass-through rate -.052 .054 -.041 .037 -.085 -.078 .041 .067 .007 
std err .223 .233 .231 .218 .231 .252 .231 .242 .236 
Good 10 
         
Pass-through rate .033 .123 -.041 .078 .060 .126 .044 -.130 .181 
std err .132 .143 .120 .111 .129 .158 .126 .138 .151 
Good 11 
         
Pass-through rate -.026 .131 -.108 .013 .003 -.025 -.042 .038 .252 
std err .410 .381 .288 .310 .263 .392 .330 .390 .391 
Good 12 
         
Pass-through rate -.128 -.007 -.143 .000 -.014 -.154 -.073 .131 .018 
std err .102 .110 .085 .101 .081 .240 .089 .093 .079 
Good 13 
         
Pass-through rate -.002 .120 .005 .158 .046 -.034 .052 .144 .005 
std err .202 .167 .176 .170 .175 .169 .176 .170 .187 
Good 14 
         
Pass-through rate .053 .083 .061 .104 .056 .063 .084 .056 .095 
std err .140 .138 .142 .143 .149 .141 .145 .137 .139 
Good 0 (All goods) 
         
Pass-through rate .042 .048 -.030 -.008 -.029 .007 .037 -.011 .050 
std err .058 .061 .065 .055 .065 .066 .055 .052 .061 
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Table 1.2m City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates   
US City St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. St.L. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win.  
Eq. 1.13           
Good 1           
Pass-through rate .118 .154 .055 -.265 -.012 -.017 -.027 -.125 .042  
std err .124 .132 .117 .111 .119 .113 .101 .102 .117  
Good 2            
Pass-through rate -.104 .024 -.090 .043 .031 -.105 .071 -.183 -.033  
std err .111 .122 .103 .119 .109 .136 .119 .121 .110  
Good 3            
Pass-through rate -.098 -.209 -.474 -.456 -.530 -.419 -.455 -.464 -.426  
std err .231 .229 .220 .219 .213 .218 .217 .223 .223  
Good 4            
Pass-through rate -.097 -.137 -.111 -.075 -.171 -.103 -.035 -.040 -.107  
std err .149 .161 .158 .160 .157 .161 .157 .169 .169  
Good 5            
Pass-through rate .980 .830 .607 .586 .636 .626 .669 .509 .609  
std err .616 .571 .507 .522 .515 .493 .538 .530 .523  
Good 6            
Pass-through rate .112 .018 -.007 -.022 .009 -.028 .009 .058 -.009  
std err .134 .121 .127 .125 .136 .131 .124 .122 .133  
Good 7            
Pass-through rate -.817 -.720 -.658 -.737 -.735 -.806 -.752 -.618 -.780  
std err .432 .448 .414 .418 .425 .460 .426 .408 .450  
Good 8            
Pass-through rate -.627 -.532 -.369 -.338 -.648 -.494 -.305 -.390 -.585  
std err .529 .557 .532 .543 .533 .557 .551 .513 .538  
Good 9            
Pass-through rate .428 .489 .653 .448 .643 .510 .366 .352 .428  
std err .468 .468 .464 .465 .477 .471 .448 .475 .460  
Good 10            
Pass-through rate .147 .141 -.043 .093 .028 .225 .111 -.080 .014  
std err .168 .161 .165 .189 .169 .216 .221 .170 .200  
Good 11            
Pass-through rate -.478 -.405 -.301 -.440 -.284 -.517 -.370 -.531 -.412  
std err .640 .601 .515 .531 .476 .623 .545 .618 .618  
Good 12            
Pass-through rate .158 .091 .019 .120 .050 .054 .047 .052 .115  
std err .162 .180 .152 .177 .142 .325 .162 .169 .132  
Good 13            
Pass-through rate -.273 -.169 -.266 -.226 -.187 -.301 -.209 -.190 -.238  
std err .240 .233 .236 .247 .234 .238 .234 .224 .249  
Good 14            
Pass-through rate .069 .079 .142 .108 .149 .106 .162 .029 .052  
std err .141 .135 .147 .153 .144 .140 .149 .143 .135  
Good 0 (All goods)            
Pass-through rate .078 .076 .002 -.024 -.004 .023 .046 -.010 .013  
std err .074 .075 .082 .079 .080 .077 .074 .071 .083  
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Table 1.2n City-pair specific and good specific pass-through rates 
US City D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. D.C. 
Can. City Calg. Edm. Mont. Otwa. Qubc. Reg. Tor. Van. Win. 
Eq. 1.13 
                  
Good 1 
                  
Pass-through rate .151 .186 .087 -.233 .020 .015 .006 -.093 .074 
std err .137 .143 .119 .118 .123 .117 .104 .104 .124 
Good 2 
          
Pass-through rate -.071 .057 -.057 .077 .064 -.072 .104 -.149 .000 
std err .092 .099 .082 .099 .084 .122 .095 .107 .096 
Good 3 
          
Pass-through rate .168 .057 -.208 -.190 -.264 -.153 -.189 -.198 -.160 
std err .164 .168 .134 .137 .134 .138 .135 .151 .162 
Good 4 
          
Pass-through rate .047 .007 .033 .070 -.027 .041 .109 .104 .037 
std err .120 .118 .124 .119 .124 .116 .121 .121 .115 
Good 5 
          
Pass-through rate .572 .422 .199 .178 .227 .218 .261 .100 .201 
std err .398 .369 .283 .299 .293 .299 .304 .310 .307 
Good 6 
          
Pass-through rate .228 .133 .109 .094 .124 .087 .124 .173 .106 
std err .203 .194 .205 .197 .187 .203 .195 .200 .199 
Good 7 
          
Pass-through rate -.409 -.312 -.250 -.328 -.327 -.398 -.344 -.210 -.372 
std err .436 .444 .416 .426 .429 .460 .432 .399 .439 
Good 8 
          
Pass-through rate -.985 -.889 -.726 -.696 -1.005 -.852 -.663 -.748 -.943 
std err .827 .843 .847 .837 .833 .845 .832 .800 .847 
Good 9 
          
Pass-through rate -.285 -.224 -.026 -.285 -.050 -.265 -.349 -.354 -.273 
std err .343 .348 .349 .346 .374 .348 .345 .337 .335 
Good 10 
          
Pass-through rate .151 .145 -.039 .097 .032 .229 .115 -.076 .018 
std err .147 .139 .132 .160 .131 .184 .194 .135 .177 
Good 11 
          
Pass-through rate .034 .107 .212 .072 .228 -.005 .143 -.019 .100 
std err .547 .511 .392 .407 .350 .532 .441 .522 .527 
Good 12 
          
Pass-through rate .214 .146 .075 .176 .106 .110 .103 .108 .170 
std err .145 .153 .130 .149 .124 .340 .137 .141 .109 
Good 13 
          
Pass-through rate .130 .233 .137 .176 .216 .101 .194 .213 .164 
std err .171 .159 .178 .175 .168 .168 .178 .161 .162 
Good 14 
          
Pass-through rate .160 .170 .233 .199 .240 .196 .253 .120 .143 
std err .155 .156 .154 .174 .166 .162 .166 .167 .156 
Good 0 (All goods) 
          
Pass-through rate .101 .099 .025 .000 .020 .046 .070 .014 .037 
std err .070 .071 .071 .066 .071 .067 .069 .059 .070 
 
 
  
          
  
  
Table 1.3a  Good 1 Good 2 Good 3 
  
 Equation 1.14 US: Food at Home US: Food away from home US: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
  
Can: Food from stores Can: Food from restaurants Can: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
 Bdist  .000015*** 0.00000465 0.00000616 
    (0.00000475) (0.00000509) (0.00000678) 
  
 Bbp  1.539*** 1.485*** 1.938*** 
    (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0468) 
  
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  14.86 13.2 20.04 
  
 R-squared  0.9547 0.9151 0.9544 
  
 Proportion of the   
      
  
 border effect due to   0.65 0.67 0.52 
  
 incomplete pass-through  
      
  Mean border effect (mi.) 30 1301 10701 
    
Good 4 Good 5 
  
    US: Shelter US: Fuel and other utilities 
    Can: Shelter -.2135(Good 5) Can: Water, fuel and elec. 
  
 Bdist  0.000016** 0.0002404*** 
    (0.00000758) (0.0000687) 
  
 Bbp  1.352*** 5.430*** 
    (0.0675) (0.716) 
  
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  5.22 6.19 
  
 R-squared  0.8644 0.5922 
  
 Proportion of the   
    
  
 border effect due to   0.74 0.18 
  
 incomplete pass-through 
    
  
Mean border effect (mi.) 273 129 
Note: Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  
Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level is denoted by *, ** 
or *** respectively.  The Mean 
Border Effect is calculated 
using the average Bdist of all 
other goods and the Bdist of 
the good in question. If the 
estimation of Bdist is 
insignificant then the Mean 
Border Effect can not be easily 
interpreted. City Dummies are 
included but not reported. 
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Table 1.3b Good 6 Good 7 Good 8 
 Equation 1.14 US: Household Furn. & Op. US: Men's and Boy's Apparel US: Women's and Girl's App. 
  
Can: Housing exc. shelter Can: .8058(Men)+.1942(Boy) Can: .8355(Wom.)+.1645(Girl) 
 Bdist  0.000011** 0.0000803*** 0.0002955** 
  (0.00000518) (0.000025) (0.0001479) 
 Bbp  1.250*** 3.365*** 11.94*** 
  (0.036) (0.309) (1.28) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  6.95 7.66 8.55 
 R-squared  0.953 0.9185 0.8655 
 Proportion of the   
      
 border effect due to   0.8 0.3 0.08 
 incomplete pass-through  
      
Mean border effect (mi.) 230 1043 63190 
  Good 9 Good 10 
  US: Footwear US: Private Transportation 
  Can: Footwear Can: Private Transportation 
 Bdist  0.0000211 0.0000107* 
  (0.0000356) (0.00000564) 
 Bbp  1.097*** 2.106*** 
  (0.293) (0.0434) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  0.33 25.47 
 R-squared  0.914 0.9459 
 Proportion of the   
    
 border effect due to   0.91 0.47 
 incomplete pass-through 
    
Mean border effect (mi.) 62 9030 
Note: Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted 
by *, ** or *** respectively.  The 
Mean Border Effect is calculated 
using the average Bdist of all 
other goods and the Bdist of the 
good in question. If the estimation 
of Bdist is insignificant then the 
Mean Border Effect can not be 
easily interpreted. City Dummies 
are included but not reported. 
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Table 1.3c Good 11 Good 12 
  
 Equation 1.14 US: Public Transportation US: Medical Care   
  
Can: Public Transportation Can: Medical Care   
 Bdist  0.0001848*** 0.0000123   
  (0.000053) (0.0000101)   
 Bbp  12.269*** 1.970***   
  (0.413) (0.081)   
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  26.33 11.98   
 R-squared  0.9194 0.9317   
 Proportion of the   
      
 border effect due to   0.08 0.51 
  
 incomplete pass-through  
      
Mean border effect (mi.) 94871313 6324 
  
  Good 13 Good 14 
  US: Personal Care US: Entertainment 
  Can: Personal Care Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(Rd.) 
 Bdist  0.00000774 0.00000766 
  (0.0000106) (0.00000547) 
 Bbp  1.420*** 1.274*** 
  (0.0764) (0.0423) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  5.5 6.46 
 R-squared  0.915 0.9365 
 Proportion of the   
    
 border effect due to   0.7 0.79 
 incomplete pass-through 
    
Mean border effect (mi.) 407 232 
Note: Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  
Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level is denoted by *, 
** or *** respectively.  The 
Mean Border Effect is 
calculated using the average 
Bdist of all other goods and the 
Bdist of the good in question. If 
the estimation of Bdist is 
insignificant then the Mean 
Border Effect can not be easily 
interpreted. City Dummies are 
included but not reported. 
    
41
 
  
Table 1.4a  Good 1 
    
Good 2 
    
Good 3 
    
 Equation 1.17  US: Food at Home US: Food away from home US: Alcoholic Beverages 
  Can: Food from stores Can: Food from restaurants Can: Alcoholic Beverages 
 Bdist  .0000166*** 0.00000607 0.0000121 
  (0.00000504) (0.00000549) (0.00000876) 
 Bbp  1.34568*** 1.352333*** 1.332464*** 
  (0.0429578) (0.0391823) (0.0448949) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  8.05     8.99     7.41   
 R-squared  
  0.9464     0.9025     0.9322   
 Proportion of the   
                  
 border effect due to     0.74     0.74     0.75   
 incomplete pass-through.  
                  
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
16.3609     374.938     868.576 
  
  
Good 4 
    
Good 5 
    
  US: Shelter US: Fuel and other utilities 
  Can: Shelter -.2135(Good 5) Can: Water, fuel and elec. 
 Bdist  0.000016** .000263*** 
  (0.00000771) (0.000068) 
 Bbp  1.251469*** 4.386963*** 
  (0.0628414) (0.6720885) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  4.00     5.04   
 R-squared  
  0.8636     0.5755   
 Percentage of the   
            
 border effect due to     0.80     0.23   
 incomplete pass-through.  
            
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
121.611     39.4216 
  
Note: Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  Significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
denoted by *, ** or *** 
respectively.  The Mean Border 
Effect is calculated using the 
average Bdist of all other goods 
and the Bdist of the good in 
question.  City Dummies are 
included but not reported. 
 
 
42
 
  
Table 1.4b  Good 6 
    
Good 7 
    
Good 8 
    
 Equation 1.17  US: Household Furn. & Op. US: Men's and Boy's Apparel US: Women's and Girl's App. 
  Can: Housing exc. shelter Can: .8058(Men)+.1942(Boy) Can: .8355(Wom.)+.1645(Girl) 
 Bdist  0.0000111** 0.0001065*** 0.0003762*** 
  (0.00000525) (0.0000261) (0.000144) 
 Bbp  1.162663*** 1.747481*** 3.835406*** 
  (0.0359905) (0.2887933) (0.5588103) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  4.52     2.59     5.07   
 R-squared  
  0.9502     0.9023     0.8439   
 Proportion of the   
                  
 border effect due to     0.86     0.57     0.26   
 incomplete pass-through.  
                  
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
100.643     40.968     147.79 
  
  
Good 9 
    
Good 10 
    
  US: Footwear US: Private Transportation 
  Can: Footwear Can: Private Transportation 
 Bdist  0.0000226 0.0000131** 
  (0.0000352) (0.0000061) 
 Bbp  .8617368*** 1.910693*** 
  (0.220167) (0.0480232) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  -0.63     18.97   
 R-squared  
  0.9151     0.9352   
 Percentage of the   
            
 border effect due to     1.16     0.52   
 incomplete pass-through.  
            
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
35.5365     1831.76 
  
Note: Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  Significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
denoted by *, ** or *** 
respectively.  The Mean Border 
Effect is calculated using the 
average Bdist of all other goods 
and the Bdist of the good in 
question.  City Dummies are 
included but not reported. 
 
 
 
43
 
  
Table 1.4c  Good 11 
    
Good 12 
          
 Equation 1.17  US: Public Transportation US: Medical Care       
  Can: Public Transportation Can: Medical Care       
 Bdist  0.0002702*** 0.0000161       
  (0.000071) (0.0000102)       
 Bbp  6.862152*** 1.670908***       
  (0.376003) (0.0697443)       
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  15.59     9.62         
 R-squared  
  0.8421     0.9287         
 Proportion of the   
                  
 Border effect due to     0.15     0.60   
      
 incomplete pass-through.  
                  
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
21395.1     137.475 
        
  
Good 13 
    
Good 14 
    
  US: Personal Care US: Entertainment 
  Can: Personal Care Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(Rd.) 
 Bdist  0.0000103 0.00000862 
  (0.00000942) (0.00000558) 
 Bbp  1.168995*** 1.216829*** 
  (0.066703) (0.0414415) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  
  2.53     5.23   
 R-squared  
  0.9149     0.9332   
 Percentage of the   
            
 border effect due to     0.86     0.82   
 incomplete pass-through.  
            
 Mean border effect (mi.)  
  
111.047     98.6393 
  
Note: Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  
Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level is denoted by *, ** 
or *** respectively.  The Mean 
Border Effect is calculated 
using the average Bdist of all 
other goods and the Bdist of 
the good in question.  City 
Dummies are included but not 
reported. 
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Table 1.5a Good 1   Good 2   Good 3   
 Equation 1.19 US: Food at Home US: Food away from home US: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
Can: Food from stores Can: Food from restaurants Can: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.0000143** 0.0000142** 0.00000757 0.0000119 0.00000891 0.000011 
  (0.00000454) (0.00000439) (0.0000054) (0.0000075) (0.00000797) (0.0000105) 
 Bbord 0.0000531** 0.0001456** 0.0000817** 0.0002595** 0.0001601** 0.0003354** 
  (0.00000325) (0.00000312) (0.00000698) (0.00000909) (0.00000891) (0.0000115) 
 Proportion of the   
            
 border effect due to   0.64 0.69 0.52 
 incomplete pass-through  
            
Mean border effect (mi.) 4 37 10 762 82 5866 
  Good 4   Good 5   
    
  US: Shelter US: Fuel and other utilities 
  Can: Shelter -.2135(Good 5) Can: Water, fuel and elec. 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.000018** 0.0000212** 0.0002016** 0.0002015** 
  (0.00000756) (0.0000092) (0.0000657) (0.0000663) 
 Bbord 0.0000545** 0.0002245** 0.0007911** 0.0009209** 
  (0.0000108) (0.0000123) (0.0000879) (0.0000882) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.76 0.14 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 4 169 388 970 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% 
and 5% level is denoted by * or **. 
City dummies are included but not 
reported. The mean border effect is 
computed using the Bbord estimate 
and the average of the good specific 
distance effect and the average 
distance effect of all goods.  The 
proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.19 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.20. 
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Table 1.5b Good 6   Good 7   Good 8 
 
 Equation 1.19 US: Household Furn. & Op. US: Men's and Boy's Apparel US: Women's and Girl's App. 
  
Can: Housing exc. shelter Can: .8058(Men)+.1942(Boy) Can: .8355(Wom.)+.1645(Girl) 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.0000115** 0.0000155** 0.0000858** 0.0000898** 0.0003486** 0.0003525** 
  (0.00000531) (0.0000068) (0.0000264) (0.0000277) (0.0001639) (0.0001658) 
 Bbord 0.0000451** 0.0002134** 0.0003625** 0.0005061** 0.0016191** 0.0017723** 
  (0.00000592) (0.00000722) (0.000035) (0.0000363) (0.0001869) (0.0001886) 
 Proportion of the   
            
 border effect due to   0.79 0.28 0.09 
 incomplete pass-through  
            
Mean border effect (mi.) 3 184 127 654 2569 4735 
  Good 9   Good 10   
  US: Footwear US: Private Transportation 
  Can: Footwear Can: Private Transportation 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.0000269 0.0000306 0.0000138** 0.0000178* 
  (0.0000355) (0.0000358) (0.00000668) (0.00000921) 
Bbord -0.0000145 0.0001477** 0.0001919** 0.0003586** 
  (0.0000513) (0.0000523) (0.00000844) (0.0000103) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0 0.46 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 1 21 141 5050 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% 
and 5% level is denoted by * or **. 
City dummies are included but not 
reported. The mean border effect is 
computed using the Bbord estimate 
and the average of the good specific 
distance effect and the average 
distance effect of all goods.  The 
proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.19 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.20. 
  
 
46
 
  
Table 1.5c Good 11   Good 12   
 Equation 1.19 US: Public Transportation US: Medical Care 
  
Can: Public Transportation Can: Medical Care 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.0002217** 0.0002242** 0.0000159 0.0000185 
  (0.00007) (0.0000725) (0.0000111) (0.0000131) 
 Bbord 0.0019167** 0.002091** 0.0001645** 0.0003394** 
  (0.0000863) (0.0000888) (0.0000153) (0.0000169) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.08 0.52 
 incomplete pass-through  
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 677103 1784014 62 2993 
  
  Good 13   Good 14   
  US: Personal Care US: Entertainment 
  Can: Personal Care Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(Rd.) 
  
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
Equation 
1.19 Equation 1.20 
 Bdist  0.0000102 0.000013 0.00000744 0.00000946 
  (0.000011) (0.0000121) (0.00000548) (0.00000696) 
Bbord 0.0000595** 0.0002181** 0.0000479** 0.0002075** 
  (0.0000113) (0.0000126) (0.00000629) (0.00000758) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.73 0.77 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 5 245 4 239 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 
10% and 5% level is denoted by * or 
**. City dummies are included but 
not reported. The mean border 
effect is computed using the Bbord 
estimate and the average of the 
good specific distance effect and the 
average distance effect of all goods.  
The proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.19 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.20. 
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Table 1.6a Good 1   Good 2   Good 3   
 Equation 1.21 US: Food at Home US: Food away from home US: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
Can: Food from stores Can: Food from restaurants Can: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.0000128** 0.0000128** 0.00000437 0.0000065 0.00000917 0.0000113 
  (0.00000341) (0.00000334) (0.00000505) (0.0000065) (0.00000588) (0.000081) 
 Bbord 0.0000343** 0.000129** 0.000053** 0.000211** 0.0000655** 0.000214** 
  (0.00000791) (0.00000776) (0.00000637) (0.00000852) (0.0000085) (0.0000119) 
 Proportion of the   
            
 border effect due to   .73 0.75 0.69 
 incomplete pass-through  
            
Mean border effect (mi.) 3 52 7 1323 8 829 
  Good 4   Good 5   
    
  US: Shelter US: Fuel and other utilities 
  Can: Shelter -.2135(Good 5) Can: Water, fuel and elec. 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.0000729 0.00000942 0.000132** 0.00013** 
  (0.00000456) (0.0000059) (0.0000632) (0.0000636) 
 Bbord 0.00000829 0.000174** 0.000461** 0.000585** 
  (0.0000072) (0.0000825) (0.0000869) (0.0000871) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.95 0.21 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 1 283 150 605 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% 
and 5% level is denoted by * or **. 
City dummies are included but not 
reported. The mean border effect is 
computed using the Bbord estimate 
and the average of the good specific 
distance effect and the average 
distance effect of all goods.  The 
proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.21 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.22. 
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Table 1.6b Good 6   Good 7   Good 8 
 
 Equation 1.21 US: Household Furn. & Op. US: Men's and Boy's Apparel US: Women's and Girl's App. 
  
Can: Housing exc. shelter Can: .8058(Men)+.1942(Boy) Can: .8355(Wom.)+.1645(Girl) 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.000009* 0.0000113* 0.0000801** 0.0000838** 0.000217 0.000219 
  (0.0000051) (0.0000064) (0.0000246) (0.000026) (0.000143) (0.000146) 
 Bbord 0.0000403** 0.000205** 0.000348** 0.000491** 0.001273** 0.001423** 
  (0.00000687) (0.00000848) (0.000029) (0.0000304) (0.000155) (0.000156) 
 Proportion of the   
            
 border effect due to   0.80 0.29 0.11 
 incomplete pass-through  
            
Mean border effect (mi.) 4 633 193 1358 12897 35497 
  Good 9   Good 10   
  US: Footwear US: Private Transportation 
  Can: Footwear Can: Private Transportation 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.0000087 0.0000119 0.00000659 0.00000683 
  (0.0000366) (0.0000338) (0.00000439) (0.00000498) 
 Bbord -0.000051 0.00011** 0.000102** 0.000221** 
  (0.0000512) (0.0000519) (0.00000812) (0.0000107) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   1 0.54 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 0 31 32 1802 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% 
and 5% level is denoted by * or **. 
City dummies are included but not 
reported. The mean border effect is 
computed using the Bbord estimate 
and the average of the good specific 
distance effect and the average 
distance effect of all goods.  The 
proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.21 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.22. 
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Table 1.6c Good 11   Good 12   
 Equation 1.21 US: Public Transportation US: Medical Care 
  
Can: Public Transportation Can: Medical Care 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.000212** 0.000214** 0.0000091 0.0000013 
  (0.0000577) (0.000059) (0.0000046) (0.000007) 
 Bbord 0.001445** 0.001597** 0.0000972** 0.000267** 
  (0.0000762) (0.000079) (0.00000672) (0.0000087) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.10 .64 
 incomplete pass-through  
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 55490 160166 24 21203 
  
  Good 13   Good 14   
  US: Personal Care US: Entertainment 
  Can: Personal Care Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(Rd.) 
  
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
Equation 
1.21 Equation 1.22 
 Bdist  0.00000170 0.00000334 0.0000068 0.0000087 
  (0.00000823) (0.00000884) (0.00000441) (0.00000579) 
 Bbord 0.0000386** 0.000194** 0.0000441** 0.000203** 
  (0.0000109) (0.0000113) (0.00000586) (0.0000069) 
 Proportion of the   
        
 border effect due to   0.80 0.78 
 incomplete pass-through 
        
Mean border effect (mi.) 4 1092 4 783 
Note: Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  Significance at the 
10% and 5% level is denoted by * or 
**. City dummies are included but 
not reported. The mean border 
effect is computed using the Bbord 
estimate and the average of the 
good specific distance effect and the 
average distance effect of all goods.  
The proportion of the border effect is 
calculated as the Bbord of Eq. 1.21 
divided by the Bbord of Eq. 1.22. 
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Table 1.7  
    
 
Average of ALL          
pass-through 
estimates 
Std. Dev. of ALL 
pass-through 
estimates 
% of 
significant 
estimates 
Average of 
significant          
pass-through 
estimates 
Std. Dev. of 
significant pass-
through 
estimates 
Good 1 0.054 0.115 40.5% 0.041 0.164 
Good 2 -0.016 0.069 22.2% -0.028 0.105 
Good 3 -0.085 0.121 61.1% -0.132 0.121 
Good 4 -0.014 0.078 24.6% 0.018 0.126 
Good 5 0.143 0.238 71.4% 0.189 0.261 
Good 6 -0.015 0.070 24.6% -0.014 0.052 
Good 7 0.055 0.261 74.6% 0.050 0.300 
Good 8  -0.014 0.499 87.3% -0.017 0.533 
Good 9 0.040 0.225 75.4% 0.052 0.251 
Good 10 0.032 0.088 25.4% -0.022 0.129 
Good 11 
-0.038 0.181 44.4% -0.005 0.118 
Good 12 -0.061 0.096 44.4% -0.106 0.103 
Good 13 0.018 0.119 46.8% 0.004 0.156 
Good 14 0.013 0.077 29.4% 0.027 0.123 
Note: As the standard errors of the regression in Eq. 1.13 are not robust to heteroskedasticity there is the potential for 
incorrect measurement of significance of the pass-through estimates.  In total only 83.4% of the pass-through estimates 
have homoskedastic errors based on a 5% confidence interval. 
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Table 1.8a 
  
Goods and commodities Goods and commodities 
Food Food 
White bread, 1 kg (supermarket) Beef: filet mignon (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
White bread, 1 kg (mid-priced store) Beef: filet mignon (1 kg)  (mid-priced store) 
Butter, 500 g (supermarket) Beef: steak, entrecote (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Butter, 500 g (mid-priced store) Beef: steak, entrecote (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Margarine, 500 g (supermarket) Beef: stewing, shoulder (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Margarine, 500 g (mid-priced store) Beef: stewing, shoulder (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
White rice, 1 kg (supermarket) Beef: roast (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
White rice, 1 kg (mid-priced store) Beef: roast (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Spaghetti (1 kg)  (supermarket) Beef: ground or minced (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Spaghetti (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Beef: ground or minced (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Flour, white (1 kg)  (supermarket) Veal: chops (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Flour, white (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Veal: chops (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Sugar, white (1 kg)  (supermarket) Veal: fillet (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Sugar, white (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Veal: fillet (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Cheese, imported (500 g)  (supermarket) Veal: roast (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Cheese, imported (500 g)  (mid-priced store) Veal: roast (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Cornflakes (375 g)  (supermarket) Lamb: leg (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Cornflakes (375 g) (mid-priced store) Lamb: leg (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Yoghurt, natural (150 g)  (supermarket) Lamb: chops (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Yoghurt, natural (150 g) (mid-priced store) Lamb: chops (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Milk, pasteurised (1 l)  (supermarket) Lamb: stewing (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Milk, pasteurised (1 l) (mid-priced store) Lamb: stewing (1 kg)  (mid-priced store) 
Olive oil (1 l)  (supermarket) Pork: chops (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Olive oil (1 l) (mid-priced store) Pork: chops (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Peanut or corn oil (1 l)  (supermarket) Pork: loin (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Peanut or corn oil (1 l) (mid-priced store) Pork: loin (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Potatoes (2 kg)  (supermarket) Ham: whole (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Potatoes (2 kg)  (mid-priced store) Ham: whole (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Onions (1 kg)  (supermarket) Bacon (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Onions (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Bacon (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Mushrooms (1 kg)  (supermarket) Chicken: frozen (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Mushrooms (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Chicken: frozen (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Tomatoes (1 kg)  (supermarket) Chicken: fresh (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Tomatoes (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Chicken: fresh (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Carrots (1 kg)  (supermarket) Frozen fish fingers (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Carrots (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Frozen fish fingers (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
Oranges (1 kg)  (supermarket) Fresh fish (1 kg)  (supermarket) 
Oranges (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Fresh fish (1 kg) (mid-priced store) 
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Table 1.8b 
  
Goods and commodities Goods and commodities 
Food Clothing 
Apples (1 kg)  (supermarket) Business suit, two piece, medium weight (chain store) 
Apples (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Business suit, two piece, medium weight (mid-priced) 
Lemons (1 kg)  (supermarket) Business shirt, white (chain store) 
Lemons (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Business shirt, white  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Bananas (1 kg)  (supermarket) Men's shoes, business wear (chain store) 
Bananas (1 kg) (mid-priced store) Men's shoes, business wear  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Lettuce (one)  (supermarket) Men's raincoat, Burberry type (chain store) 
Lettuce (one) (mid-priced store) Men's raincoat, Burberry type  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Eggs (12)  (supermarket) Socks, wool mixture (chain store) 
Eggs (12) (mid-priced store) Socks, wool mixture  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Peas, canned (250 g)  (supermarket) Dress, ready to wear, daytime (chain store) 
Peas, canned (250 g) (mid-priced store) Dress, ready to wear, daytime  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Tomatoes, canned (250 g)  (supermarket) Women's shoes, town (chain store) 
Tomatoes, canned (250 g) (mid-priced store) Women's shoes, town (mid-priced/branded store) 
Peaches, canned (500 g)  (supermarket) Women's cardigan sweater (chain store) 
Peaches, canned (500 g) (mid-priced store) Women's cardigan sweater (mid-priced/branded store) 
Sliced pineapples, canned (500 g)  (supermarket) Women's raincoat, Burberry type (chain store) 
Sliced pineapples, canned (500 g) (mid-priced store) Women's raincoat, Burberry type (mid-priced store) 
Instant coffee (125 g)  (supermarket) Tights, panty hose  (chain store) 
Instant coffee (125 g) (mid-priced store) Tights, panty hose (mid-priced/branded store) 
Ground coffee (500 g)  (supermarket) Child's jeans  (chain store) 
Ground coffee (500 g) (mid-priced store) Child's jeans (mid-priced/branded store) 
Tea bags (25 bags)  (supermarket) Child's shoes, dresswear (chain store) 
Tea bags (25 bags) (mid-priced store) Child's shoes, dresswear  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Cocoa (250 g)  (supermarket) Child's shoes, sportswear  (chain store) 
Cocoa (250 g) (mid-priced store) Child's shoes, sportswear  (mid-priced/branded store) 
Drinking chocolate (500 g)  (supermarket) Girl's dress (chain store) 
Drinking chocolate (500 g) (mid-priced store) Girl's dress (mid-priced/branded store) 
Coca-Cola (1 l)  (supermarket) Boy's jacket, smart  (chain store) 
Coca-Cola (1 l) (mid-priced store) Boy's jacket, smart (mid-priced/branded store) 
Tonic water (200 ml)  (supermarket) Boy's dress trousers  (chain store) 
Tonic water (200 ml) (mid-priced store) Boy's dress trousers (mid-priced/branded store) 
Mineral water (1 l)  (supermarket) Tobacco 
Mineral water (1 l) (mid-priced store) Cigarettes, Marlboro (pack of 20) (supermarket) 
Orange juice (1 l)  (supermarket) Cigarettes, Marlboro (pack of 20) (mid-priced store) 
Orange juice (1 l)  (mid-priced store) Cigarettes, local brand (pack of 20) (supermarket) 
  Cigarettes, local brand (pack of 20) (mid-priced store) 
  Pipe tobacco (50 g) (average) 
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Table 1.8c 
  
Goods and commodities Goods and commodities 
Alcohol Household Supplies 
Wine, common table (1 l) (supermarket) Soap (100 g) (supermarket) 
Wine, common table (1 l) (mid-priced store) Soap (100 g) (mid-priced store) 
Wine, superior quality (700 ml)  (supermarket) Laundry detergent (3 l) (supermarket) 
Wine, superior quality (700 ml)  (mid-priced store) Laundry detergent (3 l) (mid-priced store) 
Wine, fine quality (700 ml)  (supermarket) Toilet tissue (two rolls) (supermarket) 
Wine, fine quality (700 ml) (mid-priced store) Toilet tissue (two rolls) (mid-priced store) 
Beer, local brand (1 l) (supermarket) Dishwashing liquid (750 ml) (supermarket) 
Beer, local brand (1 l) (mid-priced store) Dishwashing liquid (750 ml) (mid-priced store) 
Beer, top quality (330 ml) (supermarket) Insect-killer spray (330 g) (supermarket) 
Beer, top quality (330 ml) (mid-priced store) Insect-killer spray (330 g) (mid-priced store) 
Scotch whisky, six years old (700 ml) (supermarket) Light bulbs (two, 60 watts) (supermarket) 
Scotch whisky, six years old (700 ml) (mid-priced store) Light bulbs (two, 60 watts) (mid-priced store) 
Gin, Gilbey's or equivalent (700 ml) (supermarket) Batteries (two, size D/LR20) (supermarket) 
Gin, Gilbey's or equivalent (700 ml) (mid-priced store) Batteries (two, size D/LR20) (mid-priced store) 
Vermouth, Martini & Rossi (1 l) (supermarket) Frying pan (Teflon or good equivalent) (supermarket) 
Vermouth, Martini & Rossi (1 l) (mid-priced store) Frying pan (Teflon or good equivalent) (mid-priced) 
Cognac, French VSOP  (700 ml) (supermarket) Electric toaster (for two slices) (supermarket) 
Cognac, French VSOP  (700 ml) (mid-priced store) Electric toaster (for two slices) (mid-priced store) 
Liqueur, Cointreau (700 ml) (supermarket) Laundry (one shirt) (standard high-street outlet) 
Liqueur, Cointreau (700 ml) (mid-priced store) Laundry (one shirt) (mid-priced outlet) 
Personal Care Dry cleaning, man's suit (standard high-street outlet) 
Aspirins (100 tablets) (supermarket) Dry cleaning, man's suit (mid-priced outlet) 
Aspirins (100 tablets) (mid-priced store) Dry cleaning, woman's dress (standard high-street) 
Razor blades (five pieces) (supermarket) Dry cleaning, woman's dress (mid-priced outlet) 
Razor blades (five pieces) (mid-priced store) Dry cleaning, trousers (standard high-street outlet) 
Toothpaste with fluoride (120 g) (supermarket) Dry cleaning, trousers (mid-priced outlet) 
Toothpaste with fluoride (120 g) (mid-priced store) Recreation 
Facial tissues (box of 100) (supermarket) Compact disc album (average) 
Facial tissues (box of 100) (mid-priced store) Television, colour (66 cm)  (average) 
Hand lotion (125 ml) (supermarket) Kodak colour film (36 exposures) (average) 
Hand lotion (125 ml) (mid-priced store) Cost of developing 36 colour pictures (average) 
Shampoo & conditioner in one (400 ml) (supermarket) International foreign daily newspaper (average) 
Shampoo & conditioner in one (400 ml) (mid-priced) Daily local newspaper (average) 
Lipstick (deluxe type) (supermarket) International weekly news magazine (Time) (average) 
Lipstick (deluxe type) (mid-priced store) Paperback novel (at bookstore) (average) 
Man's haircut (tips included) (average) Three-course dinner for four people (average) 
Woman's cut & blow dry (tips included) (average) Personal computer (64 MB) (average) 
  Four best seats at theatre or concert (average) 
  Four best seats at cinema (average) 
 
 
  
Table 1.9 
  
  
  
  
  
      
 Equation 1.24              
  Food Alcohol Household Sup. Recreation 
 Bdist  -9.26E-07 2.30E-07 -3.17E-07 -2.77E-07 
  (7.75E-07) (4.53E-07) (6.51E-07) (0.00000204 
 Bbp  3.891*** 1.759*** 2.968*** 4.405*** 
  (0.544) (0.348) (0.428) (1.427) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  5.31 2.18 4.6 2.39 
 R-squared  0.6519 0.6152 0.7154 0.4896 
 Proportion of the   
                
 border effect due to   0.26 0.57 0.34 0.23 
 incomplete pass-
through  
                
Mean border effect (mi.) N/A e^23668 N/A N/A 
  
          
    
  
Personal Care Tobacco Clothing 
      
 Bdist  1.30E-07 1.07E-07 -3.79E-07     
  (7.93E-07) (7.14E-07) (5.61E-07)     
 Bbp  1.729*** 9.098*** 2.398***     
  (0.564) (0.889) (0.633)     
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  1.29 9.11 2.21     
 R-squared  0.6717 0.8915 0.6408     
 Proportion of the   
                
 border effect due to   0.58 0.11 0.42 
    
 incomplete pass-
through 
                
Mean border effect (mi.) e^41230 N/A N/A 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** or *** respectively. The Mean Border Effect 
is calculated using the Bdist of the good in question; if Bdist is negative the calculation can not be made. If the estimation of Bdist is insignificant then the 
Mean Border Effect can not be easily interpreted. City Dummies and Good Dummies are included but not reported.     
 
55
 
  56 
Figure 1.1a 
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Figure 1.1b 
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Figure 1.1c 
Distribution of 
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Figure 1.2 
Good 1 - pass-through estimates 
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Figure 1.2 (cont.) 
Good 4 - pass-through estimates
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Figure 1.2 (cont.) 
Good 7 - pass-through estimates
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Figure 1.2 (cont.) 
Good 10 - pass-through estimates
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Figure 1.2 (cont.) 
Good 13 - pass-through estimate
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH INTO U.S. IMPORTS: THE ROLE OF THE 
EXPORTING COUNTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
Using U.S. import data of 96,739 unit value observations from 57 countries of 253 
goods, I find a significant, positive relationship between the country specific pass-through 
rate and the exporter’s long term monetary volatility or the exporter’s long term average 
inflation.  Short-term price volatility significantly decreases the pass-through rate.  This 
provides evidence for the effect of short term and long term inflation given in Taylor (2000).  
The IIT index and exporter’s market share both significantly increase the good specific pass-
through rate but not the country specific pass-through rate.    
There has been a large amount of research on the determinants of exchange rate pass-
through over the last 10 years.  The work of Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) finds that 
distance, tariffs, per-capita GDP, GDP, wages, long-term inflation and exchange rate 
volatility all significantly affect the pass-through coefficient for a variety of price 
measurements.  Devereux and Yetman (2003) further substantiate the positive relationship 
between long-term inflation and exchange rate pass-through.   
Of utmost relevance for this paper are the procedures employed by Yang (1997) as 
well as Campa and Goldberg (2002).  For these papers, a two-stage regression framework is 
used to determine the sign and significance of several possible determinants of the pass-
through rate.  Yang finds that greater product differentiation leads to greater exchange rate 
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pass-through.  Campa and Goldberg find evidence that high rates of long-term inflation in the 
importing country lead to higher pass-through rates.  Also, Campa and Goldberg find that the 
country’s imputed elasticity tends to hold more explanatory power than variables concerning 
the importing country’s macroeconomic condition.  The imputed elasticity is the aggregate 
good specific pass-through rate for the importing country; the variable is designed to control 
for the good composition of trade flows. 
Yet, the datasets used by Yang (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2002) bear some 
limitations.   
Yang’s dataset cannot identify the exporting country and only has one importing 
country.  As a result, Yang cannot test macroeconomic variables and is limited solely to 
microeconomic explanations.  In addition, Yang can only test the determinants of good 
specific pass-through rates, not country specific pass-through rates. 
Campa and Goldberg’s data uses import indexes from 25 OECD countries for 5 
aggregated good categories: Food, Energy, Raw Materials, Manufactured Products and Non-
Manufactured Products.  Again, it is not possible to identify the exporting country.  
Consequently, the authors can only use macroeconomic statistics pertaining to the importing 
country but not the exporting country’s macroeconomic situation.  Also, because the data 
includes only 5 good categories, the authors can only test country specific pass-through rates, 
not good specific pass-through rates.   
The dataset used in this paper represents the most recent figures studied to date: with 
observations drawn of 3-digit SITC import data from 2000-2003 as posted by the USITC.  
This represents the largest sample studied to date: 96,739 observations culled from 253 goods 
originating from 57 exporting countries during 16 quarterly time periods.   
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One advantage to this data is the ability to identify the exporting country, with the 
corresponding disadvantage of only one importing country: enabling us to study the 
importance of macroeconomic variables from the exporting country for the first time.  
However, because the dataset has only one importing country, it is not possible to estimate 
the affect of the importing country’s macroeconomic variables.   
A second advantage of this data is the ability to test the determinants of both country 
specific pass-through rates and good specific pass-through rates.  The country specific pass-
through rates represent the pass-through coefficient of Country A’s exports into the United 
States.  The good specific pass-through rates are calculated for each of the 253 3-digit SITC 
goods. 
In this dataset, microeconomic determinants tend to affect good specific pass-through 
rates significantly, but not country specific pass-through rates.  Macroeconomic conditions in 
the exporting country tend to affect both good and country specific pass-through rates 
significantly. 
I find the theoretical work of Taylor (2000) to be empirically relevant.  As Taylor 
suggests, long-term high inflation increases the pass-through rate while short-term price 
instability decreases the pass-through rate.  The data herein supports Taylor’s conclusion.  
Long-term inflation in the exporting country, working through channel of long-term money 
supply volatility in the exporting country, has a significant, positive relationship with the 
pass-through rate.  Meanwhile, short-term price volatility in the exporting country has a 
significant, negative relationship with good and country specific pass-through rates.  Taylor’s 
model would suggest that it is the persistence of price changes that create greater pass-
through.  As short-term changes are viewed as less persistent, less exchange rate pass-
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through occurs.  Long-term inflation, being more persistent, tends to boost the degree of 
pass-through.  
Both the Intra-Industry Trade Index, a measure of product differentiation, and the 
exporter’s share of the U.S. market significantly increase good specific pass-through rates, 
but have no significant effect on country specific pass-through rates. This corresponds to the 
predictions made in Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002).  As the Intra-Industry Trade Index 
increases so too does the level of product differentiation: the greater the level of product 
differentiation, the less competitive the market.  Likewise, the larger the exporter’s market 
share, the less competitive the market.  In Bachetta and van Wincoop’s model less 
competition makes it more likely for exporter’s to use the importing country’s currency to 
denominate their price (local currency pricing); as a result, pass-through rates should be 
smaller for goods with less competition.  Another microeconomic variable, the imputed 
elasticity is insignificant in this dataset. 
  The outline of this paper is as follows.  In section 2.2 I will review both the 
empirical and theoretical research that has already been conducted on this topic, highlighting 
important factors that help to determine the rate of pass-through.  Section 2.3 concerns the 
data and methodology to be used in this study.  Section 2.4 will assess the results while 
section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
 Before establishing the data and methodology of this paper it is necessary to review 
both the theoretical and empirical work that has come before.  First, the theoretical papers of 
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importance will be discussed.  Second, the empirical papers will be examined to see what 
findings have been made regarding the theory.   
Because the data used in this study has only one importer but many exporters, I will 
focus on the previous literature on the context of a single importer with many exporters.  In 
this way we can examine what the previous literature would suggest given the dataset of this 
paper.   
Taylor (2000) states that the decline in pass-through during the 1990’s may be due to 
an environment of persistent low inflation.  How does he come to this conclusion?   I 
examine Taylor’s simplest model below.     
Suppose the demand for the firm’s product, tq , is given by the following linear 
demand curve. 
tttt ppq εβ +−= )(           (2.1) 
tε  is a random component to the demand.  The firm is allowed to sets its price, tp , 
every fourth period. The price of other differentiated goods in the market is tp , which is the 
four-period average of recent prices set by other groups of firms, 
4/)( * 3* 2* 1* −−− +++= ttttt ppppp . 
The firm’s expected profit for the four periods in which the price is set is given 
below. 
( )∑
=
++−=
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i
itittt qcpEpi          (2.2) 
The cost parameter, tc , is a function of both the costs of production and the exchange 
rate. By substituting Eq. 2.1 into Eq. 2.2 and differentiating with respect to the firm’s price, 
the optimal price can be calculated. 
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If there is a permanent increase in the cost, then .5 of that permanent cost will pass-
through to the price of the firm.  However, if the cost increase occurs in only one period, then 
only .125 of that cost increase will pass-through to the firm’s price.  Persistent changes will 
have greater pass-through to the firm’s price; fleeting changes have smaller pass-through to 
the price.   
Thus, the degree to which a firm reacts to a change in cost is dependent upon how 
permanent the cost change is (regardless of the source of the cost change, be it from an input, 
tax or exchange rate change).  Thus, firms are more willing to pass-through any exchange 
rate changes to the price of their goods if they believe that the exchange rate change is 
lasting.   
According to Taylor, if there is a large difference in the inflation rate of the exporting 
country and the inflation rate of the importing country then it is more likely that exchange 
rate changes are persistent; thus, higher exchange rate pass-through will occur.  Conversely, 
if there is only a small difference in the inflation rate of the exporting country and the 
inflation rate of the importing country then the firm may consider exchange rate changes to 
be short-lived.  Pass-through of the fleeting exchange rate changes will be low.   
For the dataset in this paper, the importing country is always the United States.  
Long-term inflation in the United States is fairly low compared to other countries. What 
would Taylor’s mode predict? If the exporting country has high long-term inflation then the 
prices of goods from that exporting country should exhibit greater pass-through.     
Thus for the purposes of this paper’s dataset, high long term inflation in the exporting 
country should be correlated with higher exchange rate pass-through in the prices of goods 
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from that exporting country.  Less persistent or short-lived price instability should be 
correlated with lower exchange rate pass-through.  These predictions will be tested in section 
2.4.   
It is not possible to consider the determinants of exchange rate pass-through without 
examining the literature on the currency denomination of trade.  The choice of currency 
denomination by a single firm can be representative of the entire country.  Indeed, exchange 
rate pass-through can be viewed as merely the aggregation of currency denomination choices 
by individual firms.  If the majority of exporters set their prices in their own currency, i.e. 
producer currency pricing, then exchange rate pass-through will be high.  However, if the 
majority of exporters set their prices in the currency of their trading partners, i.e. local 
currency pricing, then exchange rate pass-through will be low. 
Devereux and Engel (2001) consider the optimal currency denomination from the 
viewpoint of an exporting firm11.  Mixing aspects of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Friberg 
(1998), Devereux and Engel model price setting behavior for periods in which the exchange 
rate is not yet realized.  The exchange rate is a function of the money supply of the importing 
country and exporting country.  When the level of money growth is comparable between the 
two countries the exchange rate is fairly stable; exporting firms employ local currency 
pricing so that the cash flows from sales are stable (exchange rate pass-through will be low).  
If the exporting country has large monetary volatility relative to the importing country then 
exporters will tend to invoice in the importer’s currency.  However, if the exporting country 
tends to have very stable monetary policy relative to the importing country, then the 
exporting firm would have an incentive to use producer currency pricing.  
                                                 
11
 Further extensions are given in Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004). 
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I focus on these results within the context of this study.  The importing country, the 
United States, has relatively stable money growth.  The money growth volatility of the 
exporting countries in this dataset varies.  According to Devereux and Engel, those exporting 
countries with high money growth volatility will see their firms choose local currency 
pricing; the exporter’s money growth volatility should correspond to lower exchange rate 
pass-through.  
I contrast the results of Devereux and Engel (2001) with those of Taylor (2000).  
Long-term monetary instability has a tendency to lead to persistent inflation12.  In Taylor’s 
model, persistent inflation in the exporting country leads to persistent exchange rate 
movements and greater exchange rate pass-through.  In Devereux and Engel, monetary 
instability in the exporting country will lead to lower pass-through.  
The nature of the disagreement is in the exports of goods from countries with more 
volatile money growth.  Taylor and Lucas (1972) would suggest that the price of these 
exports would exhibit high exchange rate pass-through; Devereux and Engel disagree. 
 Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002) continue the theoretical analysis of the currency 
denomination of trade.  The authors show that increased competition will make it more likely 
that an exporting firm will choose local currency pricing.  The more competitive the market, 
the smaller the exchange rate pass-through should be.  
 Consider a simple model where an exporting firm must choose to denominate their 
price in the importing country’s currency (I) or the exporting country’s currency (E).  The 
firm must choose between two profit functions. 
 µµµµ
µµ
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pi
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           (2.4) 
                                                 
12
 A foundation for the non-neutrality of money can be found in Lucas (1972). 
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The firm’s demand is given by µ−= pq  where the elasticity of demand is given by 
µ .  The marginal cost is denoted by c and the future, unknown exchange rate is e.  As the 
exchange rate is unknown, the firm would prefer to denominate their price in the currency 
that offers the smallest variance of their profit. 
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The more competition in the market for the good, the larger µ  becomes, 
)( IV pi decreases while )( EV pi increases.  Conversely, suppose the market for the firm’s good 
is perfectly inelastic, µ = 0.  In the perfectly inelastic market )( EV pi = 0; the firm will prefer 
to use producer currency pricing and the resulting pass-through rate is high in the 
uncompetitive market. On the other hand, the more competition there is for the firm’s 
product, the more likely the firm will use local currency pricing; exchange rate pass-through 
will fall.      
Through their modeling framework Bachetta and van Wincoop highlight two 
variables for the measurement of international competition: market share and product 
differentiation.  The greater the exporter’s market share and product differentiation, the less 
competition in the market: and the more likely that the exporter will engage in producer 
currency pricing.  Thus, higher exporter market share and greater product differentiation 
should result in larger pass-through coefficients13.  The dataset used in this paper allows us to 
test the effect of exporter market share and product differentiation on exchange rate pass-
through.     
                                                 
13
 This mirrors the pricing power argument in Taylor (2000). 
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One element not modeled in the above papers is the cost of obtaining foreign 
currency14.  Black (1991) describes how transaction costs, specifically the bid-ask spread, 
encourage the use of vehicle currencies.  If the models of currency denomination have 
relevance to exchange rate pass-through then it is likely that larger bid-ask spreads should 
entail larger pass-through coefficients.  Why?  Because the firm would prefer not to pay the 
transaction cost of obtaining foreign currency.  By using producer currency pricing, the firm 
forces buyers to pay the exchange rate transaction cost.  A large bid-ask spread, would 
denote a large transaction cost of obtaining foreign currency. Thus, if exporters choose the 
currency in which to invoice, then a large bid-ask spread would mean that local currency 
pricing is more costly than producer currency pricing.  The larger the bid-ask spread, the 
more likely that exporting firms will choose producer currency pricing.  Thus, the bid-ask 
spread, or transaction cost of obtaining foreign currency, should be positively related to the 
pass-through coefficient.    
With a theoretical review in place, I turn to the empirical record.  Yang (1997) 
implements a two-stage regression framework.  The first stage is used to find the exchange 
rate pass-through coefficient ka1 . 
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tkMP ,  represents the U.S. import price index value at time t for industry k.  tE  is the 
exchange rate index for the U.S. dollar.  tkPP ,  is the U.S. producer price index value.  Yang 
                                                 
14
 The decrease in bid-ask spreads in foreign currency markets has been dramatic over the last 20 years.  Thus, 
as the transaction costs involved have been of decreasing importance it is not surprising that this additional 
variable has been left out of the theoretical literature.  
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uses 64 nonoverlapping three-digit and four-digit SIC industries from 1980 to 1987 as a 
sample.  Thus, the author ends up with one pass-through coefficient, ka1ˆ , for each industry.  
The second stage uses the good specific pass-through rates as a dependent variable in 
the following regression: 
kkkkk uMRcEMCcPDcca ++++= 32101ˆ       (2.7)    
All RHS variables are taken from U.S. data sources15. kPD  is a measurement of 
product differentiation for industry k.  kEMC  is a measure of marginal cost elasticity as 
given by a capital to labor ratio while kMR  is the ratio of total imports to total supply for 
industry k.  Four different measures for product differentiation are tested by the author: the 
ratio of scientists and engineers to total employment, the ratio of non-production workers to 
total employment, advertising intensity and the intra-industry trade index.  Of the four 
variables that describe product differentiation, only advertising intensity is found to be 
insignificant.  The three other measures have a significant and positive effect on the pass-
through coefficient: as the model of Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002) would imply.   
While Yang (1997) uses only microeconomic data as possible determinants of the 
good specific pass-through coefficient, Campa and Goldberg (2002) explore the importance 
of macroeconomic variables as well.  The aim of Campa and Goldberg’s first stage 
regression is to estimate country specific pass-through coefficients.   The authors include 
GDP growth of the importing country as well as lagged “wage growth” variables meant to 
capture the costs for a basket of exporters16.  The price data employed are quarterly import 
indexes from 25 OECD countries of 5 broadly defined goods covering 1977 to 1999.  
                                                 
15
 For a complete list please see the Data Appendix in Yang (1997). 
 
16
 The creation of the “wage growth” variables involves a price index, nominal and real exchange rate series.  
The construction is given in better detail in Campa and Goldberg (2002). 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to pinpoint the exporter for the five goods in question; thus, 
only the macroeconomic conditions of the importing country are considered in the second 
stage. 
The second stage regression, with the country specific pass-through rate,γ , used as 
the dependent variable is as follows: 
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Eq. 2.8 includes the importer’s average money growth rate, the importer’s average 
inflation rate, exchange rate volatility, the importer’s real GDP and an imputed elasticity 
variable.  j represents the importing country and t is the time.  jα  and tα  correspond to 
country and time dummies respectively. 
The imputed elasticity variable, jtimputed , represents the importer’s aggregate pass-
through elasticity: the sole microeconomic variable tested.  jtimputed  is designed to track the 
dynamic level of import composition for the five different goods.  Specifically, the exchange 
rate pass-through coefficient for each of the five goods is estimated over the entire sample 
period.  The imputed elasticity variable is then weighted by the import share values of the 
five goods, Energy (E), Food (F), Raw Materials (RM), Manufacturing (M) and Non-
manufacturing (NM), as shown below: 
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The authors find the imputed elasticity variable to be highly significant.  The 
significance of the imputed elasticity variable is, perhaps, not surprising given the risks of 
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endogeneity between the imputed elasticity variable and the pass-through coefficient.  
Overall, the authors find that the imputed elasticity variable holds almost all of the Eq. 2.8’s 
explanatory value.  The importing country’s macroeconomic variables are found to have 
limited impact.  Despite the statistical insignificance, the authors note that there is some 
evidence that greater inflation in the importing country and exchange rate volatility lead to 
larger exchange rate pass-through. 
While Yang (1997) tests only microeconomic explanations for variations in good 
specific pass-through rates, Campa and Goldberg (2002) test the effect of the importing 
country’s macroeconomic situation and the imputed elasticity on country specific pass-
through rates.  The dataset in this paper allows us to test the effect of the exporting country’s 
macroeconomic situation along with microeconomic concerns (imputed elasticity, exporter’s 
market share and product differentiation) on both country and good specific pass-through 
rates.   
Given the framework developed by Yang (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2002), 
there is evidence that microeconomic variables are of great importance to the level of 
exchange rate pass-through.  Taylor (2000) explains the importance of long-term inflation, 
short-term price volatility and exchange rate volatility.  Devereux and Engel (2002) note the 
consequences of monetary instability.  Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002) stress the effects of 
international competition as evidenced by market share and product differentiation.  In 
section 2.3, I will develop a modeling framework to test the findings of these papers 
described in section 2.2.    
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
 The prices studied in this paper are created using 3-digit SITC unit value data 
composed by the U.S. International Trade Commission.  Collected on a quarterly basis from 
2000 to 2003, the prices represent the most recent data studied to date.  As a result of using 
this data, there is only one importing country: the United States.  The exporting country can 
be identified for 57 countries with varying degrees of exchange rate independence.  The 
countries are categorized as having a banded exchange rate regime, managed floating 
exchange rate regime, common monetary union (Euro zone member) or independently 
floating exchange rate regime.  For details on these exporting countries please see Table 
2.117. 
 The first-stage regression in this paper finds the country specific pass-through 
rate, jγ , using three different methods: 
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17
 These categories are as given by the IMF document “Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Monetary Policy Frameworks” dated June 30, 2004. 
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tkjp ,, represents the unit value of good k at time t from exporting country j.  tkUSp ,,  
represents the unit value of good k at time t for U.S. exports.  tje ,  is the average quarterly 
exchange rate between the U.S. and country j at time t.  The tariff rate of good k at time t 
from country j is given by tkj ,,τ .   In Eq. 2.10b and Eq. 2.10c the coefficients 5α , 6α and 7α  are 
included to control for changes in the importing country’s macroeconomic situation.   5α  
captures the volatility of quarterly U.S. money growth (over 4 years).  6α  is the coefficient 
on short-term (2 year) quarterly U.S. CPI volatility.  7α  denotes the effect of long-term (5 
year) annual U.S. average inflation. In Eq. 2.10c the Inter-Industry Trade Index and 
exporter’s market share are included to control for good specific effects when estimating the 
country specific pass-through rate.  A theoretical justification for Eq. 2.10 is located in the 
Appendix.     
Within Eq. 2.10 there is a U.S. price variable, an exchange rate variable and a tariff 
variable.  As shown in Chapter 3, there is a theoretical link between these variables at a 
micro level; firms use this data when making their own price-setting decisions.  While Eq. 
2.10 is a standard regression formulation used recently in Campa and Goldberg (2002), 
Coughlin and Pollard (2004) and Yang (1997), there is the theoretical potential for an 
unstable level of multicollinearity among the relevant RHS variables. 
However, the data used in Eq. 2.10 is aggregated into a more macro level statistic, 
weakening the potential of an unstable level of multicollinearity.  One way to test this is to 
see if there is a condition index statistic greater than 10.  For Eq. 2.10a the condition index 
statistic is 1.7 while the condition index statistic of Eq. 2.10c is 12.7.  This suggests that any 
unstable level of multicollinearity originates from the additional control variables related to 
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money supply, short-term and long-term inflation, IIT index and the exporting country’s 
market share but not from the U.S. price variable, exchange rate variable and tariff variable. 
Each regression equation is undertaken once for each of the 57 exporting countries18.  
The pass-through coefficients are estimated using a total of 96,739 observations.  I find 
reason to believe Eq. 2.10a and Eq. 2.10b estimate the statistically best country specific pass-
through rate.  However, I believe that economic theory would require the control of 
microeconomic characteristics when estimating country specific pass-through rates; leading 
me to believe that Eq. 2.10c leads to the best economic estimates of country specific pass-
through rates.  Regardless, the results from all three methods tend to produce very similar 
results.  For a more detailed discussion of model selection please see the Appendix (where a 
multiple exchange rate lag structure is used to find the pass-through coefficient, Eq. B.11). 
Also, pass-through coefficients estimated by Eq. 2.10 can be found in Table B.2 of the 
Appendix.   
Eq. 2.10 is regressed via Weighted Least Squares.  Specifically, observations are 
weighted by the total value of the imports of good k at time t.  As a result, those observations 
with greater total import value are given more weight.  Because unit value data tends to be 
more volatile than other price data, those observations with the greatest total value are likely 
to produce more accurate unit values.  Thus, observations with greater total import value 
should be weighted by the total value of imports in order to produce more accurate estimates 
of the pass-through rate19.  
                                                 
18
 For the same reason as Campa and Goldberg (2002), namely the rejection of a cointegration hypothesis, an 
error correction model was not applied.  
 
19
 Campa and Goldberg use a Weighted Least Squares method that aims to do the same: to reduce the 
importance of more noisy LHS variables. 
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The country specific pass-through rates as estimated are representative of the total 
value of all exports from country j.  That is, jγ  represents the exchange rate pass-through 
estimates for an exporting country’s goods; this is not a traditional pass-through coefficient 
based on the perspective of an importer.  Instead, the estimates of Eq. 2.10 represent the 
exchange rate pass-through for the United States from each of the 57 exporting countries 
studied.       
The exchange rate pass-through estimates become dependent variables in the 
following second-stage regression motivated by Yang (1997) and Campa and Goldberg 
(2002).  Again, the observations are weighted as in Eq. 2.10 with greater weight being placed 
on countries with a greater total value of imports. 
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 The descriptive statistics for these RHS variables are given in Table 2.2.  Predictions 
of signs for the coefficients in Eq. 2.11 are given Table 2.3.    
BI , MI , and EI  are indicator variables for countries that have either a banded 
exchange rate, managed floating exchange rate or are members of the Euro zone respectively. 
jBAspread  is the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the reported exchange 
rate as averaged over the investigation period for exporting country j 
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6β  is the coefficient on exchange rate volatility.  7β  and 8β  are the coefficients on 
exporter GDP relative to importer GDP and exporter per capita GDP relative to importer per 
capita GDP.  The construction of GDP and per capita GDP are similar to that of Frankel, 
Parsley and Wei (2005).   
jltinfav  is the average annual inflation rate of the exporting country over the five 
years previous to the observation period.  10β  represents the standard deviation of quarterly 
CPI changes in the exporting country over two years previous to the observation period.  11β  
is the coefficient on the standard deviation of quarterly money growth over four years in the 
exporting country.  jexpshr denotes the import share of country j relative the total value of all 
imports into the U.S and is included to capture the effect of market share.  jsumIIT  is the 
Intra Industry Trade Index for each of the k 3-digit SITC goods as weighted by total value of 
imports of good k divided by the total value of all imports from country j 
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).  kIIT  is calculated as in Yang (1997) in order to test the 
effects of product differentiation. jImpElst  is the imputed elasticity measure from Campa 
and Goldberg.  
  jImpElst  represents the value-weighted pass-through rate of all 253 goods. Its 
construction is as follows: 
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kγ  represents the good specific pass-through rate as estimated by the regression 
equation below which is estimated once for each of the 253 goods. 
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The next section will examine the results of regressing Eq. 2.11 to determine what 
factors affect the rate of exchange rate pass-through.    
 
2.4 Results 
 The results of testing Eq. 2.11 are given in Table 2.4a, Table 2.4b and Table 2.4c.  
Table 2.4a contains results for Eq. 2.11 when the country specific pass-through coefficients 
are estimated by Eq. 2.10a.  Table 2.4b has results when the country specific pass-through 
estimates are estimated via Eq. 2.10b.  Finally, Table 2.4c holds the results when the LHS 
variable is the country specific pass-through estimate from Eq. 2.10c.  The results in Table 
2.4a, Table 2.4b and Table 2.4c are only marginally different.   
In the first column of all three tables the full model is regressed (Reg. 1).  The bid-ask 
spread, the exporter’s per capita GDP, the exporter’s short-run CPI volatility and the 
exporter’s monetary volatility are all statistically significant.   
The bid-ask spread is significant and has a positive relationship with the country 
specific pass-through rate: lending credence to the models in which the exporting firm 
chooses the currency of denomination.  If the bid-ask spread is large, then it is costly for the 
firm to denominate its price in the importing country’s currency.  Instead, the firm would 
prefer to avoid the large exchange rate transaction cost and denominate its price in the 
exporting country’s currency.  Aggregated over the decisions of all firms in that exporting 
country, a larger bid-ask spread results in a larger pass-through rate.  Thus, the positive effect 
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of the bid-ask spread on the pass-through rate is as expected.  The coefficient on the bid-ask 
spread tends to support the importance of literature on the currency denomination of trade.   
However, the positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and the pass-through 
rate could also be due to the bid-ask spread’s correlation with exchange rate volatility.  If 
there is a large degree of exchange rate volatility then exporting firms would tend to adjust 
their price more often, thereby raising the pass-through rate20. It is also true that the bid-ask 
spread may approximate financial risk.  The larger the bid-ask spread, the more risky it is to 
engage in currency trading.  Exporting firms would recognize the risk of the exchange rate 
and would tend to denominate their price in their own currency so as to limit their own 
exposure to the exchange rate.     
Similar to Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005), the exporter’s per capita GDP remains a 
significant contributor to the pass-through coefficient.  All three tables tend to suggest that 
the larger the per capita GDP of the exporting nation, the higher the level of pass-through of 
goods from that exporting nation.  The coefficient on the exporter’s per capita GDP may be 
an indication of the strength of the exporting country’s currency.  If the exporting country’s 
currency is sufficiently robust, the exporting firm may be more likely to denominate its price 
in its own currency; thereby raising the pass-through rate.   
The results concerning the exporter’s short-term CPI volatility and monetary 
volatility are less straightforward.  For the coefficient on monetary volatility, I see some 
evidence that Taylor (2000) warrants attention concerning pass-through.  And unfortunately, 
I see evidence that Devereux and Engel (2001) are wrong about monetary volatility.  Reg. 1 
suggests that greater monetary volatility tends to increase exchange rate pass-through.  The 
                                                 
20
 Gopinath and Rigobon (2006) empirically study the positive relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
the frequency of price adjustment for U.S. imported goods.  
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importance of the coefficient on monetary volatility may be due to monetary instability’s 
effect on long-term inflation rates.  From Lucas (1972), we know that the money supply has 
an effect on the general price level.  If monetary volatility can create inflation, then it may be 
that the significance of the coefficient on quarterly money growth volatility is due to money’s 
effect on long-term inflation.  
If we accept that greater monetary volatility causes higher inflation, then Taylor’s 
explanation for exchange rate pass-through seems to be accurate.  First, long-term monetary 
instability creates persistent high inflation. In Taylor’s model persistent high inflation leads 
to persistent exchange rate changes.  If the exchange rate changes, or cost changes, are long-
lasting then Taylor would suggest higher pass-through.  Thus, an exporting country with 
volatile money growth may start a chain of events leading to greater exchange rate pass-
through for the importing country.  In Reg. 3, there is evidence for the impact of monetary 
volatility on long-term inflation.  When the volatility of money growth is removed as an 
explanatory variable, the coefficient on long-term inflation becomes significantly positive in 
Table 2.4a, Table 2.4b and Table 2.4c21.   
However, as Taylor (2000) cautions “less persistence of costs reduces the size of the 
pass-through coefficient.”  I find support for Taylor’s statement in the coefficient on short-
term CPI volatility.  After controlling for long-term inflation, greater short-term CPI 
volatility appears to decrease exchange rate pass-through.  If these short-term movements are 
considered to be fleeting, then Taylor would suggest that firms would not react to any 
exchange rate changes that these short-term movements would cause.  These fleeting changes 
will decrease the estimated pass-through rate. 
                                                 
21
 Further concerns regarding the importance of monetary volatility and the inclusion of EU countries are 
addressed in the Appendix.   
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The exporting firm must consider the risk of the exchange rate.  If the exporting 
country’s price volatility is short-lived, then the effect of the price volatility on the exchange 
rate will also be short-lived.  As such, the exporting firm’s price may exhibit low pass-
through because the long-term exchange rate risk is low; there is less need to adjust prices as 
the exchange rate is not moving to a different long-term range.  Conversely, if there is 
persistent monetary volatility (or persistent inflation) in the exporting country, then there 
may be inherent risk in the long-term exchange rate.  An exporting firm could react to the 
risk of the exchange rate by denominating its price in its own currency; reducing its own 
exposure to exchange rate risk and increasing its price’s pass-through.      
There must be caution when analyzing these results.  The possibility of 
multicollinearity is evident when a number of macroeconomic variables are present on the 
RHS.  With large multicollinearity the standard errors for coefficients can be inflated, leading 
to a greater risk of Type II error; wrongly dismissing variables that truly are significant.  For 
measurement purposes a condition index statistic can be calculated to test the degree of 
multicollinearity present.  An index value greater than 10 is an indication of instability.  The 
condition index statistic for the full model of Reg. 1 is 6.4.  And while this index number is 
not greater than 10, it is unpleasantly high.   
Reg. 2 removes the most insignificant variables, the managed float dummy, distance 
and the tariff rate, in order to reduce the condition index statistic to more congenial level.  As 
the managed float dummy, distance and the tariff rate are the most insignificant variables, the 
risks of an omitted variable bias are lessened.  The resulting condition index statistic is a 
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more palatable 4.38.  For this reason, I consider the estimates in Reg. 2 to be the most robust.  
Fortunately, the results of Reg. 2 and Reg. 1 are very much alike22.             
The importance of microeconomic versus macroeconomic explanations for exchange 
rate pass-through is highlighted in Campa and Goldberg (2002).  The authors note that the 
imputed elasticity, a microeconomic variable, provides almost all of their model’s 
explanatory power.  I eliminate the macroeconomic and microeconomic variables in Reg. 4 
and Reg. 5 respectively.  I find that macroeconomic variables provide the greatest 
contribution to the model’s explanatory power.  The lack of importance for microeconomic 
explanations may be caused by the difference in data construction between Campa and 
Goldberg’s paper and this paper.  Whereas Campa and Goldberg only aggregate the good 
specific pass-through rate over 5 goods, this paper uses 253 goods.  As a result, it is much 
less likely that microeconomic variables, when all 253 goods are combined to create a single 
country-wide microeconomic variable, will hold statistical significance. 
This dataset can only draw conclusions about the effects of the exporting country’s 
macroeconomic variables.  For all observations there is only one importer, the United States.  
As such, it is not appropriate to directly compare the results herein with those of Campa and 
Goldberg.  The latter can only make use of the importing country’s macroeconomic data, 
while this dataset can only draw conclusions about the exporting country’s macroeconomic 
condition.   
It would be careless to ignore those variables that are statistically insignificant.  
Having an exchange rate regime with a banded float tends to decrease exchange rate pass-
through as would be expected from a less volatile exchange rate.  The managed float dummy 
                                                 
22
 The literature including Calvo and Reinhart (2002) would suggest that IM and IB are predetermined by many 
of the macroeconomic variables used in Eq. 2.6.  As such I don’t think a great deal of explanatory power is lost 
by excluding IM. 
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is insignificant in all formulations except that of Reg. 4 where it maintains its expected sign. 
EU membership is correlated with higher exchange rate pass-through, though the impact is 
insignificant.  Exchange rate volatility has the expected sign, though it too is insignificant.  
The exporter’s GDP, or country size, tends to decrease exchange rate pass-through. 
Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002) would suggest that the larger the exporter’s share 
of the market the greater the exchange rate pass-through should be.  The authors would also 
propose that a larger IIT index number would translate into more product differentiation and 
higher exchange rate pass-through.  The sign of the variable on exporter’s market share 
reflects the predicted positive sign while the cumulative IIT index is not as theory would 
predict.  The insignificant coefficient on cumulative IIT may be the result of using 253 
possible goods; aggregating over all 253 goods to calculate a country-wide variable may hide 
the true impact of any good specific effects. 
In addition, the imputed elasticity variable is insignificant.  The sign of the coefficient 
is negative; the opposite of what Campa and Goldberg (2002) would predict.  The 
insignificant, negative coefficient on imputed elasticity may also be the result of aggregating 
over 253 goods.  
Because the RHS variables in Eq. 2.11 are widely different in size and scale, it is 
difficult to compare the magnitude of these coefficients.  Table 2.5 reports the effect of a 
10% increase in each of the RHS variables from their mean on the pass-through rate given 
the estimates in Reg. 2 of Table 2.4c23.  The largest absolute effects are those of monetary 
volatility, the exporter’s per capita GDP, the exporter’s short-term CPI volatility and the bid-
ask spread.     
                                                 
23
 I choose the estimates from Table 2.4c as it represents pass-through estimates from Eq. 2.10c: the model 
which makes use of all U.S. macroeconomic variables and microeconomic controls.  Reg. 2 is preferred because 
it minimizes the risks of multicollinearity while maximizing the number of RHS variables. 
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In addition to using the good specific pass-through rates, kγ , to construct jImpElst , I 
use kγ  as a LHS variable in the following regression equation used to find the determinants 
of the good specific pass-through rate. 
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 The four non-microeconomic variables above are aggregated over all 57 countries 
according to the total value of exports from country j of good k relative to the total value of 
all exports of good k in order to represent the affect of each country’s impact on the good 
specific pass-through rate.  I use these four non-microeconomic variables as they have 
proven to be significant determinants of the country specific pass-through rate.  With Eq. 
2.14, I will test the impact of these non-microeconomic variables on good specific pass-
through rates.  Descriptive statistics for all of the RHS variables in Eq. 2.14 are given in 
Table 2.6. 
Table 2.7 presents results for the Weighted Least Squares regression outlined in Eq. 
2.14.   
The sign and significance of the four non-microeconomic variables in Reg. 1 of Table 
2.7 are similar to the results from Table 2.4.  The cumulative bid-ask spread and the 
cumulative money volatility are both positive and significant just as in Eq. 2.11.  The 
cumulative short-run CPI volatility is negative and significant.  The cumulative per capita 
GDP measure is insignificant and the coefficient is the opposite sign. 
Despite being aggregated over 57 countries, the bid-ask spread, short-term CPI 
volatility and monetary volatility impact the good specific pass-through rates in a similar 
manner to their impact on country specific pass-through rates.    
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The microeconomic variables, IIT index and exporter’s market share, are significant 
determinants of the good specific pass-through rates.  The coefficients on both variables are 
positive: just as Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002) would suggest. 
I eliminate the macroeconomic, microeconomic and exchange rate based variable in 
Reg. 2, Reg. 3 and Reg. 4 respectively.  For good specific pass-through rates 
macroeconomic, microeconomic and the bid-ask spread all represent a significant portion of 
Eq. 2.14’s explanatory power. 
Because the RHS variables in Eq. 2.14 vary widely in size, Table 2.8 presents the 
effect of a 10% increase in each of the RHS variables from their mean on the pass-through 
rate.  The coefficient estimates come from Reg. 1 of Table 2.7. 
To summarize, the regression results from Eq. 2.11 and Eq. 2.14 suggest that the bid-
ask spread, short-term CPI volatility, per capita GDP and monetary volatility are important 
determinants of both country specific and good specific pass-through rates.  The 
microeconomic variables, IIT index and exporter’s market share, are important determinants 
of good specific pass-through rates but may not necessarily have a significant influence on 
country specific pass-through rates.   
      
2.5 Conclusion 
 The rate of exchange rate pass-through is found to be significantly and positively 
related to the bid-ask spread and the exporter’s per capita GDP.  Just as Taylor (2000) 
predicts, the exporter’s long-term inflation, working through the channel of the exporter’s 
monetary volatility, is found to significantly increase the country specific pass-through rate.  
The exporter’s short-term price volatility is found to significantly decrease exchange rate 
pass-through.  Microeconomic factors, the IIT index and the exporter’s market share, 
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significantly increase the good specific pass-through rate but may not have a clear effect on 
country specific pass-through.  
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Table 2.1   
 List of countries and exchange rate regimes   
Country Exchange Rate Regime Country Exchange Rate Regime 
Australia Independent Float Mexico  Independent Float 
Austria Euro Netherlands Euro 
Bangladesh Managed Float New Zealand Independent Float 
Belgium Euro Nigeria Managed Float 
Brazil Independent Float Norway Independent Float 
Canada  Independent Float Pakistan Managed Float 
Chile Independent Float Papau New Guinea Independent Float 
Columbia Independent Float Paraguay  Independent Float 
Croatia  Managed Float Peru Independent Float 
Cyprus  Banded Float Philippines Independent Float 
Czech Republic Managed Float Poland Independent Float 
Denmark Banded Float Portugal Euro 
Egypt Managed Float Romania Banded Float 
Finland Euro Russia Managed Float 
France Euro Singapore  Managed Float 
Germany Euro Slovenia Banded Float 
Ghana Managed Float South Africa Independent Float 
Greece  Euro South Korea Independent Float 
Hungary Banded Float Spain Euro 
Iceland Independent Float Sri Lanka Independent Float 
India Managed Float Sweden Independent Float 
Indonesia Managed Float Switzerland Independent Float 
Ireland Euro Taiwan Independent Float 
Israel Independent Float Thailand Managed Float 
Italy Euro Turkey Independent Float 
Japan Independent Float United Kingdom Independent Float 
Kazakhstan Managed Float Uruguay Independent Float 
Kenya Managed Float Vietnam Managed Float 
Luxembourg Euro     
        
Note: These definitions come from the IMF document “Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements 
and Monetary Policy Framework” dated June 30, 2004. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 
    
Descriptive Statistics for the RHS variables in Eq. 2.11   
Independent Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Distance 5502.02 2172.01 
Tariff 0.02721 0.03060 
Bid-Ask Spread 0.00252 0.00476 
Exchange Rate Volatility  0.00018 0.00015 
GDP (Exporting Country/US) 0.03276 0.06829 
Per capita GDP (Exporting Country/US) 0.35436 0.34991 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 9.05702 13.65461 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) 0.01087 0.00919 
Quarterly Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  0.06093 0.04567 
Exporter's Share of Market 0.01564 0.02864 
Cumulative IIT Index 0.49191 0.17293 
Imputed Pass-through Elasticity 0.84980 0.23871 
  
    
Note: Descriptive Statistics are based on observations from all 57 exporting countries. 
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Table 2.3 Expected signs for the RHS variables in Eq. 2.11 
  Expected effect  
Independent Variable on pass-through coefficient 
Banded Exchange Rate Regime - (author) 
Managed Float Exchange Rate Regime - (author) 
Euro-Zone member ? 
Distance ? 
Tariff Rate ? 
Bid-Ask Spread + (Black, author) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  + (C&G) 
GDP (exporter/importer) ? (FP&W) 
Per capita GDP (exporter/importer) + (FP&W) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) + (Taylor, D&Y, C&G) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) - (Taylor) 
Quarterly Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  + (D&E) OR - (Taylor) 
Exporter's Share of Market + (Yang, B& vW) 
Cumulative IIT Index + (Yang, B& vW) 
Imputed Elasticity + (C&G) 
    
Note: The above represent my interpretations of what the author's works would predict. 
They do not necessarily represent the views of those authors referenced. 
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Table 2.4a 
          
Equation 2.11 - (57 Obs.)       
    
LHS = Country specific pass-through  Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Pass-through generated by Eq. 2.10a 
          
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy -4.135 -4.153 -4.411 -3.494 -4.564 
  (3.174) (3.053) (3.325) (3.308) (2.923) 
Managed Float Dummy -0.098   -0.602 -2.703** -0.044 
  (1.444)   (1.496) (1.237) (1.393) 
EU Dummy 1.328 1.32 -0.101 -0.043 1.057 
  (1.200) (1.083) (1.073) (1.054) (0.929) 
Distance 0.0000205   0.0000741 -0.0000574 -0.0000931 
  (0.0002541)   (0.0002653) (0.0002473) (0.0001603) 
Tariff Rate -1.46   -13.69 -4.93 -1.13 
  (18.14)   (18.16) (17.79) (17.5) 
Bid-Ask Spread 660.6** 660.3** 575.5* 360.7 655.1** 
  (275.6) (264.9) (286.3) (274.2) (242.5) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  99.5 127.8 1498.2 881.6 -117.6 
  (2210.6) (2048.4) (2226.2) (2121.1) (2015.7) 
GDP -3.672 -3.682 -2.823   -3.877 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (4.015) (3.740) (4.191)   (3.528) 
Per capita GDP 4.176** 4.257** 2.055   4.228** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (2.061) (1.730) (1.927)   (1.876) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.0859 0.0850 0.1327**   0.0814 
(Exporting Country) (0.0661) (0.0550) (0.0659)   (0.0623) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -180.3** -180.5** -225.9**   -175.5** 
(Exporting Country) (89.7) (71.6) (91.6)   (86.8) 
Quart. Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  34.1** 34.6**     31.8** 
(Exporting Country) (15.0) (13.5)     (14.0) 
Exporter's Share of Market 5.828 5.502 1.285 -1.742   
  (9.312) (5.231) (9.536) (9.120)   
Cumulative IIT Index -0.505 -0.455 -1.676 -1.271   
  (3.577) (3.421) (3.712) (3.001)   
Imputed Elasticity -0.473 -0.48 -0.212 -0.467   
(Cumulative good specific pass-through) (1.180) (1.130) (1.231) (1.164)   
Constant -2.649 -2.659 0.983 1.894 -2.256 
  (3.025) (2.376) (2.693) (2.236) (1.546) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1462 0.2042 0.0614 0.012 0.1931 
  
          
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. 
As the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more 
strict. 
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Table 2.4b 
          
Equation 2.11 - (57 Obs.)       
    
LHS = Country specific pass-through  Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Pass-through generated by Eq. 2.10b 
          
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy -4.436 -4.546 -4.762 -3.721 -5.251 
  (3.718) (3.606) (3.900) (3.944) (3.448) 
Managed Float Dummy 0.978   0.382 -2.501* 1.091 
  (1.692)   (1.755) (1.475) (1.643) 
EU Dummy 1.419 1.076 -0.272 -0.006 1.000 
  (1.406) (1.279) (1.258) (1.257) (1.096) 
Distance 0.000132   0.0001955 0.0000782 -0.0000493 
  (0.0002977)   (0.0003111) (0.0002948) (0.0001891) 
Tariff Rate -1.38   -15.86 -6.75 -0.83 
  (21.25)   (21.30) (21.20) (20.65) 
Bid-Ask Spread 620.8* 628.3* 520.1* 255.4 628.8** 
  (322.9) (312.9) (335.8) (326.9) (286.0) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  510.0 -24.7 2165.5 931.9 60.1 
  (2589.4) (2419.4) (2610.8) (2528.5) (2377.7) 
GDP -5.240 -4.274 -4.234   -5.83 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (4.703) (4.417) (4.915)   (4.161) 
Per capita GDP 5.710** 4.903** 3.200   5.753** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (2.414) (2.044) (2.260)   (2.212) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.0932 0.064 0.1485*   0.0863 
(Exporting Country) (0.0774) (0.0650) (0.0773)   (0.0735) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -226.4** -184.7** -280.3**   -218.5** 
(Exporting Country) (105.0) (84.6) (107.5)   (102.3) 
Quart. Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  40.3** 38.0**     37.1** 
(Exporting Country) (17.5) (16.0)     (16.5) 
Exporter's Share of Market 9.170 3.775 3.793 1.864   
  (10.908) (6.178) (11.183) (10.872)   
Cumulative IIT Index -1.352 -1.408 -2.738 -1.604   
  (4.190) (4.040) (4.353) (3.577)   
Imputed Elasticity -0.781 -0.888 -0.472 -0.924   
(Cumulative good specific pass-through) (1.382) (1.335) (1.444) (1.388)   
Constant -3.341 -1.810 0.959 1.823 -3.000 
  (3.543) (2.806) (3.158) (2.665) (1.823) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1074 0.1541 0.0164 -0.0698 0.1446 
  
          
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. 
As the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more 
strict. 
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Table 2.4c 
          
Equation 2.11 - (57 Obs.)       
    
LHS = Country specific pass-through  Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Pass-through  generated by Eq. 2.10c 
          
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy -4.400 -4.571 -4.721 -3.685 -5.386 
  (3.491) (3.390) (3.681) (3.774) (3.264) 
Managed Float Dummy 0.599   0.013 -2.916** 0.754 
  (1.589)   (1.657) (1.411) (1.556) 
EU Dummy 1.427 1.028 -0.233 0.198 1.014 
  (1.320) (1.202) (1.187) (1.203) (1.038) 
Distance 0.0001581   0.0002204 0.0001407 -0.0000394 
  (0.0002795)   (0.0002937) (0.0002821) (0.000179) 
Tariff Rate 2.61   -11.61 -4.18 3.04 
  (19.95)   (20.11) (20.29) (19.55) 
Bid-Ask Spread 649.9** 665.6** 550.9* 294.6 666.9** 
  (303.2) (294.2) (317.0) (312.8) (270.8) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  1180.7 779.9 2806.3 1328.0 628.0 
  (2431.4) (2274.3) (2464.5) (2419.6) (2251.1) 
GDP -6.274 -5.241 -5.287   -7.177* 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (4.416) (4.152) (4.640)   (3.940) 
Per capita GDP 5.916** 5.119** 3.451   6.003** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (2.267) (1.921) (2.133)   (2.095) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.0720 0.0470 0.1263*   0.0659 
(Exporting Country) (0.0727) (0.0611) (0.0729)   (0.0696) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -212.8** -183.2** -265.7**   -204.3** 
(Exporting Country) (98.6) (79.5) (101.4)   (96.9) 
Quart. Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  39.6** 36.8**     36.1** 
(Exporting Country) (16.5) (15.0)     (15.6) 
Exporter's Share of Market 10.027 3.576 4.747 4.275   
  (10.242) (5.808) (10.557) (10.404)   
Cumulative IIT Index -1.840 -1.788 -3.201 -2.032   
  (3.934) (3.798) (4.109) (3.423)   
Imputed Elasticity -1.018 -1.102 -0.714 -1.227   
(Cumulative good specific pass-through) (1.298) (1.255) (1.363) (1.328)   
Constant -3.158 -1.445 1.064 1.751 -3.117* 
  (3.327) (2.638) (2.981) (2.550) (1.726) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1847 0.2256 0.0920 -0.0148 0.2056 
  
          
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. 
As the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more 
strict. 
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Table 2.5 Effect of a 10% increase in RHS variable on pass-through coefficient 
Independent Variable Change in pass-through coefficient  
Bid-Ask Spread 0.1639 
Exchange Rate Volatility  0.0207 
GDP 0.0172 
Per capita GDP 0.1814 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.0426 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -0.1992 
Quarterly Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  0.2242 
Exporter's Share of Market 0.0056 
Cumulative IIT Index -0.0880 
Imputed Elasticity -0.0936 
    
Note: The change in the pass-through coefficient is based on a 10% increase from the variable's mean described in Table 2.2. 
Coefficient estimates come from Table 2.4c, Regression 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 
    
Descriptive Statistics for the RHS variables in Eq. 2.14     
Independent Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Cumulative Bid-Ask Spread 0.0010 0.0008 
Cumulative per capita GDP (Exporting Country/US) 0.4486 0.1920 
Cumulative quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) 0.0078 0.0038 
Cumulative quarterly money growth volatility (Long-Term) 0.0545 0.0263 
Cumulative exporter's share of market 0.0501 0.0402 
IIT Index 0.6146 0.2681 
      
Note: Descriptive Statistics are based on observations from all 253 available 3-digit SITC goods. 
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Table 2.7 
        
Equation 2.14 - (253 Obs.)       
  
LHS = Good specific pass-through estimate Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
Pass-through estimates are generated in Eq. 2.13 
        
Cumulative Bid-Ask Spread 335.4** 599.5** 168.5   
  (117.7) (90.5) (108.9)   
Cumulative per capita GDP -0.0084   0.4518 -0.581 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (0.607)   (0.613) (0.581) 
Cumulative quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -29.12**   -32.87** -22.52 
(Exporting Country) (14.08)   (14.29) (14.09) 
Cumulative quarterly money growth volatility (Long-Term)  12.94**   16.54** 12.79** 
(Exporting Country) (4.28)   (4.28) (4.34) 
Cumulative exporter's share of market 3.306** 3.374**   2.889** 
  (0.97) (1.016)   (0.972) 
IIT Index 0.447** 0.622**   0.246 
  (0.164) (0.166)   (0.150) 
Constant -0.387 -0.360* -0.137 0.315 
  (0.563) (0.193) (0.574) (0.513) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2397 0.1505 0.1951 0.2177 
  
        
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. 
As the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more 
strict. 
 
 
 
Table 2.8 Effect of a 10% increase in RHS variable on pass-through coefficient 
Independent Variable Change in pass-through coefficient  
Cumulative Bid-Ask Spread 0.0347 
Cumulative per capita GDP (Exporting Country/US) -0.0004 
Cumulative quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -0.0227 
Cumulative quarterly money growth volatility (Long-Term) 0.0705 
Cumulative exporter's share of market 0.0166 
IIT Index 0.0275 
    
Note: The change in the pass-through coefficient is based on a 10% increase from the variable's mean described in Table 2.6. 
Coefficient estimates come from Table 2.7, Regression 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
CURRENCY INVOICING: THE ROLE OF ‘HERDING’ AND EXCHANGE RATE 
VOLATILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Using a dynamic model of optimal currency invoicing in the presence of an 
endogenous frequency of price adjustment, I find that exporting firms will “herd” in their 
choice between local currency pricing (LCP), producer currency pricing (PCP) and vehicle 
currency pricing (VCP).  By “herding” the firm chooses a currency of denomination based 
on maintaining a stable unit of account so that the firm’s price and the competition’s price 
are affected by the exchange rate in a similar manner.  A volatile exchange rate amplifies the 
impulse to “herd” with respect to all other factors including the firm’s cost and demand 
structure.  Counterintuitively, this suggests that heightened exchange rate volatility may 
result in a greater likelihood that a representative firm denominates the price of their good in 
the more volatile currency if the firm’s competitors are already using the more volatile 
currency.    
 Why is the question of currency of denomination important?  Currency denomination 
choices by exporting firms can affect the aggregate price level in the importing country.  For 
example, if exporting firms tend to use LCP and update their price infrequently then the 
effects of exchange rate movements on inflation in the importing country are muted as the 
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exporters’ prices are more stable in the importing country’s currency24.  Conversely, if 
exporting firms have greater use of PCP or VCP and more frequent price adjustment then the 
importing country’s aggregate price may be more unstable as the aggregate price is more 
acutely affected by movements in volatile exchange rates25.  As many countries allow their 
exchange rates to fluctuate more freely, exporting firms in those countries are faced with 
more volatile exchange rates26.  This paper will study how increasing exchange rate volatility 
may affect the currency invoicing decision of those exporting firms.   
The most important improvement made by this paper for the theoretical literature on 
currency denomination is the inclusion of an endogenous frequency of price adjustment.  
Because the model in this paper allows the firm to choose how “sticky” their price will be, 
we are better able to observe the degree to which exporting firms will “herd”.  Again, a firm 
“herds” to maintain a stable relationship between the exporter’s price and the comparative 
price in the importing country.  Because the representative firm is allowed to choose its 
frequency of price adjustment, the desire to “herd” may be based on how often the exporter 
chooses to adjust its price.  Additionally, we can better study the effects of exchange rate 
volatility because the firm can react to high exchange rate volatility by either changing their 
currency of denomination or frequency of price adjustment.   
I vary different exogenous variables in the model to create thousands of different 
scenarios.  Each scenario represents a hypothetical industry.  A representative firm must 
optimize within that hypothetical industry given a set of exogenous parameters.  The 
                                                 
24
 This is the case in the U.S. as exporters to the U.S. tend to use LCP. 
 
25
 Such is the case in East Asian economies where PCP and VCP are prevalent. 
 
26
 Most notably, China’s removal of a pegged exchange rate with the dollar in 2005. 
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scenarios are not necessarily related to any specific existing industry.  Instead the scenarios 
are designed to capture optimal firm behavior within a hypothetical industry to control for 
different values of the exogenous parameters that may affect the representative firm’s 
decisions.  
    The motivation for the model in this paper comes from Friberg (1998) and Goldberg 
and Tille (2005)27.  The dynamic model in this paper represents an expansion of the 
theoretical literature on currency denomination by giving the representative exporting firm 
the ability to optimize across four dimensions; allowing the firm to choose its price, 
frequency of price adjustment, currency of denomination and allowing the firm choose 
whether or not to engage in forward currency contracts.   
One recent study that examines optimal currency denomination is Floden and 
Wilander (2006).  The authors’ main finding is to show that exporting firms engaging in PCP 
tend to change their price more often than firms using LCP.  The results in this paper 
corroborate this finding.  I find that the average frequency of price adjustment for firms using 
PCP is 8.58 monthly periods while the average price adjustment for firms using LCP is 9.28 
monthly periods.  In addition, I find that exporters using VCP adjust their price the most 
often with an average frequency of price adjustment of 6.18 monthly periods. 
The results from the dynamic model of this paper are summarized here.  First, I show 
how the representative firm’s cost and revenue functions, forward currency contracts and 
exchange rate transaction costs affect the firm’s optimal currency of denomination.  Second, 
I find that exporting firms are willing to “herd” when choosing their currency of 
denomination.  Third, I find that high exchange rate volatility amplifies the firm’s impulse to 
“herd” relative to all other considerations such as the shape of the firm’s cost and demand 
                                                 
27
 Comments made in Engel (2005) were helpful as well. 
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function.  Increasing the volatility of the importer/exporter exchange rate intensifies the 
probability that exporters will “herd” in all three currencies: the local currency, the 
producer’s currency or the vehicle currency.  Also, high volatility in the vehicle/exporter 
exchange rate increases the probability that the firm will “herd” in its choice between the 
vehicle currency and the local currency. Counterintuitively, this suggests that heightened 
exchange rate volatility may increase the likelihood that exporters will use the more volatile 
currency to denominate their price if the firm’s market is already suited to “herding”.  
The layout of this paper is as follows.  In section 3.2, there is a brief literature review.  
Section 3.3 contains a basic description of the dynamic model. Section 3.4 analyzes the 
results from the model.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Review 
 Recently, many theoretical models detail an exporting firm’s choice of currency 
denomination.  This includes work by Bachetta and van Wincoop (2005), Devereux, et al. 
(2004) and others.  I will highlight two papers that are the most pertinent given the model 
introduced in this paper.  The two papers are Friberg (1998) and Goldberg and Tille (2005). 
 In Friberg (1998), an exporter must choose between VCP, PCP or LCP.  The firm 
may choose whether or not it will engage in forward currency contracts, though it is 
constrained to an exogenous frequency of price adjustment.  The author shows that the firm’s 
optimal choice of currency denomination is based in part on the shape of the demand and 
cost functions.  Because the firm is risk averse, the exporter will use forward currency 
contracts when using LCP or VCP.  The firm’s choice of either LCP or VCP is dependent on 
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the relative variances of the two relevant exchange rates; with the exporter preferring to 
invoice in the currency with a sufficiently low exchange rate variance. 
 The model in section 3.3, similar to Friberg (1998), will include varied cost and 
demand functions and will allow the firm to choose whether or not to use forward currency 
contracts.   
 In Goldberg and Tille (2005) the exporter is not limited to a discrete choice of PCP, 
VCP or LCP.  Instead, the firm is allowed to denominate the price of its good in a basket of 
currencies.  There are no forward currency contracts and the frequency of price adjustment is 
exogenous.  The authors highlight the importance of “herding.”  The desire to “herd” is based 
on denominating the firm’s price in a basket of currencies that is similar to the basket of 
currencies that affect the targeted price index in the importer’s market.  The authors denote 
the exogenous market shares of competing brands invoiced in the three currencies to create 
the firm’s “herding” impulse. As a result, “herding” keeps a stable unit of account; 
maintaining a more stable relationship between the firm’s price and the targeted price index 
in the importing country28.   
 In section 3.3, the model will consider the firm’s desire to “herd” when the exporter is 
forced into a discrete choice of PCP, LCP or VCP.  The firm’s “herding” impulse in this 
paper comes directly from Goldberg and Tille’s basket of currencies with exogenous 
invoicing shares.   In addition, the cost and demand functions in this paper’s model are 
similar to those used by Goldberg and Tille (2005). 
                                                 
28
 Goldberg and Tille (2005) use the term “herding” based on the expected basket of currencies that may affect 
the targeted price index.  Fukuda and Ono (2006) refer to this effect as the “history” of currency denomination 
choices.  The history of previous currency denomination decisions creates the expectation of currency invoicing 
weights in Goldberg and Tille’s basket.  
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 Unlike Friberg (1998) and Goldberg and Tille (2005), the model in section 3.3 allows 
firms to choose their frequency of price adjustment.  The menu cost used in this paper is 
similar to that given in Devereux and Yetman (2005). From Engel (2005,4), “the underlying 
assumption of modern models of price stickiness is that it is costly to set a price.”  By 
combining aspects of Friberg (1998) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) and adding an 
endogenous frequency of price adjustment along with transaction costs of obtaining foreign 
currency29, the dynamic model will control for the many dimensions that may affect an 
individual firm’s choice of invoicing currency while specifically studying the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on that choice. 
       
3.3 Model 
 In this section, I will highlight basic details regarding the dynamic model used to 
compute the firm’s optimal behavior. In Section 3.4, I analyze the results from the model.  
The exporting firm is allowed to optimize simultaneously over four dimensions.  One, 
the firm sets its price30.  Two, the firm must choose one of three currencies in which to 
denominate the price: the producer’s currency, the local currency or a vehicle currency.  
Three, the firm must set their frequency of price adjustment.  Four, the firm must decide 
whether or not to engage in forward currency contracts. 
Based on Goldberg and Tille (2005) an exporting firm faces one of the following 
three direct demand functions for their product based on their currency of denomination 
decision: 
                                                 
29
 Black (1991) contains a useful analysis regarding the effects of exchange rate transaction costs. 
 
30
 Of course, by setting their price, the firm also sets their input quantity and output quantity. 
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The direct demand function is determined by the firm’s decision to engage in LCP 
( i tijp , ), PCP ( j tijp , ) or VCP ( k tijp , ). Where the quantity that the firm sells is denoted by tijq , , i 
denotes the importing country and j denotes the location of the exporting firm as country j.  
The time subscript is t. c tijp , denotes the price set in currency c by a firm in country j that is 
exporting to country i.  The comparative price index in the importing  country i at time t is 
denoted by itP .  tije , , the exogenously determined exchange rate, is the currency of country i 
per one unit of country j’s currency at time t.  1>λ  denotes the firm’s elasticity of 
substitution which is exogenous.  Under both PCP and VCP, buyers in country i face an 
exogenously determined transaction cost of obtaining foreign currency c, )1( icτ+ .  A list of 
variables and their description is located in Table C.1 of the Appendix.  
The firm uses a production technology with decreasing returns to scale where the sole 
input, labor, is given below as a function of the output quantity: 
( ) ( ) 101
,
1
,
≤<= αα αα tijtijt qqL       (3.2) 
Where α  is the exogenously determined returns to scale parameter and tL is the labor 
input for the exporting firm purchased at a wage of tjw , . 
The firm must optimize in its choice of LCP, PCP or VCP and in choosing whether or 
not to use forward currency contracts.  A forward currency rate between currencies j and k at 
time t is denoted by tjkf ,  and is determined by an efficient forward market. In the objective 
function below the indicator variables IPCP, ILCP and IVCP denote the firm’s use of PCP, LCP 
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and VCP respectively (IPCP + ILCP + IVCP = 1).  Likewise, IF is an indicator variable equal to 
one when the exporting firm is making use of forward currency contracts. The firm’s 
objective function is given: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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The exporting firm is faced with five different profit functions.  The firm’s choice of 
currency of denomination and the firm’s decision whether or not to access forward currency 
contracts determines which of the five profit functions the exporter will use.  The five 
discounted profit functions are based on the optimal price and optimal frequency of price 
adjustment, 1≥K .  The five profit functions are listed below with the quantity sold 
determined by the appropriate demand function from Eq. 3.1.  
If IPCP = 1, then    
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If ILCP = 1 and IF = 1, then 
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The menu cost, charged only in period t when the price is changed, is denoted by (1-
F)31.  The exporter must choose a frequency of price adjustment, 1≥K .  As a result, the firm 
has at least some degree of uncertainty.  A very large K allows the firm to avoid the menu 
cost but makes the exporter less able to respond to changes in the market.  
 Simultaneously the firm chooses its price, currency of denomination, frequency of 
price adjustment and chooses whether or not to engage in a forward currency contract. To 
what extent will the firm “herd”?  What role does exchange rate volatility play?  
 In order to formulate an answer to these questions, I will take advantage of a dynamic 
model calibrated to real data and based on monthly time periods.  The model must generate 
exchange rates, forward currency rates, wage inflation, and the price index of the targeted 
market.  I use an assortment of values for the exogenous variables α (returns to scale in 
production technology), λ (elasticity of substitution for the firm’s product), 0,jw (the initial 
wage), and the transaction costs ikτ , kjτ  and ijτ  to control for their different effects.     
 First, I generate three exchange rates as random walks.  A “no arbitrage” 
condition, )1()1()1(1
,,, kitkikjtjkijtij eee τττ −−−≥ , will restrict the exchange rate data 
                                                 
31
 This is similar to the menu cost used in Devereux and Yetman (2005) 
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generation process.  I follow Friberg (1998) and allow forward currency markets to be 
efficient so that the forward rate is equal to the expected future exchange rate.  The 
wage, tjw , , is sticky
32; it grows based on movements in the shadow wage.  The shadow wage 
is built on a randomly determined inflation rate.   
The dynamic model will process thousands of different hypothetical industries, where 
each industry uses different values of the model’s exogenous variables.  In each hypothetical 
industry a representative firm will optimize. More details regarding the dynamic model are 
given in the Appendix. 
 The comparative price index in the targeted importing country is generated in the 
following manner: 
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  ijδ  and ikδ  represent the rate of exchange rate pass-through in the targeted market’s 
price index, itP .  I set ijδ  and ikδ   to values ranging from 0 to 1 in order to see the effect of 
these pass-through rates on the firm’s optimal currency of denomination.   
Why should ijδ  and ikδ  have an effect on the firm’s choice of currency 
denomination?  Because the firm may wish to “herd”.  By “herding” the firm chooses a 
currency of denomination based on maintaining a stable unit of account so that the firm’s 
price and the competition’s price are affected by the exchange rate in a similar manner.  The 
easier it is to keep a stable relationship between the firm’s price and the competition’s price, 
the less often the firm will have to adjust its price and pay menu costs.   
                                                 
32
 This is as Chodhri, Faruquee and Hakura (2005) would promote. 
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When the firm uses PCP, the exporter sets its price relative to the price index at an 
optimal ratio, 
*
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tij
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P
ep
.  Because the firm’s price is sticky, it is unable to maintain that 
optimal ratio when either itP  or tije , changes.  For example, if KP = 1 then the firm would like 
to maintain the following optimal ratio for both periods in which its price is set. 
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Substituting Eq. 3.6 into Eq. 3.5 and we get an approximation that, ideally for the 
representative firm, would hold more closely: 
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  When ijδ  = 1, the firm should find it optimal to “herd”.  The price index is very 
sensitive to movements in tije , , most likely because many other firms are using currency j 
when invoicing the good.  Thus, a representative exporter should prefer to join the “herd” of 
firms already using currency j33.  By joining the “herd”, the firm is better able to maintain a 
stable unit of account. 
In the next section, I will analyze the results from the dynamic model as it pertains to 
“herding” and exchange rate volatility. 
 3.4 Results 
As noted in section 3.3, in each different hypothetical industry a representative firm 
must optimize.  I highlight the firm’s desire to “herd” and the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on the firm’s currency denomination decision.  I generate results from three 
                                                 
33
 The “herd” of firms already using currency j generate the large ijδ . 
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models: a baseline model with exchange rate volatilities taken roughly from the US/Canada, 
US/Mexico and Mexico/Canada exchange rates, a model with high importer/exporter 
exchange rate volatility and a model with high vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility. 
How do the exogenous parameters in the firm’s revenue and cost function affect the 
firm’s optimal invoicing currency?  By examining the firm’s optimal invoicing currency 
within the baseline model a few patterns arise as shown in Table 3.1.  One, as the production 
technology,α , becomes larger and approaches constant returns to scale firms will be more 
likely to adjust their price less often and use PCP or LCP.  Two, if the elasticity of demand 
for the firm’s product, λ , becomes larger then firms will adjust their price more often and use 
VCP.  Three, as the firm’s marginal cost or initial wage increases the firm will likely adjust 
its price more often and use VCP.  Four, as might be expected, if the transaction cost of 
obtaining the vehicle currency is higher then the firm will be less likely to use VCP.  
To what extent does a firm “herd” under the baseline model?  Table 3.2 provides 
results of the currency invoicing choices made by a representative exporting firm in 5,625 
different scenarios.  ijδ , the pass-through rate of the exporter’s currency to the targeted price 
index in the importing country’s market, is positively correlated with the number of firms 
who use PCP and negatively correlated with the number of firms that use LCP.  When ijδ  = 
0, 33% of firms use PCP while 38% of firms use LCP.  A pass-through rate of .25 ( ijδ  = .25) 
increases the proportion of firms using PCP to 47% while the proportion of firms using LCP 
falls to 24%.  The firm will “herd” when choosing between LCP or PCP. 
Likewise, if ikδ  gets larger, the firm is more likely to use VCP and less likely to use 
LCP.  If the pass-through rate ikδ  rises from 0 to .25, then the proportion of firms using the 
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vehicle currency rises from 9% to 16% while the proportion of firms invoicing in the local 
currency falls from 34% to 26%. 
Why does the firm “herd” when choosing between LCP and PCP or when choosing 
between VCP and LCP?  When ikδ  = 1, using VCP allows for the optimal ratio 
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be maintained more easily over time; the firm has selected a currency with a stable unit of 
account relative to the targeted price and access to forward currency contracts can mitigate 
the volatility of cash flows from the importing country helping to create stability in the store 
of value effect of money.  Likewise, when ijδ  is large “herding” in PCP provides a stable unit 
of account while PCP always results in a stable store of value as the cash flows are already 
denominated in the exporter’s currency. However, if both ijδ
 
and ikδ  are small, then using 
LCP will result in a more stable unit of account while the access to forward currency 
contracts mitigates the potentially volatile store of value effect.   
But what if the volatility of the importer/exporter exchange rate rises and all other 
factors, the firms’ cost and demand functions, remain unchanged?  The firm will be more 
likely to “herd” in their choice between LCP and PCP.  Figure 3.1 plots the shares of the 
5,625 representative firms with respect to ijδ , the pass-through coefficient of the 
importer/exporter exchange rate to the targeted price in the importing country.  Under the 
baseline model when ijδ
 
= 0, 33% of firms use PCP and 38% of firms use LCP.  However, if 
there is high volatility in the importer/exporter exchange rate, then only 24% of firms use 
PCP while the proportion of firms using LCP rises to 51% when ijδ
 
= 0.  Indeed, for all 
5,625 hypothetical industries the correlation between IPCP and ijδ  rises from .327 in the 
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baseline model to .439 in the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model; 
meanwhile the correlation between ILCP and ijδ  decreases from -.130 in the baseline model to 
-.238 in the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model.  The increased exchange 
rate volatility heightens the firms’ impulse to herd with respect to all other factors including 
their cost and demand functions.  
In addition, increasing the volatility of the importer/exporter exchange rate increases 
the firms’ desire to “herd” when choosing between LCP and VCP.  Figure 3.2 plots the 
shares of the 5,625 representative firms with respect to ikδ , the pass-through coefficient of the 
importer/vehicle exchange rate to the targeted price in the importing country.  When ikδ
 
= 0  
and there is an increase in the volatility of the importer/exporter exchange rate the share of 
firms invoicing in the vehicle currency drops from 9% to 4% while the share of firms 
invoicing in the local currency rises from 34% to 44%.  However, with increased 
importer/exporter exchange rate volatility and ikδ
 
= 1 the share of firms using VCP rises from 
20% to 23% while the share of firms using LCP falls from 22% to 20%.  For all 5,625 
representative firms, the correlation between IVCP and ikδ  rises from .095 in the baseline 
model to .188 in the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model; meanwhile, the 
correlation between ILCP and ikδ  falls from -.109 to -.174.  Again, the “herding” impulse is 
heightened due to the increased importer/exporter exchange rate volatility.       
But what happens if the vehicle/exporter exchange rate increases in volatility?  The 
results are similar: an increased likelihood of “herding” behavior in the choice of currency of 
denomination.  In Figure 3.3, when ikδ  = 0 the share of firms using LCP rises from 34% in 
the baseline model to 41% in the high vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility model: at the 
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same time the share of firms using VCP falls from 9% to 1%.  Yet, for ikδ
 
= 1 the proportion 
of firms invoicing in the vehicle currency increases (from 20% to 40%), and the share of 
firms using LCP falls (from 20% to 18%), with heightened volatility in the vehicle/exporter 
exchange rate.  For the 5,625 representative firms in the large vehicle/exporter exchange rate 
volatility model the correlation between IVCP and ikδ  is .356 compared to .095 in the baseline 
model while the correlation between ILCP and ikδ  falls from -.109 to -.179.   The impulse to 
“herd” is relatively more important for representative firms in the presence of increased 
vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility. 
Counterintuitively, the results herein suggest that high exchange rate volatility may 
increase the likelihood of an exporting firm invoicing in the more volatile currency when the 
firm’s competitors have already established a dominant invoicing currency and pass-through 
rates.  For example, if the market is suited to “herding” in the vehicle currency (firms in the 
industry use the vehicle currency so that ikδ  is large) then heightened exchange rate volatility 
will increase the likelihood of a given exporting firm denominating their price in the vehicle 
currency.  Likewise, if the market is positioned to “herding” in the producer’s currency 
(firms in the industry use the producer’s currency so that ijδ  is large) and there is an increase 
in the volatility of the importer/exporter exchange rate then a representative exporter is more 
likely to use PCP.  However, if both ikδ
 
and ijδ  are small then increased exchange rate 
volatility increases the likelihood that exporting firms will use LCP. 
One concern with the no-triangular arbitrage constraint on the exchange rate 
generation in the model is that the constrained exchange rate will necessarily have a greater 
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variance then the other two exchange rates.  In the baseline model, the constrained exchange 
rate is the exporter/importer exchange rate.   
Additionally, it is possible to change which exchange rate is constrained.  I run a 
model with a constrained vehicle/importer exchange rate.  This increases the variance of the 
vehicle/importer exchange rate relative to the other exchange rates.   
The results from the high vehicle/importer exchange rate variance model corroborate 
with the main results from this paper. First, representative firms “herd”. If there is higher 
pass-through of the exporter/importer exchange rate, ijδ , then firms would be more likely to 
use PCP and less likely to use LCP.  Also, if there is higher pass-through of the 
vehicle/importer exchange rate, ikδ , then firms would be more likely to use VCP and less 
likely to use LCP.   
For the high vehicle/importer exchange rate variance model, the correlation 
coefficient between the firms that use PCP and ijδ  is .138 while the correlation coefficient 
between the firms that use LCP and ijδ  is -.187.  Likewise, the correlation coefficient 
between the firms that use VCP and ikδ  is .353 while the correlation coefficient between the 
firms that use LCP and ikδ  is -.273.  Firms continue to “herd”.  
These results also attest to the second finding in this paper; the representative firms’ 
desire to “herd” is positively related to the volatility of the exchange rate.  In the paper’s 
baseline model, the correlation of firms that use PCP and ijδ  was .327.  However, when the 
volatility of the exporter/importer exchange rate is decreased, as in this constrained 
vehicle/importer exchange rate model, the correlation of firms that use PCP and ijδ  falls to 
.138; decreased volatility of the exchange rate decreases the likelihood of “herding”.  Also, in 
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the paper’s baseline model, the correlation of firms that use VCP and ikδ  is .095.  Yet, when 
the volatility of the vehicle/importer exchange rate is increased, as in this constrained 
vehicle/importer exchange rate model, the correlation of firms that use VCP and ikδ  rises to 
.353.  Again, we see a positive relationship between “herding” behavior and the volatility of 
the exchange rate. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 The dynamic model in this paper allows the exporting firm to maximize profits via 
four decisions; their price, currency of denomination, frequency of price adjustment as well 
as their choice to engage in forward currency contracts. 
The main contribution is to show that an exporter will “herd” between the choice of 
PCP and LCP or between the choice of LCP and VCP.  High exchange rate volatility 
increases the impetus for the firm to “herd”.  All of this is predicated on various 
characteristics of the firm’s demand, production technology, wage and the transaction costs 
of obtaining foreign currency. 
Perhaps the most important implication for the relationship between optimal currency 
denomination and exchange rate volatility is the invoicing of Chinese exports.  Exchange rate 
pass-through into the prices of US goods is very low, while the US/Chinese exchange rate 
has been unpegged, increasing exchange rate volatility. The results herein suggest that 
Chinese firms, which already tend to “herd” by using the dollar to invoice exports to the 
United States, will likely retain the use of the dollar as an invoicing currency because the 
increased exchange rate volatility makes “herding” more important.   
The results herein may also explain, counterintuitively, why the majority of Thai and 
Korean exports still tend to be denominated in the US dollar after those countries established 
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independently floating exchange rates with the US dollar in 1997, creating greater exchange 
rate volatility (Fukuda and Ono (2006)). 
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Table 3.1 
SUR: Impact of exogenous variables on freq. of price adjustment (K) and invoicing currency  
 
Seemingly Unrelated Reg. Seemingly Unrelated Reg. 
 
  
 
optimal K PCP LCP optimal K PCP VCP 
4.43** 0.071** 0.318** 4.43** 0.071** -0.0389** 
alpha: prod. (0.234) (0.0218) (0.0192) (0.234) (0.0218) (0.0152) 
technology 
            
-2.02** -0.0018 -0.0267** -2.02** -0.0018 0.0284** lambda:   
elasticity (0.0278) (0.00258) (0.00227) (0.0278) (0.00258) (0.00181) 
of demand 
        
-0.933** 0.456** -0.158** -0.933** 0.456** -0.298** pass-through  of 
exporter’s   (0.188) (0.0174) (0.0153) (0.188) (0.0174) (0.0122) 
currency  
            
-1.42** 0.032* -0.0132** -1.42** 0.032* 0.100** pass-through of 
vehicle (0.188) (0.0174) (0.0153) (0.188) (0.0174) (0.0122) 
Currency 
        
  -0.00168** -0.00020** -0.00036** -0.00168** -0.00020** 0.00016** 
initial wage (0.000632) (0.000059) (0.000052) (0.000632) (0.000059) (0.000041) 
  
            
2.74** 0.661** 0.474** 2.74** 0.661** -1.136** transaction cost 
of vehicle’s (1.06) (0.0988) (0.087) (1.06) (0.0988) (0.0691) 
ex. rate market 
        
  14.30** 0.212** 0.310** 14.30** 0.212** 0.479** 
Constant (0.282) (0.0262) (0.0230) (0.282) (0.0262) (0.0183) 
  
            
R-squared 0.5047 0.1377 0.1184 0.5047 0.1377 .2471 
 
Note: Significance at the 90% and 95% level is denoted with a * and ** respectively. 
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Table 3.2 
Evidence of “Herding” in the baseline model 
 
    
 
 
    
         
   
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
 
 PCP   27% 29% 31% 38% 41%  
 LCP 0 63% 48% 38% 24% 19%  
 VCP   10% 22% 31% 38% 40%  
 PCP   41% 43% 49% 53% 51%  
 LCP 0.25 42% 26% 19% 16% 17%  
 VCP   16% 32% 32% 30% 32%  
 PCP   65% 61% 61% 61% 61%  
 LCP 0.5 26% 19% 18% 17% 19%  
 VCP   9% 20% 21% 22% 20%  
 PCP   76% 78% 74% 74% 71%  
 LCP 0.75 20% 16% 18% 21% 22%  
 VCP   4% 6% 8% 5% 7%  
 
PCP   76% 80% 74% 78% 75%  
 
LCP 1 19% 20% 21% 22% 24%  
 
VCP   5% 0% 4% 0% 1%  
         
Note: ijδ  is the pass-through rate of currency j (the exporter’s currency) to the price index in the 
importing country i. And ikδ  is the pass-through rate of currency k (the vehicle currency) to the price 
index in the importing country i. 
Each square represents the proportion of firms that use a particular currency denomination given the 
225 industries for which ikδ  and ijδ  take their designated values. Sums do not round to 1 in all 
cases due to rounding. 
 
 
 
ikδ
ijδ
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Figure 3.1 
“Herding” with PCP and LCP: high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility. 
Baseline model: low exchange rate volatility
33%
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Note: For the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model, the variance of the 
importer/exporter exchange rate is roughly 4 times greater than in the baseline model. Sums do not 
round to 100% in all cases due to rounding. 
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Figure 3.2 
“Herding” with VCP and LCP: high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility. 
Baseline model: low exchange rate volatility
57% 58% 58% 61% 60%
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High importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model 
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Note: For the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model, the variance of the 
importer/exporter exchange rate is roughly 4 times greater than in the baseline model. Sums do not 
round to 100% in all cases due to rounding. 
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Figure 3.3 
“Herding” with VCP and LCP: high vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility. 
Baseline model: low exchange rate volatility
57% 58% 58% 61% 60%
34% 26% 23% 20% 20%
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High vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility model
58% 57% 53% 48% 42%
41% 36%
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Note: For the high vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility model, the variance of the vehicle/exporter 
exchange rate is roughly 4 times greater than in the baseline model. Sums do not round to 100% in 
all cases due to rounding. 
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Appendix A 
 A1. The formation of bpβ . 
 If we write Eq. 1.7 without city dummies, the constant, the distance control or the 
error term we have the following equation. 
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When cities i and j are in different countries ijbordI , = 1.  Also, if γ  is estimated by Eq. 
1.5 then we can rewrite Eq. A.1 as below. 
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 Note that the estimate forγ  as shown in Eq. A.2 will only be true if the estimate is 
consistent and there is no multicollinearity between tijZ ,  and 





−1
ln
t
t
e
e
 or if the estimate is 
from a simple regression.  As shown in Table A.4 there is little evidence for inconsistency 
when using Eq. 1.13 to estimate the pass-through rate.  As for multicollinearity, the highest 
condition index statistic found in Eq. 1.13 for all cross-border city pairs is 1.41; any value 
under 10 is considered stable.  
Distributing the RHS of Eq. A.2. 
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 Dividing by the parenthetical term in the RHS to isolate bpβ  and distributing the term 
in the LHS. 
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 Now if we use Eq. 1.5 and replace 
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 Replacingγ  as it is estimated in Eq. 1.5. 
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Separating the numerator and simplifying. 
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 Recall that the denominator is the portion of the border effect due to incomplete pass-
through of a volatile exchange rate.  The numerator represents the portion of the border effect 
due to all other reasons as given from Eq. 1.5.   
If the numerator is half the size of the denominator then 2/3 of the border effect must 
necessarily be due to incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate; bpβ  = 3/2 and the 
proportion of the border effect caused by incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate 
is
bpβ1 = 2/3.   
In an extreme example, suppose the numerator = 0.  Then for some pass-through rate 
ofγ  the entire border effect is due to incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate; 
bpβ  = 1 and the proportion of the border effect caused by incomplete pass-through of a 
volatile exchange rate is
bpβ1 = 1. 
Additionally, with notation most recently used by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) 
we can replicate Eq. A.8.  If we discard the constant, distance control and any other controls 
we have the following regression equation. 
∑
=
+++=
N
s
ssijCijUijij DCCUUUC
1
αγγβσ       (A.9) 
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Where ijσ  is the standard LHS variable given in Eq. 1.1, UCij, UUij, CCij are the 
border dummy, the US-US dummy and the Canada-Canada dummy respectively.  City 
dummies are given by Ds.  The estimate of the border effect from Gorodnichenko and Tesar 
(2005) is ( )CU γγββ +−= 21ˆ .  Thus, the estimate of the border effect is given by the 
additional volatility caused by crossing the border ( β ) minus the average within country 
volatility ( ( )CU γγ +21 ).  From Cheung and Lai (2006), the border effect, β , can be 
separated into a non-exchange rate border effect, pi , and an exchange rate border effect, ξ .  
The estimation procedure outlined in section 1.3 replaces the border dummy withξ .  When 
usingξ as in Eq. 1.7 the following relationship is approximately achieved. 
( ) ( )CUCUbp γγξpiγγββξβ +−+=+−=≈ 2121ˆ  OR 
( )
ξ
γγpiβ CUbp
+−
+≈ 2
1
1        (A.10) 
In the RHS term, the denominator is the exchange rate’s contribution to the border 
effect while the numerator is the average non-exchange rate border effect that is greater than 
the average within country volatility.  Eq. A.10 necessarily mirrors Eq. A.8.  The existence of 
the country heterogeneity effect which is not controlled for in Eq. A.8 or Eq. A.10 is 
addressed in section A.2 of the Appendix.  
Cheung and Lai (2006) also attempt to determine the exchange rate border effect,ξ .  
The authors propose thatξ  is as follows: 
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Theξ  proposed in this paper is 












−
−1
2 ln)1(
t
t
e
e
Vγ .  When the average pass-through 
rate is very small, Cheung and Lai’s exchange rate border effect and the exchange rate border 
effect in this paper are very similar; but when the average pass-through rate is larger the 
difference is magnified as shown in Table A.1. The average pass-through rate for the data in 
Engel in Rogers (1996), studied in this paper and in Cheung and Lai (2006), is .04.  Not 
surprisingly, the results in Cheung and Lai are very similar to those in this paper.  However, 
if the pass-through rate was greater than .5, then Cheung and Lai’s methodology would 
suggest that the exchange rate border effect is negative even though the exchange rate is not 
fully reflected in the intercity nominal price volatility; suggesting that the method outlined in 
section 1.3 is preferable.   
Finally, essentially only Eq. 1.5 is necessary to estimate the proportion of the border 
effect that is due to incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate as bpβ  could be 
calculated as in Eq. A.8.  However, using Eq. 1.7 along with the additional distance, city 
dummies and any other additional control variables allow us to test the significance of bpβ .  
If we simply used Eq. 1.5 and determined bpβ  through Eq. A.8 then we would risk an omitted 
variable bias from the lack of distance, city or other controls.   
Equally, we could discard Eq. 1.5 and use only Eq. 1.7 by simply calculating the 
denominator of Eq. A.8.  Indeed, the job of Eq. 1.5 is simply to find the necessary covariance 
between the relative prices and the exchange rate.  
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 A.2 Country Heterogeneity Control 
 As pointed out by both Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) and Cheung and Lai (2006) 
the traditional estimation method, given in Eq. 1.1, may leave the border effect estimation 
tainted by within-country effects.  If both the number of cities in each country is not the same 
and average city price variation is not the same across countries then a bias may seep into the 
estimation of the border effect as the benchmark group, within-country city pairs, is 
heterogeneous. 
 Based on the findings of Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) and Cheung and Lai 
(2006) I can control for the country heterogeneity effect. The method outlined in 
Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005) imposes the condition that the average city price variation 
is equal to zero in each country.  Thus, the average city price variation is the same across 
countries and no country heterogeneity bias exists.  However, in order to calculate the border 
effect using this method we must assume that the average city price variation is equal across 
countries before the condition is imposed; this is not an optimal assumption.  The method 
used in Cheung and Lai (2006) drops a sufficient number of cities from the dataset so that 
each country has the same number of cities.  Thus, because each country in the resulting 
dataset has the same number of cities the country heterogeneity bias is eliminated.  This 
method is also, perhaps, not optimal.  In order to calculate the border effect a sample 
randomization must take place, discarding valuable data. 
Nonetheless, I will make use of the method introduced in Cheung and Lai (2006) and 
drop the necessary number of cities from the dataset.  For the price index data from Engel 
and Rogers (1996), I retain all 9 Canadian cities and the 9 cities in the U.S. that come first 
alphabetically.  For the commodity price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, I retain 
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all 4 Canadian cities and the 4 cities in the U.S. that come first alphabetically. This is a 
sample randomization assuming that the names of U.S. cities have no correlation with city 
specific characteristics.  Results from the Engel and Rogers (1996) dataset are presented in 
Table A.2 (using Eq. 1.14) while results from the Economist Intelligence Unit are given in 
Table A.3 (using Eq. 1.16). 
 For the Engel and Rogers (1996) price index data, the estimated proportion of the 
border effect due to incomplete pass-through of a volatile exchange rate is very similar to the 
findings in Table 1.3.  The results from the Economist Intelligence Unit are also similar to 
their associate findings in Table 1.5.  However, there are two exceptions.  In Table A.3, 
Personal Care and Recreation have very different estimated proportions of the border effect 
due to the nominal price/nominal exchange rate relationship.  The estimate of bpβ  is not 
significant from zero in both cases.  The inability to find a significant bpβ  would suggest that 
there is no border effect for these two goods when controlling for the country heterogeneity 
effect.      
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Table A.2a Good 1 Good 2 Good 3 
 Equation 1.14 US: Food at Home US: Food away from home US: Alcoholic Beverages 
  
Can: Food from stores Can: Food from restaurants Can: Alcoholic Beverages 
 Bdist  0.0000241*** -0.00000197 0.0000115 
  (0.00000733) (0.00000487) (0.00000946) 
 Bbp  1.512*** 1.438*** 1.878*** 
  (0.037) (0.052) (0.057) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  13.97 8.37 15.48 
 R-squared  0.9926 0.982 0.9903 
 Proportion of the   
      
 border effect due to   0.66 0.7 0.53 
 incomplete pass-
through  
      
Mean border effect (mi.) 41 24760 45938 
  
Good 4 Good 5 
  US: Shelter US: Fuel and other utilities 
  Can: Shelter -.2135(Good 5) Can: Water, fuel and elec. 
 Bdist  0.0000209*** 0.0001216 
  (0.00000803) (0.0000842) 
 Bbp  1.256*** 6.067*** 
  (0.091) (0.896) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  2.81 5.66 
 R-squared  0.9731 0.9118 
 Proportion of the   
    
 border effect due to   0.8 0.16 
 incomplete pass-
through 
    
Mean border effect (mi.) 460 14845 
Note: Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  Significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
denoted by *, ** or *** 
respectively.  The Mean Border 
Effect is calculated using the 
average Bdist of all other goods 
and the Bdist of the good in 
question. If the estimation of 
Bdist is insignificant then the 
Mean Border Effect can not be 
easily interpreted. City Dummies 
are included but not reported. 
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Table A.2b Good 6 Good 7 Good 8 
 Equation 1.14 US: Household Furn. & Op. US: Men's and Boy's Apparel US: Women's and Girl's App. 
  
Can: Housing exc. shelter Can: .8058(Men)+.1942(Boy) Can: .8355(Wom.)+.1645(G.) 
 Bdist  0.00000389 0.0000397** 0.0001001 
  (0.00000361) (0.00002) (0.0001297) 
 Bbp  1.415*** 3.045*** 13.989*** 
  (0.036) (0.196) (1.931) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  11.56 10.45 6.73 
 R-squared  0.9932 0.9923 0.9587 
 Proportion of the   
      
 border effect due to   0.71 0.33 0.07 
 incomplete pass-
through  
      
Mean border effect (mi.) 6305 25064 1.87E+13 
  
Good 9 Good 10 
  US: Footwear US: Private Transportation 
  Can: Footwear Can: Private Transportation 
 Bdist  0.0000574* 0.0000155** 
  (0.0000319) (0.00000792) 
 Bbp  1.212** 2.064*** 
  (0.51) (0.049) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  0.42 21.8 
 R-squared  0.9772 0.9858 
 Proportion of the   
    
 border effect due to   0.82 0.48 
 incomplete pass-
through 
    
Mean border effect (mi.) 48 41351 
Note: Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  Significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
denoted by *, ** or *** 
respectively.  The Mean Border 
Effect is calculated using the 
average Bdist of all other goods 
and the Bdist of the good in 
question. If the estimation of 
Bdist is insignificant then the 
Mean Border Effect can not be 
easily interpreted. City Dummies 
are included but not reported. 
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Table A.2c Good 11 Good 12   
 Equation 1.14 US: Public Transportation US: Medical Care   
  
Can: Public Transportation Can: Medical Care   
 Bdist  0.0002734*** 0.0000121   
  (0.0000773) (0.0000128)   
 Bbp  11.766*** 1.980***   
  (0.452) (0.093)   
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  23.8 10.58   
 R-squared  0.9743 0.9695   
 Proportion of the   
      
 border effect due to   0.09 0.51   
 incomplete pass-
through  
      
Mean border effect (mi.) 1081351 72497  
  
Good 13 Good 14 
  US: Personal Care US: Entertainment 
  Can: Personal Care Can: .8567(Rec.)+.1433(Rd.) 
 Bdist  0.00000662 0.0000039 
  (0.0000106) (0.00000437) 
 Bbp  1.479*** 1.288*** 
  (0.085) (0.038) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  5.65 7.66 
 R-squared  0.9899 0.9926 
 Proportion of the   
    
 border effect due to   0.68 0.78 
 incomplete pass-
through 
    
Mean border effect (mi.) 3639 1851 
Note: Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  
Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level is denoted by *, 
** or *** respectively.  The 
Mean Border Effect is 
calculated using the average 
Bdist of all other goods and the 
Bdist of the good in question. If 
the estimation of Bdist is 
insignificant then the Mean 
Border Effect can not be easily 
interpreted. City Dummies are 
included but not reported. 
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Table A.3 
  
  
  
  
  
      
 Equation 1.24          
  Food Alcohol Household Sup. Recreation 
 Bdist  -0.00000126 -4.76E-08 -0.00000088 0.00000115 
  (0.00000247) (0.00000188) (0.00000185) (0.00000717) 
 Bbp  2.316** 1.453 2.921*** 0.705 
  (0.991) (0.987) (0.806) (1.955) 
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  1.33 0.46 2.38 -0.15 
 R-squared  0.6754 0.605 0.7283 0.5626 
 Proportion of the   
                
 border effect due to   0.43 0.69 0.34 1.42 
 incomplete pass-through  
                
Mean border effect (miles) N/A N/A N/A e^1887 
  
        
    
  
Personal Care Tobacco Clothing 
      
 Bdist  0.00000146 -0.00000273 4.96E-07     
  (0.00000226) (0.00000355) (0.00000277)     
 Bbp  0.924 8.612*** 2.720**     
  (0.95) (1.321) (1.182)     
 t-stat (Bbp=1)  -0.08 5.95 1.46     
 R-squared  0.7228 0.8545 0.642     
 Proportion of the   
                
 border effect due to   1.08 0.12 0.37 
    
 incomplete pass-through 
                
Mean border effect (miles) e^1962 N/A e^17000 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** or *** respectively. The Mean Border 
Effect is calculated using the Bdist of the good in question; if Bdist is negative the calculation can not be made. If the estimation of Bdist is 
insignificant then the Mean Border Effect can not be easily interpreted. City Dummies and Good Dummies are included but not reported.     
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Table A.4 
Number (out of 126) of cross-border city pairs where the DWH test fails 
 
Pass-through estimates 
via Eq. 1.13 
Pass-through estimates 
via Eq. 1.13 and an 
additional lagged 
relative price variable 
Good 1 2 2 
Good 2 2 1 
Good 3 2 13 
Good 4 2 1 
Good 5 16 15 
Good 6 7 2 
Good 7 8 1 
Good 8 7 3 
Good 9 16 5 
Good 10 9 7 
Good 11 26 18 
Good 12 12 10 
Good 13 3 1 
Good 14 4 1 
Percentage 6.58% 4.54% 
Note: The failure rate is based on a 95% confidence interval.  The 
necessary DWH statistic was calculated using the residuals of an AR(1) 
regression of the change in the exchange rate.  
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Appendix B 
 
B.1 Theoretical justification of Eq. 10 
 In order to compute the pass-through rate, we can start from the export price of good 
k from country j at time t, tkjp ,, .  Let the price of the good be denominated in the U.S. dollar 
(the importer’s currency for this paper).  Using Feenstra (1995) as a baseline, suppose the 
price is computed by the following function. 
 tjtjtktkjtkjtkjtkj ewxp ,,,,,,,,,,, ),()1( φµτ+=       (B.1) 
 tkj ,,µ  represents the markup over the marginal cost, tkj ,,φ .  The marginal cost is a 
function of two other variables.  One, the good specific element, tkx ,  ( tkx ,  can be considered 
the quantity produced of good k at time t). Two, the export country specific costs, tjw ,  ( tjw ,  
can be considered the wage in country j at time t).  The exchange rate is denoted by tje ,  and 
the tariff/transportation costs are denoted by )1(
,, tkjτ+ .       
 Under perfect competition the markup is equal to 1, tkj ,,µ  = 1.  But, suppose that the 
market for good k is somewhat imperfect.  Under imperfect competition, the markup is likely 
to be a function of the competitor’s price in the United States, the exchange rate and the 
marginal costB1.  The greater the degree of imperfection in the market, the greater the markup 
will be. 
 
( )),(,,
,,,,,,,,,,, tjtktkjtjtkUStkjtkj wxep φµµ =      (B.2) 
 Inverting Eq. B.2. 
 
( )tjtkUStkjtkjtjtkUStkjtkjtjtktkj epepwx ,,,,,,,,,,,,1 ,,,,,, ,,),,(),( µθµµφ == −   (B.3) 
                                                 
B1
 Evidence for the endogeneity of the markup can be found in Hellerstein (2004).     
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 Substituting Eq. B.3 into Eq. B.2. 
  
( )tjtkUStkjtkjtjtkjtkjtkj epep ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,)1( µθµτ+=     (B.4) 
 Based on derivation given in Eq. B.4, the RHS of Eq. 2.10 must control for 
movements in the tariff/transportation costs, markup, exchange rate and the price in the U.S. 
market.  Eq. 2.10c, reproduced below, does all of these things.       
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 Eq. 2.10c computes pass-through rates for each of the 57 countries, as such the 
distance between country j and the U.S. is constant; thus, if transportation costs change over 
time, then they are controlled by the trend.  The tariff is captured by 

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markup is controlled by tkIIT , and tkjexpshr ,, . Both the intra-industry trade index and 
exporter’s market share help to approximate the degree of competition in the market for good 
k.  By approximating the degree of market imperfection tkIIT , and tkjexpshr ,,  can also 
approximate the markupB2.  Finally, the exchange rate and the U.S. price are represented by 

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 Likewise, Eq. 2.13, reproduced below, estimates the good specific pass-through rates 
for 253 goods. 
                                                 
B2
 More detail on competition in imperfect markets can be found in Bachetta and van Wincoop (2002). 
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 Just as in Eq. 2.10c, Eq. 2.13 must control for movements in the tariff/transportation 
costs, markup, exchange rate and the price in the U.S. market.  The effect of the tariff and 
transportation costs are captured by 6α and 7α .  Because Eq. 2.13 is regressed once for each 
good, the good component of the markup is the same for all observations.  The country 
component of the markup is approximated by the per capita GDP of the exporting country 
and the exporter’s market share.  Finally, the exchange rate and the U.S. price are represented 
by 

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 B.2 Empirical modeling and weighting of Eq. 2.10  
 In order to find the country specific pass-through coefficients I experiment with three 
different methods outlined in this section of the appendix.  The first method, exemplified in 
Table B.1, is to find the statistically optimal estimation method for all countries taken 
together.  The second method, exemplified in Table B.2, is to find the statistically optimal 
estimation method for all countries taken separately.  The last estimation method relies on 
the theoretical model above. 
 Table B.1 presents results for 5 models tested using all 96,739 observations.  The 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is helpful in determining the optimality of certain 
regression models in a manner that reflects optimality for all 57 countries.  With the BIC, I 
can test the optimality of additional variables to the simple regression, Eq. 2.10a.  Because all 
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96,739 observations are used, the macroeconomic variables are included to control for 
exporting country specific effects.  Because they act as control variables, I’m unable to test 
their usefulness.  However, a “kitchen sink” approach that does make use of the 
macroeconomic variables tends to perform poorly relative to the other three methods (details 
are given below).  Yet, I am able to test the importance of other variables: explicitly, the 
exporter’s market share, the IIT index, and the three U.S. macroeconomic variables. 
I turn to Taylor (2000) to provide the motivation behind the model in Table B.1. 
Following the staggered price setting model in Taylor (2000) let exporting firm i face the 
following demand function for its product. 
 
( ) ttititi pPq εβ +−= ,,        (B.5) 
 The quantity sold by firm i, tiq , , is a function of the elasticity of substitution for the 
firm’s product, iβ , the average price level of other (differentiated) goods, tP , the price set by 
firm i, tip , , and a random demand parameter in the importing country, tε .   
Firm i sets its price to last four periods.  Firm j, firm k and firm l are located in the 
same country as firm i and they set their prices for four periods, except at different points in 
time. The average price level in the importing country is given by the four period average of 
the prices set by firm i, firm j, firm k, firm l and the average price of all other firms not 
located in the exporting country.  Let the average price for all other firms not located in the 
some country as firms i, j, k and l be denoted by tp . 
( ) ( ) 4/1 3.,2,1,, −−− ++++−= tltktjtitt pppppP αα       (B.6) 
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The exporting country’s market share in the importing country is given byα .  The 
marginal cost of firm i’s production is tic ,  and the firm pays a tariff rate of ti ,τ .  The firm’s 
profit for the four periods in which the price is fixed can then be expressed as belowB3. 
( )∑
=
++++ −−
3
0
,,,,,
)1(
s
stistitistitistt qcqpeE τ      (B.7) 
Because the price data in this paper is unit values we do not observe any individual 
exporting firm’s prices.  Instead, we observe the following as a unit value. 
tltktjti
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3,,2,,1,,,
+++
+++
=
−−−
   (B.8) 
So how would the model herein predict the results from Table B.1?  We should 
expect to see the positive relationship between the observed price and either the exchange 
rate or the importing country’s price (rows 1 and 2 of Table B.1).  
An individual firm would react to higher transportation costs (proxied by distance in 
row 4 of Table B.1) by raising pricesB4.  The coefficient in Table B.1 is negative.  The LHS 
variable is the change in the observed price; this suggests that transportation costs are 
decreasing over time. Exporting countries from greater distances are more able to pass those 
transportation cost savings on to their price relative to firms in exporting countries closer to 
the United States which may have a lower percentage of their costs determined by 
transportation costs. 
                                                 
B3
 Implicit in the formulation above is the assumption that the firm always uses Local Currency Pricing.  Given 
that the data used in this paper is of US imports and the fact that over 90% of US imports are denominated in 
the dollar this is a reasonable assumption.   
 
B4
 In order to get this result, one need only consider ti ,τ as a measure of transportation costs, ala the iceberg 
method, instead of a tariff rate. 
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Additionally, an individual firm would react to higher tariffs by raising prices.  
However, the tariff coefficient in Table B.1 is negative (row 5).  This is the result of the 
nature of the tariff rate coefficient within the context of the unit value data.  The observed 
tariff rate in the data is as follows: 
3,,2,,1,,,
,3,,,2,,,1,,,,
−−−
−−−
+++
+++
=
tltltktktjjttiti
tltltltktktktjtjjttititi
t pqpqpqpq
pqpqpqpq
ratetariffobserved ττττ       (B.9) 
The numerator of the observed price becomes the denominator of the observed tariff 
rate; creating a strong impetus for a negative coefficient in OLS. An alternative formulation 
for the tariff would be to use the observed per unit tariff given below. 
tltkjtti
tltltltktktktjtjjttititi
t qqqq
pqpqpqpq
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,,,
,3,,,2,,,1,,,,
+++
+++
=
−−−
ττττ
 (B.10) 
When the observed per unit tariff is used instead of the observed tariff rate the 
resulting coefficient is positive but insignificant. 
The trend variable (row 6) denotes that prices for all goods and countries are tending 
to decrease over time as expected given decreased trade restrictions. 
The macroeconomic condition of the exporting country is given in rows 7-18.  An 
alternative setup would be to use dummy variables for each country.  This however isn’t 
required when estimating each country’s pass-through rate individually. 
Likewise, the dynamic macroeconomic condition in the importing country is 
controlled by the long-term inflation, short-term price volatility and monetary volatility (rows 
21-23). 
The exporting country’s market share and the IIT index for industry are given in rows 
19 and 20 respectively.  While not explicitly modeled above inα , one way that the firms in 
the exporting country could increase their market share is to have lower prices; this is 
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reflected in the negative coefficient in row 19.  The coefficient in row 20 is not as the model 
would expect (as exporting countries with more differentiated products would likely be more 
able to raise prices) but it is insignificant. 
So why use the results of Table B.1 to motivate the first stage regression to estimate 
the pass-through rate?  The regressions in Table B.1 represent alternative estimation methods 
for the entire sample of all goods and countries.  Using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) I can test whether certain formulations are better for the entire sample.  As the country 
specific pass-through rates must be compared relative to one another it is important to see 
what estimation formulation is optimal for all countries when taken together.  The best BIC 
coefficient can be found when using Reg. 3.  Reg. 3 is mirrored in the setup of Eq. 2.10b.  
Less optimal formulations, for all countries taken together, as measured by the BIC include 
Reg. 1 (mirrored by Eq. 2.10c), Reg. 2 (with U.S. price lagged variables), Reg. 4 (without the 
US macro variables) and Reg. 5 (mirrored by Eq. 2.10a).  However, Eq. 2.10c is the 
estimation formulation most consistent with the theoretical model given above section B.1.  
Also, when all countries are taken separately, Eq. 2.10a is optimal as measured by the BIC 
for most of the 57 countries; this is shown below.   
How much does all this matter?  Probably not too much: the 2nd stage regression 
results in Table 4 are robust, remaining similar regardless of which estimation method is used 
in the 1st stage regression. 
 Now I turn to Table B.2 in order to see which estimation method works best for all 
countries separately. I also use the BIC for each of the 57 individual country regressions to 
see which of the three methods provides the “best fit”.  The overwhelming favorite is the 
simplest regression, Eq. 2.10a.    
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The first method, Eq. 2.10a, is the simplest approach and is based on Reg. 5 of Table 
B.1.  While Reg. 5 performs poorly relative to Reg. 1-3, individual countries find Eq. 2.10a 
optimal to all others. Out of the 57 countries, 31 countries find Eq. 2.10a superior to Eq. 
2.10b, Eq. 2.10c (from the BIC).  Thus, I state that there is evidence for Eq. 2.10a to be 
statistically superior. 
The second method, Eq. 2.10b, also maintains some evidence for statistical 
superiority (9 of 57 countries by BIC).  In Table B.1, Reg. 3 provides the best fit model from 
the BIC.  As such Eq. 2.10b is modeled after Reg. 3 which omits the IIT index and the 
exporter’s market share and includes the three U.S. macroeconomic variables.   
The third method, Eq. 2.10c, is based on Reg. 1 from Table B.1.  17 of 57 countries 
are modeled best by Eq. 2.10c as determined by the BIC.  I find economically compelling 
reasons for the use of Eq. 2.10c with this dataset.  Because Eq. 2.10 is concerned with finding 
country specific pass-through rates, there is both a time and good component to the price 
data.  The time component is controlled with a trend variable while Eq. 2.10c controls for 
some of the characteristics of the good with tkIIT , and tkjexpshr ,, . 
The pass-through estimates generated by Eq. 2.10a, Eq. 2.10b and Eq. 2.10c are 
presented in Table B.2.  Regardless of the differences in the three methods of estimating the 
country specific pass-through rates, the methods produce very similar results as shown in 
Table 2.4.  Some of the 57 pass-through estimates produce theoretically unfeasible pass-
through rates (a feasible pass-through rate falls between 0 and 1).  However, those countries 
with unfeasible pass-through rates tend to have a low weight; as such, in Eq. 2.11, the effect 
of those unlikely pass-through estimates is limited. 
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As shown in Table B.2, there are roughly 65% of the pass-through estimates from Eq. 
2.10 that are not statistically different from the theoretical range of 0 and 1.  While this is less 
than optimal, the sample size as a whole as shown in Table B.1 estimates the pass-through 
coefficient as .773.  The price data in this paper is composed of volatile unit values rather 
than the price indexes studied in Yang (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2002).  As such, 
pass-through coefficients of the smaller samples will be more likely to exhibit extremes 
relative to the less volatile price index data.         
85% of the coefficients on the US price variable, 3α , fall in the same theoretical 
range.  However, for the tariff coefficient, 4α , only 60% of the pass-through estimates fall the 
theoretically predicted range; most of the tariff coefficients that are not theoretically as 
predicted are significantly negative.  As noted above, this is mainly because of the 
construction of the tariff variable given in Eq. B.9.  In an alternate formulation of the tariff 
variable, as given in Eq. B.10, the tariff coefficients are less likely to be below 0. 
I reject the use of a “kitchen sink” approach, which makes use of macro variables 
from Eq. 2.11, to find the 57 country specific pass-through coefficients.  When measuring the 
best fit model for each of the 57 countries, the “kitchen sink” model performs poorly relative 
to the simplest model given in Eq. 2.10a.  The exporting country’s macroeconomic variables 
do an excellent job of controlling for country specific effects in the regressions reported in 
Table B.1.  However, Eq. 2.10 is regressed once for each of the 57 countries; there is little 
need to control for country specific effects.  This may be due to the fact that each individual 
country’s macroeconomic characteristics are fairly stable over the 4 year time period in the 
dataset.  The average coefficient of variation for the additional RHS variables in the “kitchen 
sink” model is 16 compared to 114 in Eq. 2.11 and 56 in Eq. 2.14.    
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I also experimented with including lagged variables for the exchange rate, the foreign 
price and the U.S. price. 
In order to test the usefulness of including additional lagged exchange rate 
variablesB5, I run the following regression for each of the 57 countries. 
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 In Table B.2, the coefficient estimates for 0jγ are presented with the pass-through 
coefficients estimated for Eq. 2.10.  In only 5 of the 57 countries does Eq. B.11 lead to more 
theoretically feasible pass-through rates (a theoretically feasible pass-through rate falls 
between 0 and 1).  For 27 countries Eq. B.11 leads to less theoretically likely pass-through 
rates.  Why?  Most likely because of the implicit multicollinearity between the exchange rate 
lags and the macroeconomic variables.  So long as the exchange rate itself follows an 
autoregressive process, there is a certain level of multicollinearity in the RHS of Eq. B.11.  
There is evidence for the presence of multicollinearity in Eq. B.11 as the average condition 
index statistic for the 57 countries is 31.1.  A condition index statistic greater than 10 is an 
indication of instability.  To contrast, the average condition index statistic for Eq. 2.10a is 1.7 
and the average condition index statistic for Eq. 2.10c is 12.7B6.  Because of the high level of 
                                                 
B5
 Both Campa and Golderg (2002) and Yang (1997) sum the coefficients on the four exchange rate lagged 
variables to determine long-run exchange rate pass-through.  Short-run exchange rate pass-through is given by 
the coefficient on the first lagged exchange rate variable. 
 
B6
 The low condition index statistic for Eq. 2.10a is another reason for statistical preference of pass-through 
coefficient estimates from that particular regression.  
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multicollinearity in the lagged exchange rates, the coefficient estimates of 3210  and ,, jjjj γγγγ  
are unstable.   
In order to add lagged variables of the LHS variable, 

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, I necessarily must 
drop all observations for which there is no record of imports of good k from country j in any 
of the 3 previous quarters.  The result is that I must drop 19,982 of the 96,739 observations 
(20.6%).  The remaining 76,757 observations are placed into the following regression 
equation: 
∑∑∑
=
−−
−
=
−−
−
+
=
−−
−
+
−
+








+







+








+=







 3
0
,
1,
,
3
0 1,,
,,
5
3
1 1,,
,,
11
1,,
,, lnlnlnln
s
tk
stj
stj
js
r rtkUS
rtkUS
r
q qtkj
qtkj
q
tkj
tkj
e
e
p
p
p
p
p
p
εγααα   
  (B.12)   
Because there is a strong autoregressive process in the movements of the exchange 
rate, I constrain 321  jjj γγγ == .  As such, 
∑ +−
3
1
0
1
q
q
j
α
γ
represents the short-term pass-through 
rate while the long-term pass-through rate is defined as 
∑
∑
+−
3
1
3
1
q
q
s
js
α
γ
.  The short-run and long-
run pass-through coefficients of Eq. B.12 are reported in Figure B.1.  Of all the regression 
equations used to determine the pass-through rate, Eq. 2.10a, 2.10b, 2.10c and Eq. B.11, Eq. 
B.12 provides the greatest number of pass-through estimates that fall in the theoretically 
feasible range between 0 and 1. 
I place the short-term pass-through and long-term pass-through rate into Eq. 2.11 
which is reproduced below. 
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 The results are reported in Table B.3.  Again, the theoretical work of Taylor (2000) 
remains valid.  Long-term inflation increases the level of exchange rate pass-through while 
short-term price volatility decrease the level of exchange rate pass-through.  The imputed 
elasticity variable is significant but is of the opposite sign.  
Eq. 2.10a, 2.10b and 2.10c are all weighted in the same manner.  Each weight is 
constructed to take into account both the value at time t and t-1: 
 
( )1,,,, 5. −+= tjtjtjk KTotalValueKTotalValueweight     (B.14) 
Eq. 2.10, Eq. 2.11, Eq. 2.13 and Eq. 2.14 are given an analytical weight (aweight in 
Stata).  As there is a time, a good and a country component to the data, Eq. 2.10 and Eq. 2.13 
are likely to possess heteroskedastic residuals.  The use of analytical weights solves the 
potential problem of heteroskedasticity.  In addition, because the LHS variable in Eq. 2.10 
and Eq. 2.13 is a 1st moment and most of RHS variables in Eq. 2.10, Eq. 2.11, Eq. 2.13 and 
Eq. 2.14 are either 1st or 2nd moments I feel it is appropriate to use analytical weights.  
Because some observations represent a larger share of the market, Eq. 2.11, Eq. 2.13 and Eq. 
2.14 make use of the weight outlined above.  Thus, those observations with greater total 
value are given more weight. 
Full results for all regressions in this paper and this paper’s dataset can be found at 
www.unc.edu/~witte 
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B.3 Data Sources and Construction 
This section of the appendix is designed to act as an index to the creation of variables 
and to designate their sources. 
 Both the U.S. price and foreign price data (3-digit SITC) are collected via the 
USITC’s DataWeb.  The total value of the exports and imports are also collected from 
DataWeb in order to aid in the construction of the IIT index and the exporter’s market share.  
The data is collected by quantity measurement.  As some goods are measured in multiple 
quantities, such as Grams and Kilograms, each observation is indexed by the quantity of 
measurement and the SITC code.  For that reason, some SITC goods are observed multiple 
times for a single time period and a single exporting country. 
 There are many occasions when no observations occur in a time period because there 
is no record of exports from country j at time t for good k.  Thus, for the sake of simplicity, 
only those observations that are ranked as being the top 200 in total export value are 
considered.  Because each observation is weighted by the total value of the observation, the 
removal of those observations with little total value has a mitigated effect.     
 The exchange rate, including the bid and the ask price is collected on a daily basis 
from WM/Reuters.  The exchange rate volatility is calculated as below: 
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 je  represents the average exchange rate over the two quarters in the observation. 
The quarterly money supply, quarterly CPI and annual CPI change is compiled by the 
International Monetary Fund and was collected via the International Financial Statistics 
Browser.  The measurements of GDP and per capita GDP are annually collected by the 
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World Bank.  For Eq. 2.11 and Eq. 2.14, the RHS variables for each of the 15 time periods 
are averaged out for each of the 57 countries to control for the entirety of the observation 
window. 
The DataWeb term for the total value of imports is “Customs Value” which is defined 
as the price paid or payable for merchandise.  “Customs Value” excludes import duties, 
freight, insurance, and other charges.  The quantity measure used to create unit values is the 
“First Unit of Quantity.” 
The DataWeb term used for the total value of exports is the “Total FAS Export 
Value” which is defined as the value of exports at the U.S. port, based on the transaction 
price, including inland freight, insurance, and other charges incurred. The value excludes the 
cost of loading the merchandise and also excludes any further costs. The quantity measure 
used to create unit values is the “Total First Unit of Quantity.”  Because the “Total FAS 
Export Value” includes freight and insurance the unit value constructed will likely be greater 
than the true unit value.  However, because Eq. 2.10 and Eq. 2.13 use the differenced U.S. 
unit value solely as a cost control, there is a limited chance that the additional freight and 
insurance charges will affect the estimates of the pass-through coefficient in a meaningful 
way.  
To find the tariff rate, I use DataWeb’s “Calculated Duties” divided by the “Customs 
Value”.    
 
B.4 Non-EU Countries and Monetary Volatility 
This section of the appendix is concerned with the possible bias of the coefficient on 
monetary volatility due to the presence of EU country observations. 
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Because the European Union countries all share the same currency, those countries all 
share the same monetary volatility.  In Table B.4, I remove all EU countries from the sample 
and regress Eq. 2.11.  Regardless of the method of estimation for the country specific pass-
through rate, the volatility of money supply retains a positive, significant relationship with 
the pass-through rate. 
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Table B.1 
        
(96739 Obs.)     
      
LHS = Change in Exporter's Price Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
ln(pf,t/pf,t-1) 
          
Change in Exchange Rate  0.773** 0.773** 0.773** 0.792** 0.792** 
ln(et/et-1) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
Change is US Price at time t 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 0.120** 0.120** 
ln(pus,t/pus,t-1) (0.00626) (0.00627) (0.00626) (0.00625) (0.00625) 
Change is US Price at time t-1 
  0.000137       
ln(pus,t-1/pus,t-2) 
  (0.000359)       
Distance -2.68E-06** -2.68E-06** 3.53E-07 2.74E-06** 3.99E-07 
  (1.02E-06) (1.02E-06) (6.08E-07) (1.02E-06) (6.09E-07) 
Tariff Rate -0.179** -0.179** -0.180** -0.172** -0.174** 
  (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0799) (0.0799) 
Time -0.00655** -0.00655** -0.00656** -0.00261** -0.00252** 
  (0.000769) (0.000769) (0.000769) (0.000305) (0.000304) 
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy 0.0358** 0.0358** 0.0438** 0.0365** 0.0448** 
  (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0134) 
Managed Float Dummy -0.0216** -0.0216** -0.0227** -0.0231** -0.0243** 
  (0.00554) (0.00554) (0.00553) (0.00554) (0.00553) 
EU Dummy -0.0224** -0.0224** -0.0115** -0.0238** -0.0125** 
  (0.00498) (0.00498) (0.00401) (0.00498) (0.00402) 
Bid-Ask Spread -1.646* -1.649* -1.397 -2.112** -1.860** 
  (0.943) (0.943) (0.941) (0.942) (0.940) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  -2.458 -2.454 -2.094 -0.583 -0.240 
  (3.123) (3.123) (3.122) (3.106) (3.105) 
GDP 0.0797** 0.0797** 0.0729** 0.0809** 0.0738** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.016) (0.0162) (0.016) 
Per capita GDP -0.0651** -0.0651** -0.0623** -0.0702** -0.0673** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (0.00810) (0.00810) (0.00806) (0.00809) (0.00806) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) -0.00081** -0.00081** -0.000645** -0.000859** -0.000689** 
(Exporting Country) (0.000209) (0.000209) (0.000205) (0.000209) (0.000205) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) 0.746** 0.746** 0.694** 0.790** 0.739** 
(Exporting Country) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.181) 
Quart. Money growth Volatility (Long-Term) -0.265** -0.265** -1.481 -0.303** -0.239** 
(Exporting Country) (0.059) (0.059) (0.942) (0.059) (0.057) 
Exporter's Share of Market -0.152** -0.152**   -0.157**   
  (0.041) (0.041)   (0.041)   
IIT Index -0.000182 -0.000312   -0.000186   
  (0.00102) (0.00107)   (0.00102)   
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.121** 0.121** 0.118**     
(US-Importing Country) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)     
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) 25.02** 25.02** 25.10**     
(US-Importing Country) (2.274) (2.274) (2.274)     
Quarterly Money growth Volatility  -1.576 -1.577 -1.481     
(US-Importing Country) (0.942) (0.942) (0.942)     
Constant -0.191** -0.191** -0.218** 0.098** 0.067** 
  (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0499) (0.0109) (0.00723) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0160 0.0160 0.0156 0.0142 0.0141 
BIC - Bayesian Information Criterion -1326.976 -1315.642 -1336.143 -1204.993 -1213.205 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. As 
the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more strict. 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
 
     
Australia Passthrough Coefficient 1.411 1.337 1.310 2.197 
  Standard Error 0.491 0.497 0.505 0.665 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.026 0.013 0.012 0.016 
1.37E+10 Standard Error 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 
  Tariff Coefficient -3.709 -3.721 -3.725 -3.717 
  Standard Error 1.069 1.074 1.074 1.070 
  
        
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0200 0.0221 0.0221 0.0260 
  F-test 12.00 7.56 5.88 6.23 
  BIC' -16.58 1.86 17.30 19.10 
Austria Passthrough Coefficient 0.814 1.137 0.997 0.784 
  Standard Error 0.391 0.444 0.474 0.629 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.129 -0.133 -0.130 -0.117 
1.04E+10 Standard Error 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074 
  Tariff Coefficient -5.670 -5.444 -5.415 -5.327 
  Standard Error 1.832 1.836 1.836 1.837 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0666 0.0078 0.0081 0.0093 
  F-test 5.29 3.59 2.87 2.49 
  BIC' 11.15 31.36 46.79 67.00 
Bangladesh Passthrough Coefficient 4.077 4.728 4.334 -7.653 
  Standard Error 0.613 0.689 0.655 1.545 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.319 0.331 0.276 0.035 
8.40E+09 Standard Error 0.052 0.057 0.054 0.055 
  Tariff Coefficient 1.403 1.531 1.872 1.360 
  Standard Error 0.689 0.687 0.653 0.593 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1515 0.1599 0.2556 0.3927 
  F-test 28.81 17.94 23.42 34.56 
  BIC' -80.80 -70.72 -126.39 -246.07 
Belgium Passthrough Coefficient 0.482 0.356 0.303 1.789 
  Standard Error 0.239 0.267 0.268 0.339 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.213 -0.221 -0.221 -0.190 
3.19E+10 Standard Error 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
  Tariff Coefficient -4.089 -4.549 -4.762 -4.611 
  Standard Error 1.110 1.119 1.124 1.117 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0272 0.0295 0.0305 0.0466 
  F-test 29.85 18.94 15.43 16.76 
  BIC' -84.56 -72.48 -62.00 -97.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  151 
Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
     
Brazil Passthrough Coefficient 1.161 1.145 1.257 1.431 
  Standard Error 0.058 0.081 0.096 0.188 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.050 
5.14E+10 Standard Error 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
  Tariff Coefficient -4.036 -3.995 -3.968 -3.877 
  Standard Error 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.817 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0900 0.0894 0.0921 0.0907 
  F-test 107.32 61.98 48.86 37.14 
  BIC' -376.34 -355.65 -344.40 -324.99 
Canada  Passthrough Coefficient 0.636 0.769 0.779 0.345 
  Standard Error 0.156 0.173 0.175 0.226 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.075 0.081 0.081 0.085 
2.51E+11 Standard Error 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.564 -0.050 -0.052 0.562 
  Standard Error 2.507 2.490 2.491 2.491 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0103 0.0277 0.0270 0.0330 
  F-test 8.10 12.13 9.45 8.79 
  BIC' -0.60 -28.46 -12.84 -9.00 
Chile Passthrough Coefficient 1.686 1.186 0.147 1.154 
  Standard Error 0.216 0.369 0.403 0.522 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.560 0.538 0.442 0.446 
1.17E+10 Standard Error 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 
  Tariff Coefficient 1.669 1.646 1.090 1.206 
  Standard Error 0.571 0.581 0.578 0.576 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0923 0.0985 0.1248 0.1345 
  F-test 37.42 23.36 23.71 19.71 
  BIC' -113.76 -104.79 -134.82 -133.53 
Columbia Passthrough Coefficient 1.628 1.371 1.402 2.188 
  Standard Error 0.244 0.320 0.321 0.450 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.162 0.148 0.150 0.190 
1.87E+10 Standard Error 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.056 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.154 0.187 0.133 0.769 
  Standard Error 1.530 1.527 1.529 1.547 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0300 0.0322 0.0324 0.0403 
  F-test 13.67 9.40 7.58 7.19 
  BIC' -24.08 -12.57 -0.02 4.86 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
     
Croatia  Passthrough Coefficient 11.631 16.387 4.376 -36.753 
  Standard Error 2.377 2.775 3.286 4.683 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.055 -0.249 -0.105 0.163 
4.25E+08 Standard Error 0.574 0.578 0.565 0.522 
  Tariff Coefficient -9.858 -9.066 -10.553 -13.614 
  Standard Error 7.117 7.090 6.931 6.414 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0308 0.0460 0.0818 0.2184 
  F-test 6.77 5.85 9.49 20.95 
  BIC' 0.20 6.91 -21.51 -142.42 
Cyprus  Passthrough Coefficient 6.237 6.658 6.675 3.842 
  Standard Error 1.676 1.801 1.839 2.429 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.428 0.251 0.251 0.368 
4.24E+07 Standard Error 0.461 0.480 0.482 0.477 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.014 -0.003 -0.005 0.042 
  Standard Error 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.033 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0358 0.0416 0.0347 0.0675 
  F-test 3.58 2.73 2.11 2.68 
  BIC' 8.31 20.44 31.65 35.77 
Czech Republic Passthrough Coefficient 2.682 2.655 2.722 6.600 
  Standard Error 0.426 0.452 0.454 0.789 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.243 0.255 0.244 0.289 
1.07E+09 Standard Error 0.150 0.150 0.151 0.149 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.999 -0.992 -0.955 -0.680 
  Standard Error 0.882 0.881 0.882 0.865 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0264 0.0277 0.0279 0.0677 
  F-test 10.83 6.90 5.62 9.63 
  BIC' -13.71 3.17 15.50 -24.82 
Denmark Passthrough Coefficient 1.315 1.701 1.845 2.107 
  Standard Error 0.349 0.390 0.389 0.504 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.331 0.293 0.294 0.295 
5.30E+10 Standard Error 0.104 0.104 0.103 0.104 
  Tariff Coefficient 8.211 8.200 8.403 7.962 
  Standard Error 2.128 2.118 2.109 2.109 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0199 0.0310 0.0414 0.0449 
  F-test 10.75 9.78 10.21 8.52 
  BIC' -12.37 -14.64 -22.16 -9.54 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
     
Egypt Passthrough Coefficient 0.512 0.557 0.607 0.622 
  Standard Error 0.210 0.211 0.255 0.373 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.151 0.132 0.132 0.139 
2.75E+09 Standard Error 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.047 
  Tariff Coefficient 4.303 4.458 4.477 4.741 
  Standard Error 1.101 1.101 1.103 1.088 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0195 0.0227 0.0213 0.0499 
  F-test 6.76 4.84 3.80 6.06 
  BIC' 1.37 15.74 29.48 13.34 
Finland Passthrough Coefficient 0.924 0.611 0.473 0.035 
  Standard Error 0.274 0.306 0.315 0.413 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.063 0.023 -0.003 0.022 
5.95E+09 Standard Error 0.119 0.121 0.122 0.124 
  Tariff Coefficient -6.507 -6.009 -5.971 -5.855 
  Standard Error 2.182 2.173 2.173 2.175 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0129 0.0235 0.0242 0.0247 
  F-test 5.93 6.19 5.17 4.19 
  BIC' 5.68 8.30 19.80 37.99 
France Passthrough Coefficient 1.281 1.585 2.046 2.322 
  Standard Error 0.285 0.317 0.344 0.481 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.750 0.734 0.738 0.748 
3.02E+10 Standard Error 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.084 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.722 -2.731 -2.452 -2.407 
  Standard Error 0.947 0.947 0.948 0.951 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0413 0.0436 0.0475 0.0472 
  F-test 29.41 18.17 15.61 11.87 
  BIC' -83.79 -69.46 -66.47 -44.88 
Germany Passthrough Coefficient 0.502 0.929 0.873 0.312 
  Standard Error 0.196 0.217 0.218 0.324 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.105 -0.121 -0.124 -0.111 
5.02E+10 Standard Error 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.643 -0.771 -0.569 -0.526 
  Standard Error 0.869 0.869 0.872 0.873 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0087 0.0164 0.0181 0.0215 
  F-test 6.85 7.34 6.43 5.87 
  BIC' 4.23 4.15 13.49 24.77 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
     
Ghana Passthrough Coefficient 0.441 -0.224 -0.331 -0.162 
  Standard Error 0.295 0.340 0.335 0.667 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 2.813 2.644 2.611 2.617 
4.81E+08 Standard Error 0.204 0.210 0.208 0.212 
  Tariff Coefficient -1.635 -1.755 -6.194 -8.287 
  Standard Error 12.251 12.000 11.820 11.879 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.3448 0.3719 0.3958 0.3963 
  F-test 64.94 42.11 36.37 27.58 
  BIC' -185.17 -190.23 -198.76 -183.67 
Greece  Passthrough Coefficient 2.538 2.211 2.211 2.419 
  Standard Error 0.323 0.365 0.365 0.502 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.241 0.257 0.256 0.255 
1.56E+09 Standard Error 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.128 
  Tariff Coefficient -4.082 -3.914 -3.950 -4.032 
  Standard Error 0.788 0.790 0.804 0.811 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0623 0.0680 0.0672 0.0656 
  F-test 23.59 15.18 11.89 8.97 
  BIC' -62.71 -52.40 -38.83 -17.92 
Hungary Passthrough Coefficient -12.270 -14.123 -15.046 -24.020 
  Standard Error 1.069 1.324 1.480 1.833 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.193 0.931 0.929 0.859 
3.03E+09 Standard Error 0.406 0.419 0.419 0.388 
  Tariff Coefficient 3.198 3.630 3.155 16.711 
  Standard Error 2.925 2.879 2.901 2.863 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1010 0.1369 0.1369 0.2897 
  F-test 34.53 28.05 22.05 41.59 
  BIC' -102.88 -133.30 -121.24 -335.88 
Iceland Passthrough Coefficient 2.113 2.316 2.163 1.756 
  Standard Error 0.569 0.678 0.685 0.776 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.176 -0.168 -0.144 -0.130 
7.42E+08 Standard Error 0.171 0.174 0.175 0.177 
  Tariff Coefficient 25.181 25.191 25.886 26.289 
  Standard Error 12.610 12.634 12.632 12.637 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0285 0.0254 0.0273 0.0276 
  F-test 5.28 3.17 2.82 2.38 
  BIC' 4.57 22.50 32.05 47.93 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
India Passthrough Coefficient -12.393 -12.433 -12.515 26.308 
  Standard Error 1.993 2.049 2.065 3.205 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.576 0.581 0.581 0.517 
2.70E+10 Standard Error 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033 
  Tariff Coefficient 2.541 3.196 3.176 -2.155 
  Standard Error 2.905 2.912 2.919 2.716 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1306 0.1368 0.1362 0.2660 
  F-test 91.23 55.39 43.08 73.54 
  BIC' -309.26 -306.09 -290.75 -661.73 
Indonesia Passthrough Coefficient 0.775 0.750 0.820 0.840 
  Standard Error 0.070 0.072 0.082 0.102 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.159 0.131 0.131 0.116 
1.84E+10 Standard Error 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
  Tariff Coefficient 4.240 4.164 4.116 3.860 
  Standard Error 0.531 0.527 0.528 0.528 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1193 0.1327 0.1333 0.1442 
  F-test 62.32 40.58 31.94 26.64 
  BIC' -204.17 -212.47 -200.70 -204.28 
Ireland Passthrough Coefficient 0.935 1.199 1.725 10.112 
  Standard Error 0.393 0.420 0.413 0.529 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.206 0.182 0.179 -0.755 
5.82E+10 Standard Error 0.087 0.087 0.085 0.095 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.596 -1.694 -1.108 4.908 
  Standard Error 8.464 8.348 8.137 7.161 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0853 0.1110 0.1555 0.3481 
  F-test 38.87 29.95 34.22 73.28 
  BIC' -119.34 -146.38 -217.07 -618.72 
Israel Passthrough Coefficient 1.321 2.323 2.280 2.033 
  Standard Error 0.161 0.267 0.281 0.309 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.038 0.051 0.051 0.060 
2.89E+10 Standard Error 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.384 -0.339 -0.346 -0.368 
  Standard Error 1.045 1.039 1.039 1.036 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0342 0.0460 0.0452 0.0508 
  F-test 18.13 14.33 11.18 9.65 
  BIC' -41.10 -45.21 -30.44 -22.32 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Italy Passthrough Coefficient 1.063 0.363 0.546 0.846 
  Standard Error 0.236 0.258 0.248 0.317 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.030 -0.010 0.034 -0.008 
2.62E+10 Standard Error 0.067 0.067 0.064 0.065 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.036 0.571 0.940 0.863 
  Standard Error 1.284 1.273 1.222 1.220 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0075 0.0306 0.1085 0.1156 
  F-test 5.91 12.72 36.11 29.28 
  BIC' 7.88 -32.79 -236.53 -236.78 
Japan Passthrough Coefficient 0.643 0.754 0.617 1.173 
  Standard Error 0.172 0.177 0.202 0.229 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.060 -0.065 -0.066 -0.081 
5.95E+10 Standard Error 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.451 -0.463 -0.470 -0.477 
  Standard Error 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.356 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0187 0.0202 0.0214 0.0312 
  F-test 13.48 8.72 7.35 8.03 
  BIC' -21.98 -5.44 5.22 -0.64 
Kazakhstan Passthrough Coefficient 10.877 30.588 22.907 23.148 
  Standard Error 9.946 12.821 12.265 22.702 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.390 -0.670 0.090 0.096 
1.27E+09 Standard Error 0.663 0.654 0.640 0.645 
  Tariff Coefficient 4.434 7.045 5.685 3.006 
  Standard Error 7.245 7.131 6.766 6.921 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared -0.0099 0.0346 0.1342 0.1383 
  F-test 0.55 1.94 4.15 3.45 
  BIC' 18.60 22.85 11.14 12.66 
Kenya Passthrough Coefficient 3.429 3.025 2.626 2.403 
  Standard Error 0.899 0.935 0.927 1.383 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.400 0.425 0.307 0.352 
5.69E+08 Standard Error 0.142 0.157 0.157 0.165 
  Tariff Coefficient -1.651 -2.106 -2.419 -2.214 
  Standard Error 1.046 1.069 1.069 1.100 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0378 0.0447 0.0701 0.0757 
  F-test 6.86 4.99 6.00 5.07 
  BIC' -1.47 10.35 4.98 17.51 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Luxembourg Passthrough Coefficient 0.332 0.537 0.613 -0.333 
  Standard Error 0.708 0.785 0.824 1.084 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.562 0.606 0.598 0.638 
9.42E+08 Standard Error 0.274 0.278 0.281 0.283 
  Tariff Coefficient -1.460 -1.461 -1.427 -0.975 
  Standard Error 1.361 1.371 1.375 1.392 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0039 0.0014 -0.0009 0.0008 
  F-test 1.72 1.15 0.93 1.05 
  BIC' 19.52 38.13 51.01 66.49 
Mexico  Passthrough Coefficient 1.599 1.272 0.972 0.693 
  Standard Error 0.111 0.118 0.120 0.151 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.046 -0.036 -0.050 -0.046 
1.16E+11 Standard Error 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.699 0.646 0.730 0.684 
  Standard Error 0.387 0.383 0.377 0.375 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0850 0.1052 0.1322 0.1506 
  F-test 63.36 46.08 46.43 40.65 
  BIC' -211.05 -250.22 -318.64 -355.52 
Netherlands Passthrough Coefficient 0.766 0.820 0.930 1.044 
  Standard Error 0.284 0.316 0.344 0.460 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.025 -0.050 -0.053 -0.052 
1.20E+10 Standard Error 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 
  Tariff Coefficient -1.361 -1.395 -1.368 -1.369 
  Standard Error 0.649 0.648 0.649 0.652 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0095 0.0134 0.0129 0.0118 
  F-test 6.81 5.72 4.53 3.42 
  BIC' 4.04 14.72 29.59 52.61 
New Zealand Passthrough Coefficient 0.415 0.618 0.700 0.218 
  Standard Error 0.176 0.201 0.204 0.273 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.020 -0.018 -0.017 -0.031 
6.32E+09 Standard Error 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.224 0.234 0.296 0.314 
  Standard Error 0.201 0.202 0.203 0.203 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0302 0.0317 0.0339 0.0401 
  F-test 13.30 8.41 7.16 6.51 
  BIC' -23.02 -6.50 2.75 11.52 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Nigeria Passthrough Coefficient 0.999 0.431 0.677 -0.258 
  Standard Error 0.364 0.388 0.404 0.428 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.099 -0.043 -0.024 0.123 
3.22E+10 Standard Error 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.049 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.916 -19.483 -9.966 -23.865 
  Standard Error 16.553 16.695 17.463 17.055 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0262 0.1182 0.1256 0.2030 
  F-test 4.47 10.88 9.23 11.95 
  BIC' 7.23 -28.38 -22.23 -54.51 
Norway Passthrough Coefficient 1.405 1.536 1.576 2.570 
  Standard Error 0.213 0.271 0.273 0.335 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.116 0.127 0.132 0.030 
1.69E+10 Standard Error 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.052 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.003 -1.699 -1.560 -1.186 
  Standard Error 2.386 2.373 2.376 2.334 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0305 0.0418 0.0416 0.0756 
  F-test 13.85 11.19 8.88 12.14 
  BIC' -25.06 -25.09 -11.87 -51.85 
Pakistan Passthrough Coefficient 1.762 1.475 2.036 1.496 
  Standard Error 0.239 0.294 0.293 0.434 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.335 0.359 0.322 0.340 
7.84E+09 Standard Error 0.048 0.051 0.050 0.051 
  Tariff Coefficient -3.179 -3.127 -2.062 -1.672 
  Standard Error 0.894 0.892 0.876 0.881 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1186 0.1228 0.1717 0.1777 
  F-test 43.29 26.13 29.95 23.64 
  BIC' -134.29 -121.85 -181.77 -172.58 
Papau New Guinea Passthrough Coefficient 1.003 0.701 0.737 1.136 
  Standard Error 0.235 0.327 0.321 0.373 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.677 0.649 0.558 0.607 
1.39E+08 Standard Error 0.184 0.195 0.188 0.188 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.254 -2.525 -1.673 -2.722 
  Standard Error 1.766 1.753 1.750 1.780 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.2431 0.2598 0.3259 0.3576 
  F-test 9.43 6.27 6.64 5.87 
  BIC' -14.98 -6.56 -9.34 -3.82 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Paraguay  Passthrough Coefficient 1.159 1.379 1.415 1.735 
  Standard Error 0.296 0.513 0.520 0.691 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.292 0.286 0.294 0.271 
1.15E+08 Standard Error 0.191 0.192 0.193 0.195 
  Tariff Coefficient -1.425 -1.349 -1.447 -1.224 
  Standard Error 1.064 1.099 1.111 1.119 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0470 0.0443 0.0394 0.0456 
  F-test 4.65 2.96 2.35 2.18 
  BIC' 4.42 19.29 30.13 42.16 
Peru Passthrough Coefficient 1.395 0.575 0.574 0.420 
  Standard Error 0.578 0.635 0.636 0.768 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.113 0.086 0.089 0.096 
6.69E+09 Standard Error 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.062 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.060 0.188 0.095 -0.015 
  Standard Error 0.660 0.665 0.682 0.695 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0089 0.0145 0.0140 0.0138 
  F-test 4.10 3.91 3.18 2.61 
  BIC' 12.58 23.38 36.57 55.50 
Phillipines Passthrough Coefficient 1.512 1.148 1.242 0.586 
  Standard Error 0.238 0.283 0.281 0.294 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.280 0.265 0.258 0.106 
9.93E+09 Standard Error 0.050 0.053 0.052 0.052 
  Tariff Coefficient 2.303 2.291 2.160 1.523 
  Standard Error 0.259 0.260 0.258 0.257 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.1035 0.1059 0.1241 0.1860 
  F-test 44.11 26.25 24.50 29.43 
  BIC' -138.08 -123.03 -141.16 -231.85 
Poland Passthrough Coefficient 1.169 1.188 1.154 0.980 
  Standard Error 0.350 0.364 0.395 0.519 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.066 0.060 0.058 0.057 
1.48E+09 Standard Error 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.110 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.806 -0.839 -0.845 -0.846 
  Standard Error 0.930 0.933 0.936 0.936 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0055 0.0040 0.0028 0.0014 
  F-test 3.19 1.90 1.49 1.18 
  BIC' 16.70 38.18 52.85 74.11 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Portugal Passthrough Coefficient 0.607 0.856 0.756 0.740 
  Standard Error 0.193 0.214 0.215 0.275 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.271 0.281 0.299 0.286 
2.47E+09 Standard Error 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.916 0.957 0.967 0.707 
  Standard Error 0.933 0.933 0.929 0.937 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0495 0.0525 0.0602 0.0654 
  F-test 18.87 11.86 10.77 8.99 
  BIC' -44.85 -30.47 -29.28 -18.16 
Romania Passthrough Coefficient -0.994 -1.562 -1.147 -2.910 
  Standard Error 1.201 1.551 1.635 1.783 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.259 0.251 0.258 0.162 
1.63E+09 Standard Error 0.147 0.149 0.149 0.151 
  Tariff Coefficient -3.355 -3.478 -3.488 -3.138 
  Standard Error 1.370 1.378 1.378 1.401 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0140 0.0129 0.0118 0.0193 
  F-test 5.53 3.37 2.70 3.09 
  BIC' 6.59 26.52 40.12 48.94 
Russia Passthrough Coefficient -1.442 -2.748 -3.705 -3.953 
  Standard Error 0.649 0.925 0.956 1.539 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.094 -0.161 -0.169 -0.143 
2.52E+10 Standard Error 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.817 -0.934 -0.705 -0.828 
  Standard Error 1.216 1.198 1.194 1.181 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0076 0.0373 0.0461 0.0671 
  F-test 4.39 10.77 10.48 11.56 
  BIC' 12.37 -21.81 -25.08 -44.79 
Singapore  Passthrough Coefficient 2.913 9.545 8.337 -9.529 
  Standard Error 1.627 1.612 1.640 2.186 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.783 -1.007 -1.065 -1.760 
7.01E+09 Standard Error 0.169 0.157 0.158 0.157 
  Tariff Coefficient -10.036 -6.526 -6.675 -7.045 
  Standard Error 3.238 3.012 3.010 2.821 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0453 0.1788 0.1851 0.2882 
  F-test 20.33 51.64 42.09 55.93 
  BIC' -50.02 -276.16 -275.90 -477.06 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Slovenia Passthrough Coefficient 2.736 2.586 2.394 2.413 
  Standard Error 0.525 0.584 0.586 0.737 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.265 -0.261 -0.252 -0.238 
9.14E+08 Standard Error 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.122 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.618 0.549 0.115 0.225 
  Standard Error 2.175 2.210 2.216 2.213 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0245 0.0229 0.0282 0.0340 
  F-test 9.20 5.36 5.20 4.83 
  BIC' -7.75 13.00 18.24 28.87 
South Africa Passthrough Coefficient 2.340 2.407 3.518 5.141 
  Standard Error 0.333 0.428 0.468 0.514 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.621 0.599 0.605 0.811 
1.28E+10 Standard Error 0.057 0.061 0.060 0.059 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.435 -0.452 0.284 -0.087 
  Standard Error 2.113 2.114 2.104 2.000 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0817 0.0813 0.0951 0.1860 
  F-test 44.39 25.67 23.79 38.16 
  BIC' -140.07 -119.53 -135.99 -322.98 
South Korea Passthrough Coefficient 0.199 -0.040 0.127 0.074 
  Standard Error 0.152 0.161 0.191 0.204 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.241 0.219 0.221 0.208 
2.32E+10 Standard Error 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.727 -0.670 -0.706 -0.712 
  Standard Error 0.327 0.327 0.327 0.330 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0149 0.0230 0.0237 0.0269 
  F-test 10.25 9.22 7.60 6.64 
  BIC' -9.53 -9.28 2.47 14.81 
Spain Passthrough Coefficient 1.763 2.302 2.330 2.578 
  Standard Error 0.237 0.263 0.263 0.340 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.209 0.174 0.180 0.183 
9.13E+09 Standard Error 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068 
  Tariff Coefficient -7.103 -7.092 -7.290 -7.074 
  Standard Error 0.856 0.853 0.856 0.862 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0576 0.0702 0.0720 0.0726 
  F-test 37.08 26.47 21.34 16.41 
  BIC' -113.09 -124.59 -115.53 -96.90 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Sri Lanka Passthrough Coefficient -1.229 -1.668 -1.765 -1.098 
  Standard Error 0.699 0.707 0.707 0.748 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.219 0.170 0.176 0.156 
6.83E+09 Standard Error 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.054 
  Tariff Coefficient 0.942 0.723 0.271 0.466 
  Standard Error 0.967 0.968 0.980 0.980 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0258 0.0354 0.0403 0.0585 
  F-test 7.71 6.31 5.74 6.25 
  BIC' -2.85 4.89 11.46 9.80 
Sweden Passthrough Coefficient 0.817 1.344 1.593 1.464 
  Standard Error 0.276 0.289 0.289 0.395 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.357 0.327 0.277 0.340 
9.65E+09 Standard Error 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.078 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.680 -1.129 -1.163 -1.091 
  Standard Error 1.016 1.011 1.003 1.004 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0148 0.0315 0.0475 0.0606 
  F-test 9.07 10.96 12.90 12.54 
  BIC' -5.37 -21.95 -44.51 -54.20 
Switzerland Passthrough Coefficient 0.014 0.040 1.722 3.386 
  Standard Error 0.491 0.547 0.567 0.841 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.022 -0.040 -0.038 -0.016 
1.32E+10 Standard Error 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.083 
  Tariff Coefficient -20.543 -20.125 -19.435 -20.702 
  Standard Error 2.955 2.965 2.910 2.915 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0192 0.0204 0.0568 0.0649 
  F-test 12.13 7.79 16.25 14.16 
  BIC' -17.18 0.06 -72.73 -72.05 
Taiwan Passthrough Coefficient 0.500 0.363 1.093 0.943 
  Standard Error 0.271 0.298 0.313 0.352 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.117 0.097 0.081 0.084 
2.23E+10 Standard Error 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.050 -0.038 -0.225 -0.311 
  Standard Error 0.389 0.388 0.385 0.387 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0055 0.0109 0.0297 0.0313 
  F-test 4.48 4.98 9.62 7.82 
  BIC' 13.44 20.17 -14.92 1.47 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Thailand Passthrough Coefficient 2.573 2.269 2.195 1.769 
  Standard Error 0.226 0.258 0.257 0.256 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.168 0.166 0.178 0.117 
2.09E+10 Standard Error 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.746 -2.706 -2.499 -3.083 
  Standard Error 0.631 0.634 0.632 0.626 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0979 0.1029 0.1123 0.1509 
  F-test 59.60 36.39 31.37 32.98 
  BIC' -195.94 -187.92 -197.41 -273.34 
Turkey Passthrough Coefficient 1.063 0.988 0.925 0.707 
  Standard Error 0.138 0.168 0.169 0.304 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient -0.187 -0.214 -0.158 -0.149 
8.30E+09 Standard Error 0.131 0.136 0.137 0.137 
  Tariff Coefficient 3.015 3.110 3.070 2.754 
  Standard Error 1.904 1.903 1.899 1.920 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0379 0.0401 0.0448 0.0462 
  F-test 16.93 10.63 9.43 7.52 
  BIC' -36.97 -21.41 -16.70 0.15 
United Kingdom Passthrough Coefficient 0.160 0.405 0.136 1.041 
  Standard Error 0.529 0.617 0.617 0.737 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.688 0.689 0.695 0.675 
5.85E+10 Standard Error 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.064 
  Tariff Coefficient -4.757 -4.787 -4.897 -4.829 
  Standard Error 1.942 1.944 1.935 1.939 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0448 0.0442 0.0530 0.0540 
  F-test 32.01 18.44 17.44 13.56 
  BIC' -93.75 -71.22 -82.12 -64.13 
Uruguay Passthrough Coefficient 1.052 1.014 1.178 1.280 
  Standard Error 0.158 0.204 0.226 0.267 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.050 0.075 0.067 0.080 
6.79E+08 Standard Error 0.103 0.113 0.113 0.113 
  Tariff Coefficient -0.001 -0.006 0.011 -0.004 
  Standard Error 0.281 0.282 0.282 0.281 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0489 0.0457 0.0469 0.0642 
  F-test 11.31 6.48 5.38 5.59 
  BIC' -17.51 2.24 12.56 14.83 
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Table B.2 
 
Eq. 
2.10a 
Eq. 
2.10b 
Eq. 
2.10c Eq. B.11 
continued 
          
Vietnam Passthrough Coefficient -3.606 0.808 2.489 1.691 
  Standard Error 1.301 1.420 1.471 1.785 
Weight Price (US) Coefficient 0.116 0.099 0.088 0.092 
6.84E+09 Standard Error 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 
  Tariff Coefficient -2.196 -2.238 -2.288 -2.093 
  Standard Error 0.334 0.331 0.330 0.330 
  
       
  Adjusted R-squared 0.0644 0.1067 0.1172 0.1386 
  F-test 22.78 22.58 19.67 17.96 
  BIC' -59.74 -99.85 -102.61 -115.19 
 
Table B.3 
  
Equation B.13 - (57 Obs.) LHS is short-term  LHS is long-term  
Pass-through estimates are generated by Eq. B.12 pass-through estimate pass-through estimate 
  
 from Eq. B.6  from Eq. B.6 
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy -1.963* -1.918 
  (1.09) (1.66) 
Managed Float Dummy -0.316 -1.293* 
  (0.496) (0.755) 
EU Dummy -0.085 -0.211 
  (0.412) (0.628) 
Distance 0.0000505 0.0000148 
  (0.0000872) (0.0001329) 
Tariff Rate 0.877 8.398 
  (6.228) (9.487) 
Bid-Ask Spread -2.62 -141.39 
  (94.63) (144.15) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  39.8 -425.7 
  (759.0) (1156.0) 
GDP -0.566 0.247 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (1.378) (2.099) 
Per capita GDP 0.112 -0.599 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (0.708) (1.078) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.0584** 0.0694* 
(Exporting Country) (0.0227) (0.0346) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -98.15** -92.70* 
(Exporting Country) (30.78) (46.89) 
Quarterly Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  3.699 1.095 
(Exporting Country) (5.142) (7.832) 
Exporter's Share of Market 2.621 0.654 
  (3.197) (4.87) 
Cumulative IIT Index -0.235 0.528 
  (1.228) (1.871) 
Imputed Elasticity -0.994** -0.389 
(Cumulative good specific pass-through) (0.405) (0.617) 
Constant 1.314 1.216 
  (1.038) (1.582) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3083 0.2394 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. As 
the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more strict. 
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Table B.4 
      
  LHS  LHS  LHS  
Equation 2.11 - (45 Obs.) generated generated generated 
LHS = Country specific pass-through estimate by Eq. 2.10a by Eq. 2.10b by Eq. 2.10c 
  
      
Banded Exchange Rate Dummy -2.598 -2.205 -2.155 
  (3.476) (3.864) (3.538) 
Managed Float Dummy -0.367 0.536 0.164 
  (1.577) (1.753) (1.605) 
Distance 0.00014 0.00031 0.00034 
  (0.00028) (0.00031) (0.00028) 
Tariff Rate -4.554 -5.041 -1.117 
  (19.689) (21.886) (20.042) 
Bid-Ask Spread 581.3* 491.7 508.4 
  (302.4) (336.1) (307.8) 
Exchange Rate Volatility  1628.3 2786.8 3513.4 
  (2472.4) (2748.4) (2516.8) 
GDP -4.692 -7.019 -8.238* 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (4.524) (5.029) (4.605) 
Per capita GDP 5.099** 7.082** 7.434** 
(Exporting Country/U.S.) (2.362) (2.626) (2.405) 
Average Annual CPI Inflation (Long-Term) 0.037 0.0228 0.0047 
(Exporting Country) (0.077) (0.085) (0.078) 
Quarterly CPI growth volatility (Short-Term) -138.6 -166.3 -154.9 
(Exporting Country) (100.7) (111.9) (102.5) 
Quarterly Money growth Volatility (Long-Term)  51.02** 64.34** 62.96** 
(Exporting Country) (17.87) (19.86) (18.19) 
Exporter's Share of Market 14.44 21.48* 22.16* 
  (10.74) (11.94) (10.93) 
Cumulative IIT Index -6.65 -10.5* -11.19** 
  (4.783) (5.317) (4.869) 
Imputed Elasticity -7.246 -10.617 -10.568 
(Cumulative good specific pass-through) (3.543) (3.939) (3.607) 
Constant 3.699** 6.051** 6.061** 
  (4.531) (5.037) (4.612) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2223 0.2662 0.3547 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by * and ** respectively. As 
the regressions are weighted by the total value of each country's imports, the parameter values for significance are more strict. 
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Figure B.1 Pass-through rates from Eq. B.12 
HUN
VNM
NGA
KAZ
LKA
IND HRV SGP
RUS BEL
HUN
VNM
NGA
KAZ LKA
IND HRV
SGP
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Short-term
Long-term
 
PRT GBR
POL LUX SWE
ITA NLD
TUR ISR AUT
PRT GBR
POL LUX
ITA
NLD
TUR
ISR
AUT
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Short-term
Long-term
 
GHA NZL KOR DEU
URY PER TWN IDN
NOR EGY
GHA
NZL
KOR
DEU
URY
PER
TWN
IDN
NOR
EGY
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Short-term
Long-term
 
 
  167 
Figure B.1 Pass-through rates from Eq. B.12 
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Appendix C 
 
The dynamic model is calibrated so that each period represents one month.  As such, I 
allow the firm to choose a frequency of price adjustment from K = 1…23.  When K = 23, the 
firm’s price remains unchanged for 2 years.  The menu cost parameter, F, is .04 (the same as 
Devereux and Yetman (2005)).  The discount factor is consistent with monthly time 
periods, 99.=β .   
First, I generate three exchange rates according to the following process designed to 
imitate a random walk: 
jkikijtjktiktij
tiktiktik
tjktjktjk
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          (C.1) 
 The construction of )ln(
,tije  is designed to fulfill a “no arbitrage” condition.  The 
variances of the error terms, tik ,µ and tjk ,µ , are modeled in part after the variances of the 
US/Canada, US/Mexico and Mexico/Canada exchange rates as reported by International 
Financial Statistics.  Just as in Friberg (1998), I allow forward currency markets to be 
efficient so that the forward currency rate is equal to the expected value of the exchange rate 
one period forward.  In both Friberg’s paper and in this paper the effect of forward currency 
contracts is pronounced (as shown in Figure C.1).  Without forward currency contracts firms 
are much less likely to use LCP.  
The exporter’s wage, tjw , , is based on inflation, but will tend to be sticky depending 
on movements in the shadow wage tjw ,&&&
C1
.  The shadow wage is based on the randomly 
determined inflation rate in country j, jtpi .  The inflation rate is based on individual country 
                                                 
C1
 Choudhri, Faruqee and Hakura (2005) convinced me of the necessity of sticky wages. 
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data from International Financial Statistics and is modeled as a random walk.  The process 
for generating the wage is as follows: 
1,1, −−= tj
j
ttj ww &&&&&& pi   
if 1,, 05.1 −> tjtj ww&&&   then tjtj ww ,, &&&=      (C.2) 
else 1,, −= tjtj ww    
The parameter 1.05 demands that any increase in the wage be at least 5%.  The 
targeted price index in the importing country, itP , is determined by Eq. 3.5 which is 
reproduced below. 
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The variance of vt is calibrated to the variance of several U.S. price indexes which 
display a random walk. 
The firm’s profit and price are calculated as given in Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.5.  I average 
the exporting firm’s profit over three trials to find the final results. 
In the baseline model, the values ofα are .2, .4, .6, .8 and 1. Values of λ are 1.1, 3.5, 
5, 6.5 and 8. Meanwhile the values given to 
ij
jk
ij
ik
τ
τ
τ
τ
=  are .05, .1 and .2.  The initial 
wage, 0,jw , takes the values of 10, 50 and 250. ijδ
 
and ikδ  each take the values of 0, .25, .5, 
.75 and 1. With these values there are a total of 625,5553355 =×××××  possible 
combinations and as a result the model tests 5,625 hypothetical industries. 
For the high importer/exporter exchange rate volatility model, the exogenous 
variables are the same as the baseline model.  However Eq. C.1 is changed to include a 
normally distributed random variable as shown below: 
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The variance of tε  is set to .6: making the variance of 
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 The high vehicle/exporter exchange rate volatility model also has the same set values 
of the exogenous variables from the baseline model.  Eq. C.4 is changed so that the third 
equation generates )ln(
,tjke instead of )ln( ,tije .  The variance of tε is set to .16: making the 
variance of 








−1,
,ln
tjk
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e
e
 roughly four times greater than the average variance of 
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and 
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. 
The full MATLAB model used in this paper may be found at www.unc.edu/~witte  
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Table C.1 
Variables in the model and their descriptions 
Variable 
Symbol 
Variable Name Variable Type 
tijq ,  Quantity sold of a good by a firm  Endogenous 
i
tijp ,  Price of good produced by a firm, denominated in currency i 
Endogenous 
i
tP  Price index in country i Exogenous-dynamic 
tije ,  Exchange rate, currency of country i per one 
unit of currency j 
Exogenous-dynamic 
tjkf ,  Forward rate, currency of country j per one 
unit of currency k 
Exogenous-dynamic 
λ  Elasticity of substitution for the firm’s good Exogenous-static 
ijτ  Transaction cost for exchanging currency i 
for currency j, or vice versa 
Exogenous-static 
α  Returns to scale for the firm’s production 
technology 
Exogenous-static 
tL  Labor input Endogenous 
tjw ,  Wage in country j Exogenous-dynamic 
LeK  Optimal Frequency of price adjustment, (in 
this case for LCP and no forward contracts) 
Endogenous 
IPCP Indicator variable, denotes that the firm is 
using PCP 
Endogenous 
IF Indicator variable, denotes that the firm is 
using forward currency contracts 
Endogenous 
kf
tpi  Maximum profit from using VCP (denominating in currency k) and using 
forward contracts 
Endogenous 
F  Menu cost Exogenous-static 
β  Discount factor Exogenous-static 
ijδ  Pass-through rate of currency j to the price 
index in country i 
Exogenous-static 
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Figure C.1  
Effect of forward currency contracts on optimal invoicing currency 
Optimal invoicing currency without forward currency contracts
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Note: In the top graph representative firms are not allowed to engage in forward currency 
contracts.  In the lower graph firms can choose whether or not to use forward currency 
contracts.
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